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THE  
RULE  
OF  
CATHOLIC FAITH.

1840

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THE  
**RULE**  
*OF Rev. Thos. J. Bogan*  
**CATHOLIC FAITH;**

OR, THE  
**Principles and Doctrines**

OF THE  
**CATHOLIC CHURCH,**  
DISCRIMINATED FROM THE OPINIONS OF THE SCHOOLS,

AND FROM  
**POPULAR ERRORS AND MIS-STATEMENTS.**

*By Francis Veron. 1575-164*  
TRANSLATED BY THE  
**REV. J. WATERWORTH, M. A.**

**BIRMINGHAM :**

Printed and Published by R. P. Stone, 5, Cherry Street,



BOOKER, AND KEATING AND BROWN, LONDON; ROCKLIFFE AND DUCKWORTH, LIVERPOOL;  
WILLIAMS, CHELTENHAM; SCULLY, DUBLIN; LYNCH, MANCHESTER; AND BRIDGEN,  
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The history of the United States is a story of the struggle for freedom and justice. It is a story of the people who have fought for the rights of the oppressed and the weak. It is a story of the men and women who have sacrificed their lives for the cause of liberty. It is a story of the great ideas and principles that have shaped our nation. It is a story of the triumph of the human spirit over adversity and oppression. It is a story of the hope and faith that have sustained us through the darkest of times. It is a story of the love and compassion that have brought us together as a people. It is a story of the courage and determination that have made us a nation of the free. It is a story of the dreams and aspirations that have driven us to create a better world for ourselves and for future generations. It is a story of the power of the human mind and the strength of the human will. It is a story of the beauty and wonder of the human experience. It is a story of the glory and honor of the American people. It is a story of the greatness of the United States of America.

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## TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

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THE authority of the following treatise of Veron is well-known, and universally acknowledged. The Translation is from the Latin edition of the work, which is much more complete and satisfactory, than the original French, as it first came from the pen of the Author. Of the latter, a Translation has already appeared in our language, printed at Paris, in 1660, with only the initials of the Translator's name, which, I have reason to believe, was Edward Sheldon. But there is such a dissimilarity between the two works, that they may almost be considered as two distinct publications. The edition, which I have followed, is that which Hooke has appended to his Treatise on the Church.

The object of the work is to draw a distinct line between the doctrines of the Catholic Church, and the opinions advanced by Catholic Theologians, on the erroneous tenets ascribed to us by writers of other persuasions. This the Author executes in a masterly manner. His plan is simple, but must, I think, prove highly satisfactory to any one, who sincerely wishes to know the real tenets of our Church.

If this Translation tend in any degree to weaken, or remove prejudice, or to correct mis-statements,—

much, if not the whole of the merit is due to Lord Dormer, without whose assistance, this Translation would, probably, never have seen the light. I am aware, that, in a work of this kind, which is replete with quotations from the writings of the schoolmen, which it demands no ordinary study to comprehend, many errors, or inaccuracies may have crept into the Translation, I shall, therefore, deem it a favor to have them fairly stated.



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THE  
CATALOGUE  
OF THE  
RULES OF THE  
COURT

OF THE  
COURT OF COMMONS

1841.

BY  
J. H. B. B. B.

It is the duty of the Court to see that the Rules of the Court are duly observed, and that the same are not violated. The Court has the honor to inform you that the Rules of the Court are now in force, and that the same are to be observed by all persons who are admitted to the Court. The Court has the honor to inform you that the Rules of the Court are now in force, and that the same are to be observed by all persons who are admitted to the Court.

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# THE CATHOLIC RULE OF FAITH.

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## CHAP. I.

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### § 1.

#### RULE OF FAITH.

*That, and that only, is an Article of Catholic Faith, which has been revealed in the word of God, and proposed, by the Catholic Church, to all her children, as necessary to be believed with divine faith.* Whether a doctrine be *proposed* by a General Council, and confirmed by its definitive decree ; or rest on the universal agreement of the faithful, its authority is the same.

The above rule comprises two parts ; the first requiring that a doctrine, to be received as an Article of Faith, be revealed by Almighty God,—for, *Faith*, says St. Paul, (Rom. x. 17) *cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ* ;—and the second, that it be taught by the Church, either in her General Councils, by an express and definitive decree ; or practically confirmed by the unanimous assent of the pastors of the Church, and the faithful.

This, in fact, is clearly implied by the words “ Catholic Faith : ”—for, by *divine faith*, is understood, *the belief of any doctrine on account of the divine authority that has revealed it* : since every act of divine faith resolves itself, in the *last analysis*, into the authority and veracity of God. But the doctrines of Christianity are *proposed* to our belief, either by those whom Christ commissioned to that office, the pastors of the church assembled in a General Council, or are received in virtue of the manifest agreement of the whole body of the faithful. There can be no obligation, at least for the faithful as a body, to believe any doctrine that is not based on this evidence, and proposed in this manner.

To prevent being misunderstood, I shall call doctrines of this class, articles of *Catholic Faith*. I substitute the word *Catholic* for the more usual term *divine* faith, because many writers have applied the latter to debatable doctrines, to doctrines which some Theologians assert, and others deny are necessary to be believed. The very existence of such a dispute, shews, that even they who most strenuously contend, that the doctrines in question are to be believed, on the authority of God, do not use the phrase in its strict sense; since those who refuse to receive them as articles of faith, are not *thereby considered as Heretics, deprived of the sacraments, or separated from the communion of the church*. It is the intention of the present pages to enquire, what doctrines are articles of *Catholic Faith, strictly so called*; to confine the question to that Faith of which St. Paul says, *with the heart, we believe unto justice; but with the mouth, confession is made unto salvation.*—(Rom. x. 10.) I shall treat in a word, of that faith, the profession of which constitutes us members of the *one fold*, and is required from all who abandon their errors, which alone is professed by the church in her creeds, and must be subscribed alike by the Catholic, and the convert to Catholicity. This is the faith which *with the heart we believe, and with the mouth confess*; from which are excluded all controverted questions, leaving these to be defended, or impugned by Theologians, and the schools.

The above rule and principles are laid down, and acted upon by all our councils, by the fathers of the church, and by the whole body of Theologians. Accordingly, those only have been, and are still considered Heretics, who have chosen to hold opinions, on points of this vital character, opposed to the belief clearly embraced by the agreement of the Universal Church, or the decrees of her General Councils. Such persons condemn themselves by preferring their own private opinion and judgment, to that of the Universal Church.

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## EXPLANATION OF THE FOREGOING RULE.

For any doctrine to be an article of Catholic Faith, two things are conjointly necessary:—first, that the doctrine be revealed by Almighty God, by the mouth of his prophets or apostles, or contained in the inspired writings that form the canon of scripture; and, secondly, that it be proposed to the belief of the faithful by the church. A doctrine invested with these two conditions must be believed with divine, and Catholic faith. But it no longer belongs to this heavenly deposit, if either of these conditions fail;—namely, if it have not been revealed, or not been propounded by the church. The second condition, however, presupposes the first;—for, as Christ promised his church the assistance of his Holy Spirit to teach her, and lead her into all truth, it is impossible,—unless, as they cannot, these promises fail,—that this heavenly guided church can ever propose any thing as revealed, which has really not been so. However, a doctrine, although actually revealed by the Almighty, and contained, but in an obscure manner, in the holy scriptures, may, as yet, not have been *proposed* by the church. In this case, though something has been revealed, still, we require an interpreter to explain the precise meaning of the revelation; and, as the church has not hitherto declared the sense of the inspired words, or unfolded her stores of tradition, nothing can be said to be positively defined on the subject. Various and conflicting opinions may be advanced; but until the church has spoken, none of these opinions have any claim to be considered as a part of *Catholic* faith. It is upon this principle that fresh decrees on doctrinal points, have been made by our General Councils, and received by the Universal Church:—for instance, the Council of Nice defined that baptism, although administered by a heretic, or a person not a member of the true church, was valid, and ought not to be repeated. On this controversy, St. Austin observes;\* that as “this question appeared doubtful to the bishops of the last century, and opposite opinions were main-

\* S. Aug. Lib. I. contra Crescon. cap. 32. Tom. 7, p. 168, col. ii.



tained ; though without causing any breach of unity, it was resolved (at the Council of Nice, can. 8) that our present practice should alone be followed, throughout the Catholic Church."

### § 3.

#### CONSEQUENCES TO BE DRAWN FROM THE ABOVE RULE.

1. As nothing is an article of Catholic Faith, which has not been revealed, and communicated to us by the prophets, or apostles, or canonical writers, it follows that *no revelation made to any saint, since the time of the apostles, can be an article of our faith*, though ascribed to an Ambrose, or a Cyprian, or to any other servant of God however holy, or however near to the apostolic age, or however modern. Many revelations are, indeed, recorded in the lives of the saints, who are honoured by the church ; as in those of Saint Catharine of Sienna, St. Bridget, &c. ; and some have even received the sanction of General Councils ;\* but, respectable as is such an authority, these visions, and spiritual communications do not, on that account, challenge our belief as articles of faith. And the reason is, that these revelations were not made, either to the prophets, or apostles, or canonical writers. The faith, consequently, with which they can be received is merely *human*, since we acknowledge no divine authority in the writers that relate them. Our belief in these revelations, is, therefore, weak or firm, doubtful or certain, according to the weight of evidence in their favor,—proportioned, in a word, to the credibility of the vouchers. This is frequently low indeed, and, by examining the circumstances that are said to have accompanied these revelations, &c., these revelations are often found deserving of little or no credit. Yet, surely, if we believe profane historians, such as Suetonius, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, &c., sound criticism requires us to yield an equal, or rather a firmer assent, to the relations of writers of greater weight, and authority.

2. *No doctrine, delivered since the time of the apostles, can be an article of our Faith, though even miracles have*

\* Vid. second Council of Nice, Iabb. Tom. 7, pp. 266, 267, &c.

*been performed to confirm it ; nor is it an article of our Faith that any of these miracles are really genuine.* This is true, however respectable may be the authors that record them. Thus, though many miracles are related by St. Austin,\* St. Gregory, and other writers of equal authority, as having been actually performed before their own eyes ; and though others are reported in the Bulls of Canonization published by the Bishop of Rome ; whilst some are not only related, but are declared authentic by General Councils,—as in the second Council of Nice ; still they do not form any part of Catholic Faith. And this for the reasons assigned in the first corollary ;—these miracles were not performed, nor related by prophets or apostles, and, consequently they cannot form an article of Catholic Faith, nor can any such article be built upon them.

The lives of the saints are, indeed, full of miraculous relations, some evidently false, and others deserving of little credit. We have many instances of the first kind, in the lives written by *Jacobus a Voragine*, and *Metaphrast*, especially in their accounts of St. George, St. Ursula, &c. *Bellarmin*,† and *Baronius*,‡ both make the same observation. Still, after all proper deductions have been made, we shall find, if we apply to them the ordinary rules of criticism, that, almost all, or, at least, the far greater part of the miracles ascribed to the saints must be pronounced genuine. For if, as has been already observed, it would be considered rash, and foolishly sceptical to refuse to believe the accounts left us by *Suetonius*, &c. and to deny that the battles, which he describes, were ever fought, or that his facts are true ; surely it would be an equal, if not a greater, act of folly, to reject, at once, as false and ridiculous, all the miracles recorded by writers of the most acknowledged veracity and greatest weight,—some of whom, and, amongst these, St. Austin, declare, that they were eye-witnesses to many of the miracles, which they relate. But, of course, we believe these miracles with a merely human faith, nor do we pretend to rest our belief

\* S. Aug. De civitate Dei Lib. 22, cap. 8, p. 296. Tom. 5.

† Bellarm. de Scriptor. Eccles. in Metaphr. pag. 266.

‡ Baron. in Martyrol. ad eorum festa.

in any revealed truth upon them, nor is any doctrine of Catholic Faith believed on their authority. It cannot, however, be denied, that many doctrines have unquestionably been confirmed by them; and they may thus, in some, though in a very modified sense, be said to bring with them a revelation from heaven. St. Paul (Epis. Hebr. ii 3, 4) argues on this principle, "How shall we escape," says he, "if we neglect so great salvation? Which having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed unto us, by them that heard *him*. God also bearing them witness by signs, and wonders, and divers miracles, and distributions of the Holy Ghost, according to his own will." And St. Mark also, (xvi. 20) "But they, going forth, preached everywhere: the Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed." In this sense a miracle may be said to be the voice and word of God; but, *it is impossible for God to lie*, (Hebr. vi. 18) in whatever manner he is pleased to communicate his will to man. So that the evidence in favour of a doctrine confirmed by miracles, subsequently to the time of the apostles, is proportioned to the degree of credibility due to the evidence, on which those miracles rest. This, as usual, is exceedingly various;—at one time amounting to certainty, at another to probability, and, sometimes, not even to this; according to the character of the relators, and their means of information. It is deserving of being again noticed, that some of these writers were themselves eye-witnesses,—and witnesses of no ordinary character,—as an Austin, a Gregory, &c. whilst some miracles are also related by them on the testimony of others. To illustrate what has been said by an example. It is an article of Catholic Faith, *that the relics of the saints are deserving of respect*. The truth of this doctrine is *most powerfully* confirmed by the undeniable miracles related by St. Austin,\* as having been performed by the relics of St. Stephen, to which he himself was an eye-witness; those recorded by him and St. Gregory, as having been related to them by others, are of *less force*, but still furnish a *probable* argument; whilst, as many of the miracles related by Metaphrast, and De Voragine are deserving of little credit, they

\* S. Aug. l. c.



furnish *little or no* evidence in confirmation of any doctrine. Baronius \* passes the following just censure on these two last writers. "We have the acts of St. George edited by Metaphrast, and I am far from approving or receiving the legend about Athanasius, the magician. I have also looked into the *legends of the saints* by Jacobus de Voragine, and find much in them to correct." Bellarmin † makes a similar remark, at least on Metaphrast. "Metaphrast has left us the lives of many saints, which he has disfigured with numerous fictions, and stories drawn purely from his own fancy. He relates numerous miracles, and those, too, of a most extraordinary kind, as having happened at the destruction of Pagan temples and idols, of which we find not one word in any old writer." But, even granting that the miracles are proved to be clearly genuine, no article of faith can be grounded on them, *since they were not performed, nor is the account of them transmitted to us, by the inspired prophets and apostles*. Moreover they are not, generally at least, proposed and received by the Universal Church, to which alone Christ promised immunity from error. Accordingly, our belief in them is purely human, and proportioned to the credibility and character of the writers, who record them, who were all fallible men. This belief differs widely from that, which we yield to articles of Catholic Faith, and of which alone we are here treating.

But what are we to call the assent yielded to a doctrine on the authority of these *private* revelations, as contradistinguished from those made to the prophets and apostles, and contained in the sacred writings? Is it merely human, or may it not be divine, in as much as it seems to be elicited, and to rest on the authority of divine revelation, not indeed confirmed by the written or unwritten word of God, nor authoritatively proposed by the Universal Church; but, certified by human testimony, and the relation of fallible men? This is a purely problematical question, and as such is a very different thing from the articles of our faith, which are now our only concern. But, if called on for an opinion, I

\* Baronius in Martyr. 23 Aprilis. pag. 171. col. 1.

† Bellarm. de Scriptor. Eccles. anno 850. p.

should say, that very probably such a belief is not divine, but purely human ; since it rests on, and resolves itself into, the purely human authority of a certain number of fallible writers. The whole evidence being purely human, the assent yielded does not even amount to what is called Theological Faith, and, consequently, is very far indeed from being a divine or Catholic Faith.

3. *No doctrine is an article of Catholic Faith, which is grounded on texts of scripture, which have been interpreted in various senses by the holy fathers, or, are still differently explained by our best, and most learned modern Theologians.* For, in this case, both the elements which constitute the Catholic Rule of Faith, are wanting. First, it is not clear that the doctrine in question has been revealed ; nor secondly, can any interpretation of the contested texts be said to be approved of by the Universal Church ; as is evident from the very variety of explanations supposed to exist. However, although it be true, that when different opinions exist in the church as to the precise doctrine to be drawn from certain passages of scripture, no interpretation of these passages can be called Catholic ; still, it must be observed, that when the holy fathers, in their explanations of the sacred text, agree in deducing, and teaching one and the same doctrine, though from different passages of scripture, their unanimous consent on this point of doctrine, must not only be considered as expressive of the belief of the church, but also, as having its foundation in the revealed word of God, though not grounded on this or that particular passage.

4. *We do not admit as an article of Catholic Faith, any consequence, however certain, or however logically deduced from premises, one of which is of faith, and the other clear by the mere light of reason.* There are two insuperable objections against any doctrine of this character being classed among our articles of faith. The first is, *that it has not been revealed*, for, “*faith*,” says St. Paul, “*cometh by hearing : and hearing, by the word of Christ.*”—(Rom. x. 17) but deductions, however clear they may seem, from scriptural truths ; are not mentioned in the sacred writings as a part of the word of God. But, as every such consequence is contained *virtually* in the premises, the deductions, from



scriptural propositions, of which we are speaking, though they cannot be considered as formal, or express articles of Catholic belief, virtually, at least, form a part of that sacred deposit. In a word, the principle only is an article of faith, and from it the mind deduces, as a necessary and clear consequence, a doctrine, which it receives, not indeed with a divine, but with a firm and unhesitating faith. The consequence drawn may be as evident and certain as any doctrine can possibly be supposed to be, still, much that is merely human goes to its formation, both in the necessary train of argument,—which is often mixed with something purely philosophical,—and in the comparison and reunion of the ideas contained in the premises, without which, it is obvious, no conclusion can be drawn. So that, considered as a whole, the process is far from being supernatural, and, consequently, the doctrine elicited can, by no means, be called divine. In the schools, if the premises be both undeniable, a consequence deduced from them is called a *theological conclusion*; if one or both of them, as is generally the case, be doubtful, it is called a *problematical opinion*; but, if one of the premises, or the form of argumentation be false and sophistical, the deduction is, naturally, called *false*. Most of the scholastic opinions, which have, so long, divided and tortured the schoolmen, belong to this last class. It may be as well to notice, that there is a diversity of opinion both among Catholic and Protestant writers, on the question, whether *theological conclusions from scriptural propositions are articles of faith*. Catholics, as well as Protestants, assert that they are; others, of both parties, deny it as warmly. Vego and Melchior Canus, among Catholic writers, support the affirmative, but, as even Daillé grants,\* many theologians of the same faith defend the negative of the question. Some take a middle course, and distinguish between deductions from *two scriptural premises*,—and these they assert to be of faith,—and conclusions drawn from two premises, one of which only is a scriptural proposition, and the other self-evident, and these, according to these writers, are not of faith. Vasquez† agrees with none of the above opinions, and proposes another

\* Daillé in Fid. fund. part. 1. p. 28.    † Vasquez, 1 p. d. 12. a. 8. c. 2.

of his own. According to him, our assent to a *theological conclusion* considered as resulting, by the common laws of argument, from premises, one of which is revealed, and the other self-evident, is not an act of divine faith; but, inasmuch as a conclusion, virtually divine, is clearly contained in such premises, though this is discovered, or rather proposed to the understanding by ratio-cination, our belief may be said to be an act of divine faith. This variety of opinion shews clearly that, amongst Catholics at least, *it is, at most, only a probable opinion that deductions from articles of faith, are also of faith.* All are, consequently, agreed that they are not articles of *Catholic* faith; and that *no one, therefore, would be a Heretic, who should choose to deny that they form a part of the deposit of faith.* To assert the contrary, would be to expose oneself to the charge of dangerous and presumptuous innovations in faith;—we should ourselves incur the guilt of broaching new doctrines; and by the very fact of condemning others, be deserving of the strongest condemnation, and the severest censures of the Church. It must, then, be laid down as a certain and undeniable position, that *theological conclusions are not articles of Catholic faith.* I have said that a similar difference of opinion is found amongst Protestant writers. Osiander, Chemniz, and, in fact, a great majority of the ablest Lutheran divines, do not receive them as articles of faith. Even Vedel \* acknowledges this, though himself a strenuous supporter of the contrary opinion. His whole work, in fact, goes upon this principle. He is followed, or rather copied, by Daillé, and a few other Calvinists, although, in general, the Dissenting Churches agree with the Lutherans. There is not a word on the subject in the Calvinistic confession of faith, so that the opinion of these writers cannot be considered as that of their church. Moreover, as they consider the Lutherans, who differ from them on this point, as brothers in faith, and the cause of reformation, I cannot see clearly with what consistency these writers could lay this down as a fundamental principle of controversy. Surely the Calvinists, who adopt this principle, and yet act as I have stated, cannot possibly expect

\* Vedel. *Rationale Theologicum.*

that much security can be felt by their readers in the truth of doctrines built on so insecure a basis.

There is, also, a second defect, which alone would suffice to hinder the opinion, that theological conclusions are articles of faith, from ever being considered, by Catholics at least, as a necessary part of Catholic belief. This opinion has never been *proposed* to the belief of the Universal Church. This is granted on all hands:—as it is neither found in clear and express words in Scripture; nor has it been taught by any General Council. It is, therefore, a question open to debate; since, so long as a doctrine has not been propounded by a competent authority, no one is bound to receive it as divinely revealed. And, as far as other dissenting churches are concerned, although some of their writers have chosen to call it a fundamental and essential doctrine, there is no public, or authoritative decision, in any of their confessions of faith, to authorise, or give weight to their opinions. We are justified, at all events, in coming to this conclusion, that, *this opinion is no article of Catholic faith.*

#### § 4.

*Other doctrines not articles of Catholic faith, because not revealed, or not proposed by the Church, or because both these conditions are wanting.*

1. *No doctrine is to be considered an article of Catholic faith, on the authority of Gratian's Decretal:* that is to say, no opinion is to be received as of faith, merely because it is found in that Decretal. This observation deserves particular attention, as Du Moulin, and other writers of the same stamp, have had the effrontery to assert, *that whatever is contained in that Decretal is an article of our Faith.* Their object was manifestly, merely to find something fresh to condemn in the Catholic Church. But, surely, one religious is not the Universal Church! Nor did Gregory XIII., or any other Pope, much less a General Council, in approving of this Decretal, ever declare that its contents were to be received as articles of Catholic faith. So far from this being the case, it is, really, no very difficult matter to detect mistakes in it of no small importance, such as false quotations,



errors in chronology, &c. Almost at the outset of his work, we find him quoting from St. Isidore's "Books on Etymology," so little connexion has the matter before him with articles of faith. We also meet, almost in the same place, with these titles to his sections:—*What is civil law—what military,—and what is meant by the tribunitial laws?* What has this to do with articles of faith?

2. *No Decretals of the Roman Pontiffs, which form the body of Canon Law;—as the Six Books of Decretals, the Clementines, Extravagantes, &c;—no Bulls issued, more recently than these Decretals, by the successors of St. Peter, are of sufficient authority to prove any doctrine an article of Catholic Faith.* No doctrine is of faith because it happens to have been taught by the Pope in one of the above mentioned works. The reason is clear. The Pope, in whatever character, or however solemnly he may give his opinion, even in scholastic phraseology, *ex cathedra*, is not the universal church, and, consequently, whatever may be his private opinion, and however declared, such opinion is not, on that account, propounded by the Catholic Church as an article of her belief. And, observe, that this is so clearly acknowledged by all theologians, that any one that should presume to advance a contrary opinion, would be an innovator, and expose himself to the censures of the Church, as a broacher of new doctrine. This may be shewn even from Bellarmin, where he cites the three opinions that have been advanced by Catholic writers, on the authority of doctrinal decisions emanating from the Pope. He says,\* "The first opinion is, that the Pope, even speaking as the successor of St. Peter, or as Pope, may teach heresy, when he takes upon himself to define anything, without the concurrence of a General Council; and even be an actual and formal heretic. This, it is asserted, has really happened. Gerson, Almain, and several other French theologians have maintained this opinion, which was also defended by Alphonsus de Castro and Pope Adrian VI. All these writers placed the infallibility of the Church, in matters of faith, not in the Pope, but in the Uni-

\* Bellarm. Lib. 4. de Pont. Rom. cap. 2. p. 209. Tom. 1. Colon. Agrip. an. 1628.

versal Church, or rather, in a General Council. A second opinion runs to the opposite extreme, and asserts, that the Pope can, under no circumstances, be a heretic, nor publicly advance an heretical opinion, even, though alone and unadvised, he teach a particular doctrine. The third opinion takes a middle course, and teaches that, whether the Pope can be a heretic or not, he cannot, at least, in any case, propose an heretical opinion, and direct it to be received by the Universal Church. This opinion is by far the most common, and is supported by the great body of Catholic writers, as by St. Thomas, Cajetan, &c. As the supporters of the first opinion are still tolerated by the church, they cannot, strictly speaking, be called heretics ; still the opinion seems clearly erroneous, and but little removed from actual heresy. The second opinion is probable, though not certain. The third is by far the most probable, and ought to be embraced by all Catholics." These are Bellarmin's own words, and I have given the passage entire, to shew how unjustly many persons are calumniated as heretics for asserting, that *it is not of faith that the decisions of the Roman Pontiffs even ex-cathedra, when unsupported by a General Council, are articles of Catholic faith.* This, let it be observed, is clear from Bellarmin's words, and what is more, is the unanimous opinion of all Catholic divines. Bellarmin expressly acknowledges that "they cannot be called heretics." So far I agree with him ; but I cannot when he says "that the first seems an erroneous opinion, and but little removed from actual heresy." It is but just to notice that the word "seems," used by Bellarmin, in the above quotation, implies that he said this with a degree of doubt and hesitation. But this censure does not seem to all Catholics, at all called for,—to many of whom it rather seems rash and imprudent to pronounce an opinion erroneous, and nearly heretical, which has such names as Gerson, Almain, and Adrian in its favour. In fact, it is clear, from Bellarmin himself, that *"it has never been defined by the church that the Pope is infallible, when unassisted by a General Council,* nor that any doctrine advanced and proposed by him, is, in consequence of such proposal, an article of Catholic faith. All divines, consequently, are agreed, as Bellarmin allows, that Papal Infallibility is no doctrine of

the Catholic Church :—and this is all that I have asserted, and is certain beyond all controversy. It would have been well if all writers had taken time to form a more correct judgment on this subject.

It is quite beyond the object of this present work to enter into any explanation of my own sentiments on the three opinions stated above. Although the third, without however, in the least, censuring the first, may be the one which I am most inclined to favour; still, as my object is, by carefully separating what is of faith from what is not, to render the road to truth less difficult for those who have strayed from it, I shall abstain from an enquiry which might involve me in useless discussion. But, I wish it to be clearly understood, as many writers have not correct notions on this point, that we do not say *that the doctrinal decisions of the Pope are not of faith*, but merely, and I again repeat it, *that they are not articles of CATHOLIC Faith*;—in other words, the infallibility of the Pope is not one of those articles which all are bound to profess if they wish to continue, or to become Catholics; or one, *the contrary to which would be heretical, and separate, at once, him who should maintain it, from the communion of the Church*. Still, undoubted as this is, all Catholic writers agree that the opinions of the Pope, though he may merely have been assisted by his private council, or have even simply expressed his private sentiment, in reply to questions from other prelates, are of *great weight*; of *greater* when sanctioned by a provincial synod; and of *paramount weight and importance* when proposed *ex-cathedra*, either with the consent of his private, or of a provincial council. Indeed it would be highly rash to hold a different opinion from one sanctioned by this authority.

I hope, that, in future, after this statement, certain writers will be more cautious in condemning others. These theologians, in their eagerness to condemn others of heresy, have exposed themselves to the merited censures of the church by introducing the new and unheard of dogma, that the decisions of Sovereign Pontiffs, *ex-cathedra*, unsupported by a general council, are articles of Catholic Faith, and as such, are to be received by all Catholics under the grievous penalty of heresy. Such writers surely laboured under a mental



hallucinatio;—they must have fallen into error through their own wilful blindness;—thus to denounce censures so hastily and unreasonably, is a proof that the mind and judgment were rather injured than in error. They fancied, accordingly, that many writers said things of which they never even dreamed. But to return to the question,—namely, the authority of the Decretals which constitute the Canon Law. Why Bellarmin even does not hesitate to acknowledge that they contain many erroneous opinions! For instance, when the centuriators of Magdeburg, in their life of Gregory III. accuse that Pontiff of allowing a certain person to marry again, whose first wife was incapable, by disease, of rendering the marriage debt,—though such a permission, as Gratian had already observed, is contrary to the gospel,—Bellarmin gives this answer,\* “It might, also, be said that the Pope erred, through ignorance, which we grant may happen when he does not positively define anything as an article of Catholic Faith, but merely states his own private opinion to another who has asked it, as Gregory seems to have done in the case before us.” Now let us apply this principle to the rest of the Decretals, and, it will be soon perceived that they cannot possibly have any claim to establish articles of Catholic Faith. When pressed by a difficulty, or an opinion drawn from this source, we have only to answer with Bellarmin, “that the Pope did not mean to propose the doctrine objected, as an article of Faith, but simply to state his own private opinion.” This, it is obvious, is no ground for an article of Faith, much less of *Catholic* Faith.

It may be as well to enter into a few details as to the nature of these Decretals. The greatest part of them are merely regulations to direct the sitting officer in the episcopal court in his decisions; there are also a variety of instructions on the collation of benefices, as principles by which all disputes on this subject are to be settled. Now, what has all this to do with Faith? Articles of Faith are evidently of a very different nature. Moreover, many, in fact, most of these decisions are answers to individuals, and not proposed to the Universal Church; and it is granted, on all hands,

\* Bellarm. Lib. 4. de Pont. Rom. cap. 12. p. 219. col. 1.

that the Pope is liable to error in private answers of the above character; and that such answers are not a sufficient ground on which to establish an article of Faith, much less of sufficient authority to establish an article of *Catholic Faith*.

Of course, as the answers contained in these Decretals are numerous, they are naturally a fertile source of dispute. However, the general principle laid down above as to their authority, cuts off, at once, a multitude of difficulties, which have been collected by our adversaries from Gratian, the Decretals, Papal Bulls, &c.—in a word, from the whole body of Canon Law. These writers, by tacking together whatever seemed to make for their point,—by favouring us also with their own glosses, contrive to give these Decretals quite a contrary meaning, to what they were originally intended to convey. And this, they triumphantly assert, is our faith, the faith of the Catholic Church; and this they attack with all possible gravity. Volumes swell upon volumes, whilst Catholics are as busy, on their side, in composing as many in answer. But the method traced above is far more compendious, and is a safe and valuable way of bringing back to the Catholic fold, those who have wandered from the true Church. It consists in these few words,—*nothing of all this is matter of Catholic faith*, nothing, accordingly, of all this is to be found in the professions of faith, which we propose to those, who return to the bosom of the Church.

3. *No decision of a Provincial Council, though the Pope preside at it, personally, or by his Legates, is an article of Catholic Faith.* In fact, such Council is not the Universal Church, and, consequently, the doctrine proposed by it, is not, thereby, proposed by the Universal Church, and is not, consequently, an article of Catholic Faith. It would, however, become such, if the opinion of the Church were clearly shewn, from proper sources, to have been pronounced in its favour; as was the case with many decisions passed, in what are called, by St. Austin, the *regionary councils*, against the doctrines of Pelagius, and other heretics. We have an instance of this kind in the council of Meelah,\* in Numidia,

\* Tom. I. Concil. p. 630, 753, &c.



held under Innocent I. The principle laid down in this third corollary, may be proved from the passage of Bellarmin, quoted above, in which he gives the three opinions advanced by Catholic writers on Papal Infallibility. The reader would do well to consult the passage, and to read my observations on it.

However, as the authority, both of the Pope and of Provincial Councils, is very great, their decisions are to be received with a corresponding respect. Nor is less attention due, to doctrines which have been clearly confirmed by miracles and revelations, of which I have treated above, provided always, this supernatural agency can be proved by satisfactory evidence.

4. *Nor are all practices of the Church, even of the universal Church, a sufficient ground for an article of Catholic Faith.* This is clear, since the second condition of the rule of Faith is wanting:—these practices do not propose a doctrine to be believed, but a custom to be observed. Nor, to justify the church in adopting a particular practice, is it at all necessary to be shewn that such practice is clearly good and commendable; it is sufficient if it be probably such. Hence the church may make what alterations she pleases in these observances, resting, as they do, on merely human and probable grounds. We are, of course justified in accommodating our practice to these changes, and even in embracing a quite contrary practice, provided it can be shewn to have as probable evidence in its favour. The correctness of this principle I will prove by an extract from Vasquez. This writer\* first shews “that, from the very nature of the sacrifice of the Mass, and by divine institution, it cannot, and indeed never could, be offered up, for those who have not received the sacrament of baptism. It, of course, made no difference, whether the unbaptized had been received as Catechumens, or were still purely Pagans or Jews. There was no difficulty, it must be observed, in offering up public prayers for them, as is still practised by the church.” He then objects against this doctrine, the practice once actually received in the church, as he clearly proves from the Roman Ordo,\* of

\* Vasquez, 3. par. Disp. 227. cap. 3.

+ Ordo Rom. c. 20.

offering up the holy sacrifice for Catechumens. To this he gives, among others, the following answer:—"But, after all, this solution might be given—The church has always approved, both in her doctrine and practice, of certain and undoubted opinions only, in every thing connected with the essence and substance of the Sacraments; but, in matters purely accidental, and ceremonial, she has sometimes followed, in her observances, an opinion, which, at best, was merely probable, without proposing it, however, in any way, as an article of her faith. Hence mass, by the direction of the Pope, was, at one time, offered up for Catechumens, though this practice is now no longer tolerated. In fact, no public prayers even, are now prescribed to be said for them, except on Good Friday, on which day the sacrifice of the mass is not celebrated." He adds, a little later, that "we cannot be surprised, that the church, formerly embracing the opinion, which was then probable, that mass might be offered up for Catechumens, should have actually celebrated it for them, or, that she should now have abandoned that practice." To this may be added an excellent observation of Bellarmin.\*—"The decrees of (general) councils do not stand in need of the approbation of the faithful, as they do not derive their authority and certainty from them; but decrees on matters of discipline, unless received by the church, may be gradually modified, or even abrogated by a custom, at which the Pope tacitly connives, because such decrees are, from their very nature, liable to change; and when the Pope is silent, though he knows that they have, for a long time not been observed, he is considered to have actually abrogated them. But decrees of faith are immutable, and, once propounded, cannot possibly be nullified. Though St. Austin's well-known principle, is most sound and just, that, "*when the Universal Church has adopted any practice, it is the height of folly and madness to call in question the lawfulness of such practice*;" still, it does not follow, as a necessary consequence from this principle, that the church, in embracing that practice, propounds an article of faith to the belief of the faithful. It is enough for a practice to appear good, for her to adopt it,

\* Bellarm. Lib. 2. de Concil. cap. 17. p. 267.

and a merely probable opinion is a sufficient ground for admitting it as good. Hence, as I before observed, the church is justified in altering even practices universally received.—These observances as they are merely recommended, or rather prescribed, may be changed;—but articles of faith can never, under any circumstances vary, because *truth* is ever the same.

5. Vasquez judiciously observes,\* “that the doctrines taught by a General Council, *in the chapters before the Canons*, must be received as articles of Catholic Faith, as may easily be collected from the words used before the Canons, at the end of every session.” Again,† “every thing doctrinal, proposed by a (general) council in the chapters found before the Canons, is of Catholic Faith. This is clear from the following passage from the Council of Trent,‡ *which belongs neither to the chapters nor canons, but is placed between them. As it is not enough, say the Fathers of Trent, to explain what is the true faith, unless we, at the same time, shew and repudiate the contrary errors, it has appeared good to this Holy Synod, to subjoin the following canons, in order that, as all are already acquainted with the Catholic doctrine* (from the exposition given in the chapter,) *they may also know the heretical tenets which they are to avoid.* We find a similar observation in the sixth session, immediately after the chapters, and before the regular canons. *It seems expedient to this Holy Synod, to subjoin to this exposition of the Catholic doctrine on justification, the following canons, that all may know both what opinions to embrace, and what to avoid and fly.*” The reason of this is, that the chapters, as well as the canons, contain propositions, made to the whole church, to be received or condemned.

Vasquez adds in the same place, “although the church sometimes forbids certain questions to be agitated, on which she has not, as yet, passed a definitive and dogmatical decision; it is merely in this sense, that no one is, thenceforward, justified in condemning or anyways censuring a particular proposition; nor, on the other hand, in declaring it a

\* Vasquez. l. 2. Disp. 200. cap. 6.

† Vasquez. 3. part. Disput. 207. cap. 3    ‡ Trid. Sess. 13. cap. 8. in line.



safe or probable opinion. She has never, hitherto, however, attempted to excommunicate any one, however obstinate and positive, for defending a proposition ; unless she had at the same time, condemned that proposition as an error against faith, and defined the contrary doctrine to be an article of Catholic Faith ; which, to impugn obstinately, would constitute a person a heretic. An error is said to be maintained *obstinately*, when it is still defended after an express definition of the church." I think it proper, also, to observe, with the same writer,\* "that sometimes the church confirms its decisions by authorities and arguments, some of which appear not to have much connexion with the point :—though, as he justly asks, when the fathers assembled in council, declare that a particular doctrine has been for ages, and is still deduced from a certain passage of scripture, who will be so rash as to say, that the ground taken, by these high authorities, is weak and insecure.

From what has been said, we may come to this conclusion, that of the doctrines contained in the chapters, those and those only, are of faith, which are expressly defined ; or to use the language of the Canonists, only the *dispositivum arresti*, that is, only the doctrine which is the prime object of the chapter, or Canon, and not the proofs of that doctrine are faith. The reason is obvious :—the doctrine alone is proposed to our belief, and is all that is, strictly speaking, defined. There is no intention, whatever, of affixing a similar authority on the motives, or proofs adduced. Accordingly there are many things, even in General Councils, which are not articles of faith. Thus, for instance, we are not bound to believe what is merely mentioned *incidentally* ; much less, the various observations made *by the Prelates* assembled, in delivering their opinions on the questions that came before them ; and still less what happened to fall from the *Theologians* in discussing and arguing the questions which it was proposed to define. The general reasons for the above decisions is, that nothing of all this can be said to be defined, or propounded by the church.

6. There is another observation, closely connected with

\* Vasquez. p. 3. Disp. 181. c. 9.

the preceding, which I will give in Bellarmin's words.\* "For a doctrine to be of faith, it must have been *expressly defined*, by the General Council, to be an article of Catholic Faith." Hence he observes, "those who deny that the Pope is above a General Council, are not, properly speaking, heretics, although (and they are the Cardinal's own words) the last Council of Lateran, under Leo X. clearly and deliberately teaches that the Pope is above all Councils, and condemns a decree to the contrary made by the Council of Basil." And he assigns as his reason for this assertion, "that it is doubtful whether the Council of Lateran defined this point expressly and definitively, as an article of Catholic Faith." Bellarmin also requires that the doctrine be defined *conciliariter*, that is, *after the manner, and according to the usages of other councils* "Martin V." he observes.† "only confirmed those decrees on questions of faith, which had been promulgated by the Council of Constance, *after the manner of other councils* ; that is, after the subject had undergone a careful examination, such as had always been given by preceding councils. Now, it is a matter of history that the decree in question, (passed at Constance, ascribing to a General Council an authority, derived immediately and directly from Christ, to which all are bound to submit, not even excepting the Pope) was made by the council without any examination whatever. Pope Martin, consequently, in confirming the decrees of this council, in matters of faith, which had been propounded after due deliberation, clearly meant his approval to be confined to the condemnation of the heretical tenets of Wickliff and Huss.

7. Bellarmin, also, commenting on an opinion advanced by Pope Boniface VIII. *that the clergy are exempt, both by divine and human laws, from the payment of taxes*, observes, ‡ "that Boniface in this, merely followed the common opinion of Canonists, and gave it as his own, but did not mean to define anything on the subject." In fact, his language is not such as he would have employed had he intended to decide this controverted question. He simply, and quite inciden-

\* Bellarm. Lib. 2. De Concil. cap. 17. pag. 267.

† Bellarm. Lib. 2. De Concil. c. xix. p. 269.

‡ Bellarm. Tom. 1. Lib. 1. de Clericis, cap. 28. p. 327.

tally states, that "as the clergy are exempt, by divine law, &c." Apply this principle to all opinions incidentally advanced by General Councils, without any express or formal decree.

8. *The subject must also be capable of being the matter of a decree.* Thus, according to this principle, though John XXII. according to Bellarmin, erred in teaching *that in things consumed in the act of being used, such use involves dominion*, still, he did not err, he observes, in a matter of faith, as this question does not, in any way, belong to the deposit of faith." Subjects of a similar character, such as questions of law, philosophy, &c. cannot be made matters of dogmatical decrees.

9. *The decree must be general, and addressed to the whole church.* "We teach," says Bellarmin,\* "that the Pope (or a General Council) cannot err on any point, which is directed to be received by the Universal Church. There is no difficulty, however, in granting, that the Pope (or a General Council) may err, when the decision or judgment is addressed to individuals only, and not to the whole church." It is upon this principle that this writer answers a difficulty taken from a permission granted by Innocent VIII. to the church of Norway, to celebrate Mass without wine. "The answer," he says, "is obvious;—the Pope never issued a decree allowing the whole church to celebrate in this manner. His error, therefore, if it was one, was confined to a particular case and fact, and did not extend to anything like establishing an erroneous opinion in the Church." Extend what has been said here to General Councils.

10 Bellarmin lays down another valuable principle, in examining the conduct of Pope Stephen, "who ordered all who had received ordinations from his predecessor, Formosus, † to be re-ordained; by which he seemed to imply that the validity of the sacrament depends on the virtue of the minister that confers it, which is a manifest error against faith. My answer is, he says, that Stephen erred in prescribing *an action*, which evidently militated against a doctrine

\* Bellarm. Lib. 4. de Rom. Pontif. cap. 5. pag. 212.

† Bell. ibid. cap. 12. pag. 219.



of the church ; but he did not, by any means, *teach erroneous doctrine* ;—he erred by establishing a bad precedent, but did not maintain anything false, or against faith.” And, in another place, he gives a similar answer ; “Stephen did not publish a decree declaring that persons ordained by a degraded bishop ought to be re-ordained, nor did he even assert this of those ordained by Formosus, who had actually been deposed ; but merely *de facto* ordered certain persons, under these circumstances, to be re-ordained. An order which proves his hatred against Formosus, but does not establish a case against him of ignorance or heresy.” If a similar case should ever occur in a General Council, these observations would apply also to it.

11. The same writer also teaches\* that “*it is true to say, that the Pope, (or a General Council) may err, in framing laws and regulations, provided those laws regard not points essentially connected with salvation ; and, also, do not touch what is, of its own nature, essentially good or evil.*” Thus a superfluous law may be passed, or one more or less indiscreet, &c. To illustrate what has been said by a few examples. Neither the Pope, *nor a General Council*, can err so far as to enjoin a vicious action, as, for instance, usurious dealing ; or forbid a virtuous one, as restitution ; because the latter of these is an essentially good, and the former an essentially bad action. Nor could the observance of circumcision, or the Jewish sabbath be required ; as this would be to impose observances opposed to the salvation of the faithful ;—nor, on the other hand, could a practice necessary for salvation be forbidden ; such as the reception of baptism, or the holy Eucharist,—although none of these rites are, of their own nature, either good or evil. There would, however, be nothing wrong or absurd in saying, that an indifferent action—one neither essentially good nor bad, may be enjoined by the Pope, or a General Council ; or, a perfectly useless practice, nowise connected with salvation, be prescribed ; or, in fine, a rite enforced under a penalty quite disproportionate to the case. But it is not, assuredly, the province of the faithful who are bound to trust in those whom

\* Bellarm. Lib. 4. de Rom. Pontif. cap. 5. p. 212.

God has placed over them, to entertain doubts on these subjects ;—it is their business to obey.”

12. It may be observed with the same author,\* that “ *all Catholics are agreed that the Pope though speaking as the successor of St. Peter, that is, as Pope, and even assisted by a consistory, or, what is more, by a General Council, may err on mere matters of fact, which, as such, depend principally, if not wholly, on the means of information, and testimony of individuals.* On this principle he answers,† the common objection from the sixth General Council which denounced Pope Honorius as a heretic. He asserts, in the first place, “ that the acts of the sixth General Council have been corrupted,” and then observes, that “ if any one, after all, cannot bring himself to believe that the controverted passage in which Honorius is condemned is really not genuine, another solution, proposed by John and Turrecremata, may be adopted. This writer grants, indeed, that the Fathers of the sixth General Council actually condemned Honorius, but asserts that they were deceived in their judgment, which was formed on false information. For, undoubted as it is, that a General Council cannot err ; still this immunity from error does not extend to mere matters of fact ; and on questions of faith nothing erroneous can be shewn in the decrees of this Synod. It may, therefore, with perfect safety, be maintained that Honorius was classed in the list of heretics by the Fathers of this Council without just reason, misled as they were by false reports, and evidently misunderstanding the meaning of Honorius’s letters.”‡ “ The seventh General Council did nothing more than follow the opinion of the sixth, and transcribe the declaration contained in its decrees ; so that the Fathers of the seventh council were led into error by their predecessors of the sixth, whose documents had been probably corrupted, or who at least, had, unjustifiably, condemned Honorius.” He gives the same answer to the share which Pope Adrian had in this business. “ If we say that the acts of the sixth synod were corrupted, we must answer, that these corruptions misled Adrian.”§

\* Bellarm. *ibid.* cap. 2. page 209. col. 1. † *Ibid.* cap. 12. p. 219.

‡ Bellarm. *ibid.* § *Ibid.*



13 I shall conclude these principles with one from Suarez.\* “Though the Pope in granting an indulgence, expressly assign his reason for such grant, conceiving it a sufficient and just ground; it is not, on that account, certain that it really is so; nor, consequently, sure that the whole indulgence is valid. A Papal decree of this kind is not on a matter of faith, but confined to a particular fact, and depends, therefore, on a mere question of human prudence and judgment; in which cases it is agreed, that the Pope is not infallibly assisted by the Holy Ghost, since Christ’s prayer, in St. Luke,† is simply this ‘I have prayed for thee, *Peter*, that thy faith fail not.’”

“The above is true also of dispensations from vows:—although the Pope may think and declare that a sufficient cause exists, he may be deceived; as his judgment in these cases, can only be directed by mere human prudence and opinion, and is liable even to be biased by many natural feelings.” The reasoning of Suarez shews clearly, that these principles must be extended, to similar cases in General Councils. These observations are highly creditable to the author, and of great value. From them it is clear, that there is even much less reason for supposing, that the validity of any particular sentence of excommunication, can possibly be an Article of Faith. Suarez, however, adds,‡ and justly, that “it is *never* expedient; in fact, that it would be highly imprudent and scandalous, publicly to denounce an indulgence, granted by the Holy See, as null and superfluous; to do so would, generally speaking, be useless, and shew but little of that respect which is due, from every member of the church, to the Vicar of Christ.” We are bound, in like manner, to comply with all the laws and regulations prescribed by the Holy See, even those enjoined under pain of excommunication; and any one refusing to do so, would sin, and actually incur the excommunication, although the Pope *may* have erred, in the sense explained above, in fulminating that sentence, and though it is not of faith, *that he has not really* and *de facto* *erred*. The reason of this is, that the rule by

\* Suarez, Tom. 4. Disp. 56. de Indulg. sect. 3. † St. Luke, xxii. 32.

‡ Suarez l. c.

which our faith is regulated, is very different from the principles upon which ecclesiastical laws are founded : the former must be, and is, infallible ; whilst infallibility is not required for the laws of the church to bind in conscience. For this it is enough, that they emanate from a competent authority, which has judged them good, &c. Indeed a merely *probable* opinion as to their usefulness, is sufficient for their introduction, as I have shewn in an extract from Vasquez. And it may be laid down as a general rule, to which no sensible, and good man will object that a great degree of deference is due, in all things, to the judgment and will of those whom God has placed over us. This is the natural dictate of reason, and may be confirmed by numerous passages of the sacred writings. But as the only object of the present pages is, to bring those who have abandoned the Catholic Faith to a profession of its doctrines, I shall spend no more time on these questions. I shall proceed, at once, to shew what are the doctrines of the Catholic Church, and what are not.

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## CHAP. II.

*Articles of Faith, on particular points of controversy, distinguished from doctrines not taught by the Catholic Church.*

We have now before us, the general principles, by which the doctrines of the Catholic Church may, with proper attention, be distinguished from the mere opinions of the schoolmen ; and, indeed, from all other opinions whatever. With these principles we will proceed to separate what is of faith, and particularly of *Catholic* Faith, on all controverted questions, from what is not.

As to the opinions of the schools, and their comparative probability,—which has superior claims to our assent ;—and which is to be embraced as morally certain, as not being merely probable, but confirmed and supported by the almost unanimous consent of our theologians ; or, finally, what particular doctrines, coming under the class of *theological conclusions*, are to be received as undoubted truths ; with all this we have no concern ; our only business is, by a plain statement of the doctrines of our Church, to bring, if possible, those who have strayed from the truth, back to the *one* fold

of Christ. With this view, I shall omit all these matters as unnecessary, and as only calculated to render the way to the truth more difficult; and confine myself, as much as possible, to our real tenets. And if it should happen, as it often does, that those who differ from us in religion, should ask us, for an opinion on any of these points, it is better to tell them, at once, that the church has decided nothing on the proposed question; that we profess to follow, and not to anticipate her judgment. In a word, that our professions of faith are silent on these subjects, and that nothing but what they contain is required to be believed and subscribed, by those who are admitted members of the Catholic Church. We must remind such persons of the advice of St. Paul,\* “not to be more wise than it behoveth to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety.” That if, when received into the Catholic Church, he should still be curious to know the opinions of the schools, they will be explained to him; but, that if he feel no such wish, he need never hear a word on the subject, as he may work out his salvation, and be a saint, and yet know nothing about them. He will perceive that, for the present at least, such an inquiry would, very likely, tend only to perplex, and confound his mind, by loading it with a multiplicity of opinions and arguments the most opposite, abstruse, and metaphysical: that such subjects are best left to the schools of divinity, in which it requires years of study to come to any thing like a satisfactory conclusion on these knotty points; none of which, after all, are articles of Catholic Faith.

But to come to particular questions of controversy, and the work of separation according to the plan proposed,—examining every opinion by the rule of Catholic Faith laid down, in the preceding pages, as the criterion of truth. With that single principle we might advance, securely and unhesitatingly, in the enquiry; but, for fear lest I may appear rash in some, at least, of my decisions; to some, who, from ignorance of the real doctrines of our Church, might condemn me unjustly; and to put a stop, at once and effectually, to the censures, whether private or public, of such people; I

\* Rom. xii. 3.



will take care to support every application of the rule of faith, and every decision to which it may lead me, by the authority of the most approved Catholic theologians.

### § 1.

*On the merit of good works—grace—and eternal glory.*

The doctrine of the Council of Trent on merit is this: \*

“If any one shall say, that the good works of the just man are so far the gifts of God, as not to be to the advantage and merit of the faithful servant of God; or, that the just man does not truly merit, by the good works which he has performed,—through the grace of God, and the merits of Jesus Christ, whose living member he is,—an increase of grace—life everlasting,—and, if he depart this life in the state of grace, the fruition of eternal life, as also an increase of glory, let him be anathema.” And, in the 26th canon of the same Session, it also declares, that “If any one shall say, that the just, who have persevered to the end in virtue, and the observance of the divine commands, ought not, as a reward of their good works performed in the Lord, to expect, and to hope for an everlasting retribution from God, through his mercy, and the merits of Jesus Christ, let him be anathema.”

We have here before us the heretical tenets, that are to be rejected under pain of anathema,—and, according to the rule laid down in the preceding pages, what is to be believed, on the subject of *merit*, as of Catholic Faith, since it is proposed to the belief of all the faithful, by a General Council.

Hence we may conclude also, that it is not an article of Catholic Faith, that there may not be such a thing, 1, as *merit of condignness*; 2, of *congruity*; nor, 3, *that the rewarding of our merit arises rather from the justice of God, than from his fidelity to his engagements*; and 4, much less *that this merit ought to be rewarded from a principle of strict and rigorous justice*. The correctness of these deductions is clear; *first*, from the silence of the Council of Trent, and of all our other General Councils; and, *secondly*, from the diversity of opinion that exists, on these questions, among our Ca-

\* Concil. Trid. Sess. 6. cau. 32.

tholic writers. We learn from Bellarmin,\* that “Three questions arise on the nature of merit. *First*, whether the merits of the just are to be called of condignness, or of congruity;—*secondly*, does the condignness of these merits arise from the divine promises only, or also from the works of the just man;—and, *thirdly*, does God reward the works of the just beyond, and punish the evil deeds of the wicked less than, their condignness. With regard to the first question, though all Catholics unite in agreeing, that the good works of the just are meritorious of eternal life; still, some are of opinion, that these works ought not to be said to merit this reward, either from a principle of condignness, or of congruity; but, that we ought to confine ourselves to the bare and simple proposition, that the good works of the just are, by God’s grace, meritorious of eternal life. This is taught by Thomas of Walden. Others, however, hold, that the works of the just may, in a modified sense, be said to merit eternal life condignly,—but the condignness allowed by these writers, when compared with the accurate and theological meaning of the word, really amounts to no more than mere congruity. Durand, Gregory of Valentia, and some others, are of this opinion. But the common opinion of divines is in favour of merit of condignity, in its strict and theological sense. Durandus’s opinion, if it mean no more than that our merits are not of condignness, or meritorious of eternal life, on principles of absolute justice, but merely hypothetically, that is, supposing the existence of a gracious promise to that effect, on the part of the Almighty,—ought not to be condemned. But he seems rather to think, that our merits, though derived from the grace of God, and allowing even the existence of a promise on his part to reward them, are still not deserving of this reward, on strict principles of justice, but merely on account of the liberality of God.” In the following chapter,† he treats of the second question, which is, “whether good works are condignly meritorious, in virtue of the promise of God only,—or merely in consequence of the good works performed,—or, in virtue of both. Cajetan, Soto, and some o-

\* Bellarm. De Justif. Lib 4. cap. 16. p. 282.

† Bellarm. Lib. 4. De Justif. cap. 17. p. 283.

ther theologians assert, that good works are, of their own nature, even exclusively of any promise on the part of God, deserving of eternal life. Whilst, Scotus, and Vega, &c., on the contrary, think, that good works,—which are the effect of divine grace,—are not condignly meritorious by virtue of the works performed; but merely deserve eternal life, because God has been pleased to receive them on these terms, and to pledge his holy word to reward them in this manner. The doctrine of these divines differs widely from that of Luther: for, Scotus does not pretend that good works are not really good and excellent, or that they are actual sins, if examined by the standard of the divine law, as the Lutherans assert,—but is of opinion, that the works of the just, though really good, in the plain meaning of the words, are not of sufficient value to be, in any sense, said to be proportionate to the eternal happiness of a future life:—that, accordingly, they are accepted by the Almighty, in consequence of his covenant and promise, and not because the works themselves are of value enough to merit eternal life. The *third*, which takes a middle course between these two opposite opinions, seems to me the most probable. By this we are taught, that the good works of the just are condignly deserving of eternal life, in virtue both of the divine covenant, and of the works themselves: not, however, but that, even without this covenant, and acceptance on the part of God, our good works would be proportionate to the reward of eternal life,—but that, without presupposing such a covenant, the Almighty would be under no obligation to admit our good works to this high recompense, though of themselves equal and perfectly proportionate to it.” As to the last question, which is, “Whether God, from his own pure liberality, rewards the works of the just beyond their condign deserts; most theologians think that he does, though Vega denies this: I will, however, briefly prove, that God does reward our works beyond their condign value, &c.... The opinions of divines are not equally unanimous on a question connected with the preceding, namely, whether God punishes the evil deeds of the wicked less than they condignly deserve, &c.”



The above extracts from Bellarmine are confirmed by the following passages from Vasquez.\* "Though all the schoolmen, and those who have written against the heresies of the day, unanimously teach, that a just man, truly deserves life eternal by his good works ; still, when they came to treat of the intrinsic nature of merit, and of merit condignly deserving eternal life, they no longer agree in opinion. St. Thomas,† in fact, affirms, that no work of ours can be said to be, strictly speaking, essentially meritorious in the sight of God. He argues thus ; where there is neither strict justice nor strict equality, there merit cannot be properly said to exist ; now, there is no such a thing as strict justice and equality between God and man ; consequently, no human act can, in a strict sense, be said to merit a recompense from God. Durand seems to be of the same way of thinking. He says, our works, performed in the state of grace, cannot properly be said to be intrinsically meritorious ; and adds, that our merits, before God, are not condignly deserving the reward of glory ; and that they are only called merits, in this sense, that God, by his divine law and appointment, requires our works as conditions, without which he will not confer upon us this glorious immortality. According to him, eternal life is conferred, in consequence of the divine promises, and not because it is condignly deserved by our merit : that between the immortality of glory, and the meritorious works of the just, there is no condign equality, not even such as subsists between the seed and its produce : he, therefore concludes that the merits of the just, compared with the rewards of heaven, are no more than merits of congruity. He, however, observes, that the merit by which the just man obtains eternal life, holds a middle place between the congruous merit of the sinner, and that which is strictly the merit of condignness, and is the fruit of justice, and may, therefore, be called, in part, congruous, and in part condign." The same author makes, also, the following remarks : ‡ " Many Catholic writers have taught, that the works of the just, of their own nature, without a covenant on the part of God, and unaccepted

\* Vasq. 1. 2. disp. 213. cap. 3. † S. Thom. art. 1. quæst. 114.

‡ Vasq. disp. 214. instit. cap. 1. 2.



by him, are not meritorious of eternal life.”\* “Many also have been of opinion, that the works of the just are of themselves of some value, but that their great value is derived from the merits and grace of Christ.”† “More modern theologians, however, think, that the whole value of the works of the just is to be ascribed to the works themselves; but that the character of merit is stamped on them by the divine promises only.” He then explains his own opinion. “As I have taught that there cannot be such a thing as justice strictly so called, but merely in a wide and general sense, between God and man; I do not attribute to the Almighty any obligation of rewarding good works, with eternal glory *in justice*, as if he were bound to recompense us for the good works which he receives from us: but I confine it entirely to his *promise*, and his fidelity to his engagements. Hence, were he not to reward them with eternal life, (which is, of course, impossible,) he could not properly be said to be unjust, but he might be said to be unfaithful, because he would violate his own word. He might, indeed, be said to be unjust, in as much as fidelity to our engagements, being a species of justice, a breach of promise, as it partakes of the nature of injustice, may be called by that name.” Such is the language of Vasquez.‡ It is clear that nothing of the above is of faith; they are the opinions of different schoolmen; controverted questions on which even our own writers do not agree. Therefore, if we separate these from our doctrinal articles, our adversaries can have but little or no difficulty, in subscribing to what is really of Catholic Faith, on the merit of good works. Mestrezat,§ in his treatise entitled *Grace against Merits*, has already done so. “We acknowledge,” says he, “that good works are pleasing to God, and that they obtain for us eternal life; and all that we contend for is, that they obtain us this blessing through the goodness, grace, bounty, and mercy of God, and we wish that the word *meritum*, or merit, be understood in the plain meaning which it has in the Latin language.” Mestrezat is perfectly orthodox, and believes everything that a Catholic is bound to receive, as of faith, on the merit of good works.

\* Vasq. ut supra. c. 1.

† Vrsq. ut sup. c. 2.

‡ Vasq. disp. 215.

§ Mestraz. p. 25.

2. *Neither is it an article of Catholic Faith, that all the works of the just are meritorious of eternal life ; that is to say, it is not defined what works in particular, besides those which proceed from charity, are deserving of that happiness ; whether, for instance, works flowing from the virtues of temperance, faith, hope, &c., are of this character.* The proof is obvious: First, the Council of Trent no where defines that any specific work of the above kinds are meritorious: and, Secondly, Bellarmin and others inform us, that our writers disagree on this subject. “It is disputed,” says Vasquez,\* “amongst the schoolmen, whether the just merit eternal life by charity only, and by works proceeding from charity; or by good works of every kind, not flowing from that virtue. Some teach, that only by good works that proceed from charity does the just man merit eternal life. This is affirmed by Scotus, Gabriel, Durand,” and also by Bellarmin.† “But, for my part,” he continues, “I have always thought that any kind of good work performed by a just man, if it be, in every respect, according to the principles of moral virtue,—is meritorious of eternal life. I am supported in this opinion by Bonaventure, Soto, and Capreolus, &c.”

This places us at an immeasurable distance, from a doctrine, calumniously, but commonly ascribed to us by dissenters, who assert that we make perfection consist in fasting, celibacy, monastic vows, &c., and not in the love of God. The truth is, that it is not even an article of Catholic Faith, that these works are meritorious of eternal life, unless they proceed from charity! These scholastic opinions once set aside, those who differ from us on other points, can find no difficulty, at least, on this head, in subscribing to our belief. I have shewn above, that Mestrezat acknowledges, that, by our works, we deserve eternal life; but he makes no distinction between the various kinds of good works, his assertion regarding good works in general: he, therefore, believes more on this point than he need do, and yet be a good Catholic.

3. *It is not a doctrine of the Catholic Church, that the*

\* Vasq. disp. 217, c. 1.

† Bellarm. Lib. 5, de Justif. c. 15. p. 281.

*just man can merit for others, in any of the various meanings of the word merit, not even by merit of congruity; or obtain by his merit the conversion of a sinner, or any other grace whatever.* This is proved, first, from the silence of the Council of Trent on the question of *meriting for others*, and the consequent absence of any decree of the church on this subject; and, secondly, from the variety of opinions held by Catholics upon this point. The following passage from Vasquez,\* I approve of, and consider the doctrine which it contains certain. "The natural, and only effects of the grace of adoption, when communicated to a mere creature, are to enable the soul that has been made partaker of it, to merit condignly eternal life, and an increase of its own powerful efficacy in himself; but not thereby to merit condignly, in the slightest degree, the first justifying grace for others, nor even the least grace as a help towards it. Hence, neither the apostles, nor the Blessed Virgin, who were in the most perfect enjoyment of habitual justice, and the grace of adoption, could ever condignly merit the least degree of grace as an assistance to others. The reason is simply this, that the efficacy of habitual grace is merely to enable us to merit these rewards,—namely, grace and glory,—confined too, to ourselves, and incommunicable to others; nor does it make any difference however much this grace may be increased in our souls, since its nature still remains the same." This, in fact, was a prerogative of Christ only. Suarez also approves of this view of the question.† "Merit of grace and glory," says he, "is so completely personal, that no one can communicate his own merit to another, so as to enable him to obtain this latter favor; namely, eternal glory, as the price, as it were, and reward of such communication:—this price must be paid by his own personal actions, since by them alone is man rendered worthy of everlasting life." This principle is quite undeniable. "We must, therefore, conclude," says Vasquez,‡ "that the grace of adoption is only a principle, and source of merit; a seed whose fruit is glory to him who has been made partaker of its benefits; and a cause

\* Vasquez. disp. 4. cap. 5.

† Suarez, Tom. 4. disp. 48. sect. 2.   ‡ Vasquez. l. c.



also of its own increase in his soul : but it neither enables us to merit condignly for others any of the varied helps of divine grace, nor justification ; and, consequently, a mere creature could not perfectly and condignly satisfy for others." This, was, in fact, as I just observed, a privilege confined to Christ only, and by *his* incarnation alone could this object be attained.

But though we cannot *condignly*, may we not at least by *congruity* merit for another ? The answer clearly is, that *it is not of faith* that we can do so. First, because the Council of Trent has not proposed this to our belief ; secondly, because some theologians, as I have already had occasion to notice, so far from admitting of the merit of congruity for others, think that we cannot even merit in this manner for ourselves ; and, thirdly, in the remarks that I shall have occasion to make later on *satisfaction*, I shall prove that the above is no article of our faith. All our satisfactions are by way of merit, and the Council of Trent holds the same language with respect both to merit and satisfaction.

However, if the real meaning of " merit of congruity," as employed by our writers, were but well understood by Protestants, they could, after all, have no difficulty in admitting it ; and of even believing that we may merit, in this sense, for others. " We use the terms *merit of congruity*, says Vasquez, \* and impetratory action, or merit, indiscriminately, and as perfectly equivalent phrases ;—merit of congruity obtains, by impetration, the favor of which it is considered the meritorious cause—it consists solely in impetration. " Now, no one can be ignorant, that by prayer, we obtain numerous blessings both for ourselves and others, and also avert many evils. Hence, in the public form of prayer used, in time of pestilence, by our dissenting brethren, we see that they are exhorted *to offer up their prayers to God to obtain mercy ;* and, unless they expect to be heard, of what use is it, to offer up their prescribed form of prayer, on every Sunday of the year, for so many different classes and kinds of men. Now this is precisely what is meant by merit of congruity ! Moreover, it cannot be doubted, that the faithful, by various kinds

\* Vasquez 3. Parte q. 94. art. 1. dub. 4.



*of good works*, obtain from God, or rather from his infinite mercy, many blessings both spiritual and temporal, both for themselves, and others. And I believe it is more probable, that these works merit these blessings condignly ;—that this condignness flows partly from the works themselves, and partly from God's promise ;—and finally that not only works flowing from the principle of the love of God, but all others, performed by a just man, are meritorious of eternal life.

## § 2.

### *On Justification.*

The following is the doctrine of the Council of Trent on this subject :\*—“ If any one shall say, that men are justified, either by the sole imputation of Christ's justice ; or by the sole remission of sins, to the exclusion of grace, and of that charity, which is poured into their hearts by the Holy Ghost,† and is inherent in them ; or, moreover, that the grace, whereby we are justified, is only the favor of God, let him be anathema.” And in the tenth canon of the same Session, the Council decrees, that, “ if any one shall say, that man is justified independently of the justice of Christ, by which he was enabled to merit for us ; or, that he is formally justified by it alone, let him be anathema.” We, from these extracts, see what is heretical, and, consequently, what is of Catholic Faith on this subject,—since it is propounded by a General Council. The same doctrine is more fully explained, in the seventh chapter of the same Session.

From this exposition of doctrine we may deduce, that *it is not an article of Catholic Faith, that this inherent justice is habitual, or, which is the same thing, that the inherent justice, which is the formal cause of our justification, is a habit or permanent quality.* The proof is this, that, in the first place, neither the Council of Trent, nor any other General Council, has defined this point, Secondly—“ It is controverted,” says Vasquez,‡ “ whether the Church has ever defined, and, consequently, whether it is an article of Catholic Faith, that the justification of the sinner is a permanent

\* Sess. 6. can. 11.           † Rom. v. 5.

‡ Vasquez, 1. 2. Disp. 203. cap. 2.

quality and habit of the soul: or, whether this justification may not be equally well supposed to be produced, by an affective impulse of divine love, and contrition for sin; and the whole body of evidence adduced from the sacred writings, Councils, and Fathers, be equally well explained, by saying, that inherent justice is an affective act of the love of God, and contrition for sin. It was thought by Vega, and several modern writers have followed his opinion, that the Church has already defined, that man is justified by a permanent habit and quality, and that every thing, that is taught by the Church on man's justification, concurs in supposing, that this is the nature of our justification. However, to me it seems probable,\* that the Church has, hitherto, nowhere defined, that the justification of adults, independently of the sacrament, is a habit." The following is the title to one of his chapters.† "From the writings of the schoolmen, it is shewn, that it has not been hitherto defined, that the justification of adults, without the sacrament, is a habit." He also expressly declares, a little later, that "it has not been defined, that inherent justice is a habit." Soto and Canus are of the same opinion; and, accordingly, observe, that the Council of Trent, in defining‡ that the formal cause of man's justification is inherent justice, purposely abstained from using the word 'habit,' not wishing to define anything on that point; and that, consequently, nothing more is meant by the decree alluded to, than that man is not formally justified by the mere favor and justice of another, but by an inherent and intrinsic justice. The scope and object of the council was to shew, in opposition to what had been asserted by certain Heretics, that we are not justified by an extrinsic justice as these writers pretended, but by a justice really intrinsic and inherent. Stapleton tells us, that he does not intend to examine minutely, what it is which, being found really inherent in us, is precisely and strictly the formal cause of our first justification, and our perseverance in that state:—as whether it be the fixed, and permanent habit of certain virtues, which God infuses into the soul; or, not an infused habit, but merely

\* Vasquez, Disp. 203. cap. 3.

† Vasquez, ut. sup. cap. 3.

‡ Concil. Trid. Sess. 6. cap. 7.

an actual, but continued and virtuous motion and inclination of the soul. He also passes over many other similar questions, as undeserving of attention ; among which is one closely connected with the subject under consideration,—namely, whether the formal cause of man's justification be the observance of the divine Law, and the practice of virtue, from a belief of whatever is of faith ; or not rather an intrinsic newness and renovation of the inward man. His reason for this is, that these questions rather belong to the schools, than to the controversies of the day, and that, on this account, the Church has neither in past ages, nor in the late decrees of the Council of Trent, given any definitive opinion on either side of the question. He then adds, " The Fathers of Trent do indeed teach, that every one receives within himself his justification in just measure,—a justification, too, which, from the gifts infused, is really inherent ; but this may be said, in some manner, to be verified in every one of the above theories." Vasquez\* states that " The Church has no where expressly defined, that the justification of children, or, of those in whom it is produced by the help of the Sacrament, by attrition only, is the effect of a permanent habit ; the council confined itself to the general declaration that justification is, in every case, produced by inherent justice. He, however, adds,† and justly, that " The common opinion of theologians, and the only true one, is, that the final cause of man's justification is not merely an inherent created justice, but that this justice and holiness is a quality that is permanently in the soul ; or, as it is commonly called a habit." He even asserts‡ that, from the decree of the Council of Trent, it clearly follows, that children and adults, whose sins are remitted by virtue of the sacrament, are justified by a permanent habit and quality only ; and that, consequently, this opinion so far belongs to our articles of Catholic Faith, that it cannot be denied without error," though it may, according to our principles, without heresy.

The conclusion to be drawn from the preceding observation is, that there is scarcely a shadow of difference between

\* Vasq. *ibid.* cap. 6. † Vasq. 1. c. cap. 2.

‡ Vasquez. *Disp.* 203. cap. 6.



the doctrine of Catholics and Protestants on this head. "We must admit," says Vasquez,\* "the common opinion of the schoolmen, and, in fact, the only true one, that the formal cause of man's justification is a habit of justifying grace, though this has not, as yet, been proposed as an article of Catholic Faith: and, this principle once admitted, it is far better to ascribe our justification, and cleansing from sin to this habit, rather than to any *actual* justice; since, by adopting this view, justification is produced, in all cases, precisely in the same manner: especially as we have already shewn that the final cause of the justification of infants, and of those who are justified by virtue of the sacrament, must necessarily be allowed to be a habit, or permanent justice.

"Inherent justice," says Mestrezat† *in his Treatise on Grace*, which is the "renewing of our souls in sanctity by Christian virtues, has its share in our salvation."‡ "God does not impute, but produces inherent justice within us."§ "As to the spirit of the new Adam, we derive it from regeneration, just as from natural generation we derive the habitual corruption of Adam." This writer admits in express and clear language inherent justice, and is, consequently, perfectly orthodox on the subject of justification. He even acknowledges that this justice is *habitual*, which as yet we do not receive as an article of Catholic Faith. The rest is a mere dispute about words—a pure logomachy. "If," says Du Moulin,|| "by the word 'justification' be meant regeneration and sanctification, as our adversaries understand it; it is not true to say, that we teach that by faith alone, we are justified, for a Christian is regenerated by the practice of all Christian virtue." This shews Du Moulin to be on this point, a perfectly good Catholic. Here, then, we have a plain instance of disunion caused by misunderstanding, and of unanimity by simply stating our doctrine.

### § 3.

#### *On Satisfaction.*

1. "If any one shall say, that satisfaction is not made to God, through the merits of Jesus Christ, for the temporal

\* Vasquez, l. c. cap. 10. † Mestrez. De Gratia, p. 35.

‡ Mestrez. De Gratia, p. 42. § Ibid. p. 37. || Du Moul. in Eras. p. 49.



punishment due to sin, by the patient endurance of the afflictions sent us from heaven ; or by the performance of the penance enjoined us by the priest ; as also, by actions voluntarily imposed on ourselves, as fasting, prayer, alms-deeds, and even other works of piety, let him be anathema.” Can. 14. “ If any one shall say, that the works of satisfaction, by which, through Jesus Christ, penitent sinners redeem their sins, are not acts of divine worship ; but mere traditions of men, that obscure the true doctrine of grace, and the real worship of God, and the benefit of Christ’s death, let him be anathema.” The above doctrines are thus condemned, and anathematized by the Council of Trent.\*

II. We also, consequently, see, as it is a General Council that speaks, what is the real doctrine of the Catholic Church. However, on the other hand, it follows, 1, that *it is not an article of our Faith*, as was also observed on the subject of *merit*, *that we satisfy by congruity, or condignness : † by the sole excellency of our works, or by virtue of the divine promises, or by these two conjointly ; neither is it of faith, that we satisfy in justice, by a rigorous and strict justice, or by the mere fidelity of God to his promises.* This is proved, first, from the silence of the Council of Trent ; secondly, from the difference of opinion among our writers. “ Ledesmas, and Durand assure us,” says Vasquez, ‡ “ that man satisfies for the punishment due to sin, merely through the goodness of God, who is pleased to accept the satisfaction offered.

3. *Nor is it of Faith, that this satisfaction is made by any works but those that flow from charity ; as also by fasting, prayer, alms-deeds, &c.,* provided always that these actions proceed from charity First, because the Council of Trent does not propose this to be believed, either in the canon quoted above, or in any other. Secondly, because our Theologians differ on this point. “ Henricus,” says Suarez, § “ gives us

\* Concil. Trid. Sess. 14. can. 13, 14.

† The following proposition of Baius was condemned by Pius V. and Gregory XIII. “ Satisfactiones laboriosæ justificatorum non valent expiare de condigno pœnam temporalem restantem post culpam condonatam.” (Transl.)

‡ Vasquez, 3 parte q. 94. art. 1. dub. 3.

§ Suarez, de pœn. disp. 37. sect. 3.

to understand, that the love of God must be the ruling principle of all these actions."

4. *It is not of faith, that the just man can satisfy for another.* 1. The Council of Trent does not propose this to our belief. 2. Suarez,\* at the head of his 48th controversy, has the following question: "Can one man assist another by way of suffrage, by satisfying in his stead, or by undergoing the punishment due to his sins? It is the opinion," he says, "of some modern theologians, that such suffrage is of no effect before God, and that the only help, which we can afford our neighbour, is to beg, and merit congruously the remission of the punishment due to his sin,—so that God, moved by our prayers, may either gratuitously grant this pardon; or, at least such helps and graces as may effectually stir up our neighbour to such works of virtue, as may obtain for him the remission of the punishment that remains due to his sins. The reasons of this opinion are, 1, that the debt of punishment being personal, must be discharged by the personal good actions and mortifications of the sinner, and not vicariously; for no one can communicate his actions or sufferings to another, so as to make them really his neighbour's, and cease to be his own. He that has sinned, deserves to be punished, and not another, who is innocent of that offence; and a debt, consequently, is contracted by sin, which the sinner must expiate by his own actions and sufferings, and not by those of another. 2. The debt of punishment can only be contracted by our own, and not by another's sins,—the satisfaction, therefore, by a parity of argument, cannot be derived from any but our own works. 3. The most that can be proved, from the texts of scripture, which are usually cited, to support an opinion contrary to that here advocated, is, that the faithful may mutually assist each other by prayer and supplication. From this doctrine it follows, that although a just man may offer up his actions, in satisfaction for the debt of temporal punishment due to the sins of another, and may actually obtain this object,—still he satisfies equally for his own sins by these same works; since, by an act of charity towards another, he, by no means, deprives

\* Suarez, Tom. 4. disp. 48. sect. 2.

himself of the fruit of his own personal satisfaction:—for, not satisfying for another by his own sufferings, it follows that his satisfaction goes to expiate what is due to his own sins. Thus a just man, when he prays, or performs a good work, that another may obtain the help of divine grace, or a blessing of any other kind whatever, performs an action as condignly meritorious of eternal life, as if he merited nothing by congruity for another; so, in like manner, when the just man obtains by congruity the remission of the temporal punishment due to another's sins, he condignly satisfies for himself, as effectually as if no such remission had been obtained for another."

I will subjoin the two following observations to confirm and illustrate the above principles. The first is from Vasquez.\* "The temporal punishment due to sin," says this writer, "is not remitted by what is called *satispassion*, but by satisfaction, which is received by the Almighty as a meritorious work. And from this principle, he draws this conclusion, that *as God requires satisfaction before he pardons the punishment due to sin*, and as this satisfaction is received as a meritorious act, it can be of no avail unless performed by a just man, in other words, a sinner in a state of mortal sin, cannot satisfy for the punishment due to his sins; and, consequently, these actions, unless performed in a state of grace, are not meritorious, nor satisfactory. The second observation is made by Suarez.† "In discussing the principles, on which the Almighty will reward our actions, or receive our satisfaction, we can derive no light whatever from the mere examination of abstract principles, since everything necessarily depends on the supreme will of, and the rule established by the Almighty, who could have definitively decreed, that, by the sufferings of purgatory alone, should the temporal punishment due to sin be remitted; in which case, no one could have satisfied, even by his own actions, for this punishment. The Almighty might also have adopted another course,—have resolved that the temporal punishment due to sin should not necessarily indeed be undergone in Purgatory, but only

\* Vasquez, 3. par. de Pœnit. q. 94. art. 1. dub. 4.

† Suarez, Tom. 4. disp. 48. sect. 2.



have prescribed this as an alternative, and hypothetically ; so that the sinner should either undergo this punishment in a future life, or satisfy for it in this, in a manner perfectly condign, and morally equivalent,—which, in fact, is the system which he has been pleased to adopt, since the just are able to satisfy for their sins. In addition to this two-fold way of satisfying for sins, the Almighty, it may be observed, might also have willed that the punishment due to sin should be expiated, either in purgatory, or in this life, and this too, either by our own works, or by those of another, voluntarily offering for our benefit the punishment which he inflicts upon himself; in which case, supposing this to be the law of God, a sufficient satisfaction would be made.” In the above extract, Suarez gives us a general view of the nature of satisfaction :—he, indeed, observes that the first opinion mentioned above *seems to him false ; and being but very lately advanced by any theologian, is, in consequence, as the matter is of such importance, to be rejected ;*—but still he does not venture to say, that it is *contrary to faith*,—much less that it is *opposed to Catholic faith*. In fact he candidly acknowledges that, as it depends on the institution and will of the Almighty, (that one man should be able to satisfy for another) *arguments drawn from the reason and nature of the thing, are of no avail, nor is there any passage of scripture which can be said to prove it beyond contradiction ; since the facts adduced above, might, strictly speaking, be understood of impetration, and of mere congruous merit.*” And indeed the authority of the *modern theologians* whom he cites, is, probably, quite enough to place the above in the rank of controverted opinions. The same writer observes\* that “there is a difficulty in determining, whether our satisfaction for another person is as condign, and on the same principle of justice, as that for ourselves. A first opinion, which I shall state, is, that such satisfaction arises, not from a principle of condignness or justice, but from the free acceptance of God ; and may even be said to be based on a principle of congruity as far as regards him that offers it,—not, however, so as to render its acceptance by the Almighty absolutely certain,

\* Suarez, l. c. sect. 3.

though proceeding from a just man, in favour of another in the same happy state. This opinion is supported by Medina and Corduba on these grounds : first, because we can conceive no obligation, in any judge, to receive the satisfaction which is due from the criminal, from the hands of a third person, though, perhaps, such satisfaction might be of itself equal to the offence,—he has always a right to punish the real delinquent. Secondly, because, neither from the holy scriptures, nor from tradition, is it clear, that any law or promise was ever made, by which we may be assured that vicarious satisfaction is accepted by the Almighty. Thirdly, because it is considered as a prerogative peculiarly belonging to Jesus Christ, to merit and satisfy condignly for others.

5. It is still less an article of our Faith, and far less certain that *the living can satisfy for the dead, except by prayer, and by way of suffrage*. This is, in the first place, obvious from the silence of the Council of Trent, and of every other General Council ; and, secondly, from the diversity of opinion on this point found amongst our divines. “ The first opinion,” says Suárez,\* “ is, that, by the pure mercy of God only, are we able to satisfy for the souls in purgatory. This is held by Cajetan, Soto, Canus and others ; amongst whom, of course, Medina and Corduba are pre-eminently conspicuous ; since they even extend this doctrine, to the satisfaction of the living for each other. The real, and only reason that can be assigned for this opinion is the absence of any thing like a promise or covenant on the part of the Almighty. Hence the church, and even the saints in heaven, are made to beg of Almighty God, that he would vouchsafe to receive their suffrages for the dead ; a pregnant sign that to accept them is not an act of justice, but purely one of mercy. The above is also confirmed, by observing that the souls in purgatory are no longer under the jurisdiction, and controul of the church, being merely amenable to the tribunal of God. Besides as it is far from being certain, that the Almighty has even promised to accept our satisfaction for the living, it is very likely that there is no such covenant in favour of the dead ; especially as we have no sufficient tes-

\* Suárez, l. c. sect. 6.

timony, or reason, for supposing that God has established any such order." He also observes a little later,\* that "for this reason we are accustomed to say, both with regard to satisfaction, and indulgences, that they benefit the souls of the departed faithful, by way of suffrage, which by many, is considered as a clear proof, that this effect is by no means infallibly certain, nor due in justice from the Almighty." And further on "If our suffrages," says he, "are sure of obtaining their object, God must have pledged his word to that effect; since without this there can be no real grounds for perfect security.

6. It is not an article of our Faith, that *there is in the church a treasure composed of the satisfaction of the saints*; and, consequently, it is not of faith, as I shall have occasion to notice hereafter, that indulgences, whether in favour of the living, or the dead, are granted, *by making them partakers of that treasure*. This may be proved, first, from its not being of faith, as I have already shewn, that we can satisfy vicariously for each other; this not having been propounded by the Council of Trent; nor, in fact, by any other General Council. The church, therefore, cannot be said to have proposed the above to our belief. I am aware of what Clement VI.† has asserted, that, "to the infinite treasure, purchased for us by *the merits and blood of Christ*, we know that the merits of the Blessed Virgin, mother of God, and of all the elect from the first to the last, are to be united. That this treasure will ever be consumed, or even diminished, there cannot possibly be a ground of fearing, the merits of Christ being themselves infinite; and also because the greater the number that are drawn to justice, by the application of this treasure of infinite merits, the greater becomes this accumulated mass."‡ But, in the first place, there is not one word here that touches the question before us, *the satisfaction of the saints*. 2. The above is merely introduced incidentally by the Pope in his decree. 3. This decretal was

\* Suarez l. c. † Clem. VI. in his Extravag. Unigenitus.

‡ Leo X. also declared against Luther, that *indulgences* are granted "ex superabundantia meritorum Christi et sanctorum." Pius VI. also in the Bull Auctorem Fidei, n. 41. did the same.



addressed to the Archbishop of Tarragona, and not to the whole church. 4. After all, the Pope is not a General Council; and, consequently the above extract is not sufficient, to establish an article of Catholic Faith. “Moreover, Suarez,\* treating of this treasure,” says that, “besides Mairon, Durandus had also the boldness to deny, that there is such a thing in the church as a treasure, composd of the satisfaction of the saints, or any treasure of this nature, but that which Jesus Christ purchased for us. He assigns two reasons for his opinion: the first the same as Mairon’s, namely, that the works of the just receive a condign reward in the persons of the just. 2. The superabundant merits of the saints, if any, would form this pretended treasure, but the saints had no superabundant merits; since every, even the least meritorious action, was rewarded by Almighty God, and rendered useful and available to the acquisition of some recompense, or another, in their own favour; and, consequently, as there is no such a thing as superabundant merit, nothing remains wherewith to form this treasure.” The following is also an extract from the same writer.† We have already seen, when speaking of suffrages, that some theologians assert, that the works, and suffrages of the just are theirs so peculiarly, and exclusively, as far as satisfaction, even of any kind, is concerned, that no just man, always, of course excepting Jesus Christ, can communicate them to another, in payment, and satisfaction for the punishment due to his sins. From this opinion, it follows as a necessary consequence, that the treasure of the church is not formed of the satisfactions of the saints; and that an indulgence is not an application of any of these satisfactions, towards the remission of the temporal punishment due to sin. So far this opinion is nearly the same as that of Durandus; but it may differ from that writer’s in this; that this opinion may be defended, and it will be still true to say, that the merits of the saints, in as far as they are able to obtain anything by imputation, or to merit it by congruity, may, in this sense, be said to form a part of the treasure of the Church. They may also, in the same sense, be said to be superabundant, since

\* Suarez, Tom. 4. Disp. 56.

† Suarez, l. c.

they can obtain from the Almighty, by way of merit, more blessings than would in reality have been otherwise bestowed on the Church, and her faithful children. This, in fact, is enough to reconcile this opinion with the Papal decrees; since Clement, in the *Extravagant* mentioned above, speaks of merit, and not of satisfaction. These extracts are enough to shew the truth of the above deduction—that *the existence of a treasure in the Church, composed of the satisfactions of the saints, is not to be admitted, as an article of our Faith*,—that, in fact, our theologians are not agreed on this point.

However, if those who maintain the existence of this treasure, merely mean, that the actions performed by the saints, during their mortal career, can, even beyond the grave, obtain many favours from the Almighty; and, if it be in this sense only, that they are said to form a part of the treasure of the church; our dissenting brethren even cannot possibly find anything to condemn in such an opinion; supported, as it is, by so many passages of holy writ. “*I am the God of Abraham, thy father, do not fear, for I am with thee: I will bless thee, and multiply thy seed for my servant Abraham’s sake.*”\* “*For thy servant David’s sake, turn not away the face of thy anointed.*”† which means, according to the Genevese bible, *do not despise, nor reject the prayers, which Solomon thy anointed king offers for the general good of his people*:—words which, as clearly admit a treasure in the church, as any used by the Catholic theologians quoted above. This power of impetration is, by many of our writers, called *congruous merit*; whilst others, so far from admitting of *congruous merit* for others, deny that we can even merit, *for ourselves*, in this manner. We have seen, in the last section on merits, that Mestrezat admits our doctrine on the merit of good works, in the manner that I have explained it. Now I should be glad to know, in what our dissenting brethren differ from us, either on the subject of *merit*,—or *satisfaction*,—either for ourselves, or, by way of impetration; as by prayer, for others,—or, in fine, on the spiritual treasury of the Church;—when once our real doctrines, on these subjects, are clearly discriminated from the mere opinions of

\* Gen. xxvi 24.

† Ps. 131, 10.

private divines ? And yet what dissensions have been caused by a mere misunderstanding of our tenets !

If, however, any one should wish to know my own private opinion, on the questions mooted above ; I should say, that I hold the same opinions on satisfaction, as on merit,—since the Council of Trent holds the same language of both ; and since the principles that must direct our judgment in both cases are precisely the same. Hence the opinion of those writers appears to me most probable, who held, 1, that our satisfactions are condign, and that this condignness results partly from the work itself, and partly from its being accepted by the Almighty. 2. That not only works proceeding from the love of God, but also others that spring from other virtues, particularly all penal actions, satisfy by impetration for the temporal punishment due to sin. 3. That the faithful can assist each other by way of suffrage, by undergoing vicariously the punishment due to another's sin ;—and that they thus satisfy, in the strict meaning of the word, which does not merely imply a gratuitous remission, but a real payment of the punishment that is due,—a satisfaction consequently which is more than impetratory. That the faithful satisfy in this manner, both for the living and the dead ; and that the satisfaction, in both these cases, is infallibly of benefit to those in whose favour it is applied, whether still detained in the flesh, or suffering in purgatory, and that too, to the full value of the satisfaction offered. 4. That, consequently, we ought to hold, that there is, in the christian church, a treasure composed, not solely, nor even principally, of the merits and satisfaction of Christ,—for it is of faith that there is a treasure in the church of this character,—but also of the merits, and satisfaction of the saints in favour of others, and, that, in the strict meaning of the word satisfaction. For a complete and satisfactory proof of each of these opinions I must refer the reader to Suarez.\* To enter into further details, would be foreign to the object of these pages, which is to lay before the reader a plain statement of our faith ; and to discriminate between the tenets of the church, and the opinions of individual theologians,—which I hope has been satisfactorily done in the preceding sections.

\* Suarez, Tom. 4, Disp. 48, sec. 2, 3, 5, 6, and Dis. 51, Sup. 1, 2.



## § 4.

*On Indulgences.*

Neither Pope Pius's creed, nor the Council of Trent decrees anything more, than what I here subjoin, on the subject of Indulgences. The creed merely gives us an abstract of the doctrine of the council: in it we *affirm that the power of granting Indulgences was left by Christ in his church; and that the use of these Indulgences is highly beneficial to all Christians.* The Council of Trent,\* in its decree concerning Indulgences, delivers the same doctrine in these words. "Since the power of granting Indulgences was bestowed by Christ on his church, and since she has exercised, from the earliest times, that power which was thus divinely entrusted to her; the Holy Synod teaches, and commands, that the use of them, as being highly beneficial to all Christian people, and approved by the authority of the Holy Councils,—be retained; and the synod anathematizes those who say that they are useless, or deny that there is in the church an authority and power to grant them; but, in this grant, the synod wishes that moderation, agreeably to the ancient, and approved practice of the church, be observed; for fear, lest by too great a facility in granting these favours, ecclesiastical discipline be weakened. As to the abuses that have crept into this practice, and which have given occasion to heretics to declaim against this valuable privilege, the Holy Synod, from a wish to correct them, ordains, by the present general decree, that all sordid gain, obtained by such grants, which has been the cause of so many abuses among the people of Christ, be entirely abolished. And as to other abuses, arising from superstition, ignorance, irreligion, or from any other source, but which, on account of the multiplied corruptions, that disgrace those places and countries, in which they are found, cannot, without inconvenience, be denounced by a special prohibition,—the synod charges every bishop to correct, with care, the abuses of the church committed to his care,—to report them to the first Provincial Synod,—that thence, with the advice of others of the episcopal body, an account of them may, without delay, be transmitted to the Sovereign Pontiff; that,

\* Concil. Trid. Sess. 25.

by his authority and prudent care, the remedies necessary for each particular church may be arranged ; that thus, the trust of dispensing to the faithful these holy favors may be exercised, piously, holily, and without abuse." This is all that the council decreed ; it follows, therefore, that the above is of faith, being proposed to our belief by a General Council ;—and, also, that nothing else but the above is of faith, since this is all that has been propounded by this, or by any other œcumenical council.

It is, therefore, an article of our faith, that *there is in the church a power, received from God, to grant Indulgences.*—This is clear from our Rule of Faith. However, it also follows, on the other hand, 1: That *it is not an article of our faith that, in the use or grant of Indulgences, as now practised, the temporal punishment due after the sin has been pardoned before God, is remitted, either in purgatory, or in this life: nor even that the church has any intention, in these grants to remit this punishment,; or that it really and de facto is remitted.\** For 1st, This is not proposed to our belief by the Council of Trent. Indeed, to determine *what the church wishes to remit*, is a mere question of fact, and cannot, therefore, possibly be an Article of Faith. 2. We find different opinions, in the writings of our theologians, on this subject. These opinions have been collected by many writers, and among the rest by Suarez, who says,\* "Some Catholic theologians have maintained, that by Indulgences the

\* It may be as well to observe, that the following proposition of Luther was condemned by Leo X. "Indulgentiæ his, qui veraciter, eas consequuntur, non valent pro remissione pœnæ pro peccatis actualibus debitæ apud divinam justitiam....," and this condemnation was confirmed by Pius VI., in his bull auctorem Fidei,"\* against the synod of Pistoja, in these words "Propositio asserens *indulgentiam secundum suam precisam notionem aliud non esse quam remissionem partis ejus pœnitentiæ; quæ per canones statuta erant peccanti.*" Quasi indulgentia præter nudam remissionem pœnæ canonicæ non etiam valeat ad remissionem pœnæ temporalis pro peccatis actualibus debitæ apud divinam justitiam. Falsa, temeraria, Christi meritis injuriosa, dudum in articulo 19. Lutheri damnata"||

† Suarez, disp. 48. sect. 1.

\* Prop. XL, page 29.

punishment which remains due, to satisfy the justice of God, after our sins have been pardoned, is nowise remitted ; and that we are thereby merely freed from the obligation of undergoing the canonical penances, or those punishments which have been enjoined by the church. This was maintained by Cajetan, who, however, confines his assertion to the actual practice of the church, without discussing its power to establish a different usage." "There is," observes Suarez in another place,\* "a variety of opinion on this subject. Some have imagined that, by Indulgences as actually now granted, the punishment due to sin is not remitted before God ; and think, that by these grants, we are merely exonerated from the obligation of performing sacramental penance ; an opinion which has a certain degree of antiquity in its favour, since we find it mentioned by St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, and implied in Albertus's definition of an Indulgence, namely, that it is the remission of penances, *which have been enjoined by the church*. This opinion is founded on certain expressions in the canon law, which seem to favour it : as we often meet there with Indulgences said to be granted from *prescribed penances*. And, indeed, from one of the decrees of Pope Clement,† it is clear that this is the common form in which Indulgences are granted ; so much so, that if Indulgences were granted without this clause, it would have to be understood and supplied ; since all such grants must be construed, and explained, according to the usual forms of Canon Law,—and such Indulgences, consequently, would only be a remission of the *penances prescribed by the church*. This view is, also, strongly confirmed by a form very commonly used by the Holy See, in granting Indulgences, namely, *we grant an Indulgence of seven years, or forty days, or a given number of forty days*, an enumeration which clearly is regulated by the ancient canonical penances, by which a given degree of punishment was awarded to different sins.—Finally, the above may be confirmed by an observation already made on the ancient practice of the church in relaxing her penances—since, as I noticed, it is not certain that, by

\* Suarez, disp. 50. sect. 3. De Indulg.

† Clem. Unic. de reliq. et vener. Sanct.



virtue of that relaxation, the temporal punishment due to sin was, at the same time, remitted at the tribunal of God.—Indulgences, were, at a later period, extended, on the same footing, to the penances which had been enjoined in the sacrament of penance; but the effect of such Indulgences was no greater, nor more certain than in the case just mentioned; and Indulgences, as granted now-a-days, are still, merely the remission of the *penances prescribed by the church and her ministers.*” The reasons adduced by these writers, as well as the weight and authority of their names, render this opinion beyond all, doubt, probable. Now, surely, Indulgences, explained in this manner, cannot possibly but be admitted by every Protestant; since they are nothing more than the relaxation of the old canonical penances, which no Protestant pretends to observe. Besides do we not see the penalties which the discipline of the dissenting churches imposes, very often remitted, and for a great variety of causes? Nay, it is the opinion of some of our dissenting brethren, that, as often as sins are remitted by the ministry of their clergy, *such sins are remitted by their ministers* (these are De Moulin’s own words,)\* without any punishment remaining to be suffered, either in this life, or in purgatory. The dissenting ministers, therefore, grant indulgences, and those too, *most plenary*, almost as often as they assemble in their places of worship.

2. *With regard to the power of granting indulgences, it is not of faith, that there is in the church a power to grant such Indulgences as actually will remit, at the tribunal of God, either in this life or in the life to come, the temporal punishment which may remain due after our sins have been pardoned; or, in other words, it is not an article of Catholic Faith, that the church can grant an Indulgence, the direct effect of which shall be the remission of the temporal punishment, which is due to the justice of God, and which would otherwise have to be undergone either in this life, or in purgatory.* This may be proved. 1. Because the Council of Trent passed no decree to this effect. 2. From the variety of opinions on this subject, among our theologians. The fol-

\* Du Moul. in Eras. p. 49.

lowing extract is from the works of St. Thomas :\* it is an answer to this question which, forms this title to his chapter—*can an Indulgence* remit any part of our satisfactory punishments? “We must grant, says he,—for this is admitted by every Catholic,—that Indulgences are useful; since it would shew a great want of piety to pretend that the church can establish a practice, to no use, or purpose. Some writers, however, assert, that Indulgences cannot remit that measure of temporal punishment which the Almighty has decreed must be endured in purgatory; although they may free the penitent from the obligation of performing those penal works, which the ministers of God may have imposed on him, or to which he may be subjected by the canons of the church. But this opinion does not seem to me well-founded, because, &c.” Therefore, though St. Thomas does not adopt this opinion, he does not denounce it as heretical. 3. None of the arguments of Suarez,† or, indeed, of any other theologian, when carefully examined by our rule of faith, and our deductions from it, prove that the above position is of faith, or, which is of more importance,—of Catholic Faith. 4. A positive proof of the truth of my proposition may be drawn from the very words of the Council of Trent. The council recognizes in the church a power of granting Indulgences, and such a power, and no other as was exercised in the earliest ages; by the Councils of Ancyra,‡ for instance, Neocæsarea,§ Nice,|| Carthage,¶ and of Agdes.\*\* Now, on this subject, we have the following concessions, from Suarez. “The Council of Trent declares, that the use of Indulgences has been approved of by the sacred authority of Councils; and the Councils of Nice, Carthage IV., Neocæssarea, Agdes, and Laodicea, are generally adduced in confirmation of this assertion. Yet all that we discover, in the decrees of these synods is, that the Bishops always enjoyed the privilege of mitigating the public and canonical penances, (which, in those days

\* S. Thomas, in Supplem. qu. 25. art. 1.

† Suarez, Disp. 49. sect. 1, and Disp. 50. sect. 2.

‡ Conc. Ancy. cap. 2. 5. 9. 21. 22.

§ Concil. Neocæs. cap. 3.

|| Concil. Nic. cap. 1. 12.

¶ Concil. Carth. IV. cap. 75.

\*\* Concil. Agath. cap. 60.

were inflicted on different sins, according to a fixed standard) in favour of penitents, as their lives and good behaviour seemed to require. We cannot, however, collect, with any certainty, from these councils that this relaxation extended so far as to mitigate or remit, in the sight of God, the temporal punishment due to sin. No argument, therefore, or at least, no convincing argument can be drawn from this source, which at most furnishes a kind of presumptive evidence,—a probable kind of argument from analogy deduced from the power of the keys.”\* The same writer, after citing various passages from the writings of St. Cyprian, St. Basil, St. Gregory of Nyssa, and adducing numerous testimonies from the General Councils, adds,† “from these documents, it is clear that it was an old practice, in fact a usage of the primitive church, to relax at times these penalties (the canonical penances;) and that this was sometimes done by remitting them after they had been imposed; and at others, by absolving the penitent at the exterior tribunal of the church, without imposing any, or at most a mitigated penance for the sins committed. Now it is not easy to see how we can prove from these abridgments, or modifications of the canonical penances, that the use of Indulgences was the same then, as I mean to shew that it is in our days. For granting that sinners were sometimes, as a matter of Indulgence, reconciled by the prelates of the church, and admitted to her communion, without being subjected to some particular canonical, or public penance; still it does not, on that account, strictly speaking, follow, that this pardon or relaxation freed them before God, from the debt of punishment which remained due to his justice, in consequence of their sins. In fact, the ministers of the church, when they received a sinner into grace, and looked upon him as reconciled, without imposing any burthen upon him, did not consider him as liberated from the punishment of purgatory, which he might have merited, but felt that it was still incumbent on him to satisfy in some other manner the justice of God; or at least they supposed, and believed, that he had already fully discharged that debt, by the fervour of his re-

\* Disp. 49. sect. 2.

† Suarez, l. c.



pentance, or in some other manner.” “It was by some such reasoning as this, (he adds a little later) that Cajetan was induced to maintain, that by Indulgences, only the penances enjoined by the pastors of the church are remitted, and not the debt of temporal punishment due to the justice of God. Though this be not true of Indulgences as now granted, it may have had some foundation in the practice of the Church, during the times of which I am now speaking, namely, before the pontificate of Gregory the Great. However this may be, I wish to be understood as thinking, that we have no positive evidence whatever, either from history, or from reasoning upon the nature of the thing itself, that the practice of the Church was not the same then as it is now;—that the arguments, consequently, in favour of Cajetan’s opinion are purely negative, arising from the want of any clear proof, in the monuments of those times, of an application of Indulgences similar to our own. This much, in my opinion, cannot possibly be denied, since none of the testimonies adduced above amount to anything like demonstration on this point.” Now this admission of Suarez, coupled with the first part of my argument, drawn from the words of the Council of Trent, seems to justify me in considering the principles contained in this paragraph, as quite undeniable. 5. In addition to the above, it will be well to pay particular attention to this fact, that among the Theologians assembled at Trent, there were many perfectly well aware, that this question was warmly debated in our schools; and that it was against this particular application of Indulgences, to the remission of punishment at the tribunal of God, that Protestants particularly reclaimed. Silence, on this point, consequently, is no small proof, that the Council was persuaded, that it is no article of Faith, that there is in the Church *a power of granting Indulgences, as remissions before God of the temporal punishment, which remains to be discharged by the sinner,—either in this life, or in Purgatory,* 6. Bellarmin,\* in discussing this difficult question, states the above opinion, without pretending to condemn it as heretical; and merely says, *I will prove in opposition* to what

\* Bellarm. Lib. 1, de Indul. cap. p. 7. prop. 4.

has been injudiciously asserted by some Catholics," &c. Neither does Suarez, as we have seen in the above extracts, pronounce it heretical. In fact, there is not a single one of our Theologians that has ventured to do so;—it is not, therefore, an article of Faith, or rather it is not, and this is all that I want to shew, an article of Catholic Faith, that Indulgences are a remission, before God, of the temporal punishment due to sin. 7. Nor can the practice of the Church be adduced in proof, or the opinion common among the faithful, resulting from that practice; because, in the first place, as I have already shewn from Vasquez, *it is not true, that all practices of the Church, even of the Universal Church, are a sufficient ground for an article of Faith, since the Church, in adopting a practice, sometimes does no more than follow an opinion that is merely probable, without proposing it as an undoubted dogma of Faith.* And, in the second place, it is far from being certain that the Church, in her grants of Indulgences,<sup>3</sup> has really any intention of remitting the temporal punishment due to sin in the sight of God. Now, if this be the case, how can it possibly be pretended, that the present practice of the Church is a proof, that the power in question exists in the Church?

However I willingly subscribe to the following observations made by St. Thomas,\* on the position, which I have here advanced. "This opinion does not seem to me well-founded; first, because it directly militates against a privilege granted to St. Peter, by our Saviour, in these words: 'whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven;'<sup>†</sup> from which text it follows, that any relaxation that is of effect, at the tribunal of the church, is also valid before God. Besides the church, by granting Indulgences of the character pretended by this opinion, would rather injure, than benefit the faithful; since by absolving them from the penances enjoined by her ministers, she would thereby deliver them over, to the much severer punishments of purgatory. For these reasons, I am of opinion, that their effects are not merely confined to the punishments, which come directly under ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but extend, also, to the tri-

\* St. Thomas in suppl. l. c.

† Matt. xvi. 19.

bunal of the Almighty, and remit the punishment that may be due after contrition and confession, whether enjoined as a sacramental penance or not, &c.” For a further and more complete proof of the existence of this power in the church, I would refer the reader to Suarez\* who argues in its favour, from the practice of the church, not only at the present time, but also during several preceding centuries; from numerous Papal Bulls, in which, in grants of Indulgences, it is expressly specified, that the temporal punishment due to the justice of God is remitted. Now I grant that these arguments have their force; but I cannot agree with the same writer when he goes so far as to assert, that the doctrine which they favour is of faith. I have already observed, and I now repeat it,—whatever Suarez may think to the contrary,—that such a practice is not a sufficient ground for admitting this opinion among our Articles of Faith. Just in the same way as a similarly universal practice does not prove that it is of faith that we *can satisfy for others*; or that there is a treasury in the Church, formed of the superabundant merits, or satisfactions of the saints. In fact, I denied, in the preceding Section, that either of these above opinions is of faith, much less of Catholic faith, which, I must again observe, is the only object of our inquiry. Indeed we have seen it clearly proved by Vasquez, that an opinion, if it be only probably true, is sufficient to justify the Church in adopting a practice in conformity with it; and such a practice we may look upon as good, and prudent. Now, as this is enough in other cases, why not also in these three,—vicarious satisfaction; the application of the treasure of the Church, and of Indulgences in favor of the living, and,—as will be shewn more fully in the next paragraph,—the dead. Before closing this subject, I shall have occasion to shew, that this is certainly sufficient with respect to many particular Indulgences, which may have been granted without sufficient reason; and yet, in granting which, we are not justified in doubting whether the Pope acted with prudence, and consequently, with propriety.

3. It is still less a fit subject of Catholic Faith, or, in other words, *it is not of faith, that the church can grant an*

\* Suarez, Tom. 4. disp. 48. sect. 1. 2.



*Indulgence in favour of the dead, in the true sense of an Indulgence as applied to these souls, namely, as a remission of their sufferings ; and it is farther still from being an article of faith, that the church has any intention whatever of remitting these sufferings, except by way of suffrage.\** For, in the first place, neither our creed, nor the Council of Trent, says one word on these points ; and, secondly, our own theologians are not unanimous. “Some Catholics,” says Suarez,† “admit that the Church can grant an indulgence of this character, (as a remission of punishment before God) but not, however, to the dead. Hostiensis, Gabriel, and Gerson, amongst Catholic writers, deny in plain, and unmodified terms, that Indulgences are of any use to the dead.‡ Indulgences, says Gerson, are granted and ordained, for those only, who subject themselves to the tribunal of mercy, to which we may have access till death, but not beyond it. For, he observes, the grant of Indulgences is an exercise of jurisdiction, now as the Pope has not been appointed judge over the souls in Purgatory, he has no jurisdiction over them ;—this belongs to Christ only, who has been appointed judge over the dead, and who alone prescribes the measure of punishment, to be endured by these suffering souls.” “Some Theologians think,” continues Suarez,§ “that an Indulgence, even by way of suffrage, does not infallibly obtain its effect, but that this depends, in every case, on the free acceptance, and mercy of God. They argue, that if even our private suffrages in favor of the dead are far from being necessarily beneficial to them, how much more doubt must there be, as to the effect of Indulgences. Some writers go so far as to assert, that neither the sacrifice of the Mass, nor any other work can in-

\* Sixtus IV. condemned the following proposition : “... Romanus Pontifex pœnas Purgatorii remittere non potest.” And Pius VI. in his Decree against the Synod of Pistoja, condemns a similar proposition. XLII. “Item in eo quod superaddit, luctuosius adhuc esse quod chimeræ isthæc applicatio transferri volita sit in defunctos. Falsa temeraria, piarum aurium offensiva, in Romanos Pontifices, et sensum universalis Ecclesiæ injuriosa, inducens in errorem hæreticali nota in Petro de Osma confixum, iterum damnatum in Art. 22. Lutheri.”

† Suarez, Disp. 49. sect. 1.      ‡ Suarez, Disp. 53. sect. 1.

§ Suarez, l. c. sect. 3.

fallibly, and from its own nature and constitution, or, in scholastic phraseology, *ex opere operato*, free the souls of the departed faithful, from their state of suffering. And even that we cannot say, that God has made any promise to this effect; though upon such a promise only, could an infallible certainty of the efficacy of our suffrages be based. This was taught by Cajetan, and Canus, and defended with even greater boldness by Corduba." To these extracts from Suarez I will add the following from Vasquez.\* "Soto, Canus, and Corduba, are of opinion, that the sacrifice of the Mass, in every instance, infallibly obtains a remission of punishment, when offered for the living, but not for the dead, who are detained in Purgatory, except by way of suffrage. They do not admit the distinctions usually made between the various kinds of suffrage, but assert, that, in the same manner, as our prayers for the dead are only so far useful to them as appears good to the Almighty, without any certain covenant on his part to remit, at our request, the sufferings of those souls; so neither can the sacrifice of the Mass, nor Indulgences, in any other sense, or manner, be applied in their favor. And as they conceive, that Indulgences are less certain in their efficacy, when applied to the dead, than when to the living, they also maintain the sacrifice of the mass.

In laying down my proposition, I subjoined these words, "*except by way of suffrage*;" "it not being absolutely certain," as Bellarmin† justly observes, "nor admitted by all Catholics, that the suffering souls in purgatory can be benefitted by Indulgences." Now, suppose a Protestant once to admit the existence of a purgatory, it is impossible that he should, after that, have any reasonable difficulty as to grants of Indulgences, *by way of suffrage*, or prayer. For he believes that we may pray for ourselves and for others, and that our prayers will be heard;—this is clear from the following title to the form of prayer, prescribed to be said in times of pestilence—*to obtain mercy offer up this prayer*. Now, to believe this, is at once to admit that we can assist others by our suffrages; and that God, by virtue of these prayers,

\* Vasquez, 3 parte. disp. 228. cap. 4.

† Bellarm. Lib. 1. de Indulg. cap. 14.

vouchsafes, in his mercy, to grant our requests. The Psalmist \* prays thus to the Almighty ; “ For thy servant David’s sake, turn not away the face of thy anointed.” Why then may not the Church supplicate the Almighty to grant to the dead, the remission of the debt of punishment, which may remain due to their sins,—offering up to God, for this end, the merits of Christ, and the pious works, performed by his faithful servants, during their mortal career ; and imploring his mercy, *for the sake* of that *true* David, Christ our Lord, and *for the sake* of the virtuous lives of the saints,—as Solomon trusted that God would hear him for David’s sake ? Or, in other words, for the meaning is the same, why may not the Church grant Indulgences, by way of suffrage ; and why should not God, who deigns to hear all other supplications of the church, and of the faithful, vouchsafe also to listen, in his mercy, to the petitions of the faithful, for the souls of their departed brethren ? Only call to mind my remarks on the *remission of the sins* of the faithful by the Dissenting ministers, which is so complete that it is followed by an entire remission of all punishment also ; and it must be a matter of surprise that they can possibly deny a power of granting Indulgences to the Pope, whilst their lowest ministers claim this privilege to a far more exorbitant extent. The only difficulty, therefore, in the case, lies in proving, that there is a purgatory ; and that a debt of temporal punishment remains after sin has been remitted. But this is quite a distinct question. The above is all that is of faith, and all beyond it amounts to nothing more than so many probable opinions.

Of these opinions, the following seem to me the most probable :—1. That the remission of punishment, whether due from the living, or the dead, by virtue of a law established by the Almighty, is always granted as the infallible effect of the sacrifice of the mass. “ This opinion,” says Vasquez, † “ is common among divines, and is the only true one. 2. That the suffrages of the faithful are beneficial, according to a fixed and determined law, to the souls of the faithful departed. 3. I even think with Suarez, ‡ that it is more

\* Psalm cxxxi. 10. † Vasquez, l. c. ‡ Suarez, disp. 53. sect. 3.



true, to say, that an Indulgence granted in favour of the dead, has its effect as infallibly as when granted to the living. This is St. Thomas' opinion, and was considered by Soto, as least liable to objection. The former of these writers asserts that an Indulgence, when granted in the form prescribed for the purpose, is as beneficial to the dead, as one granted to the living." However, since my only view is to discriminate what is of faith, from what is not, and to propose the former, to the belief of those who differ from us in religion; and since the profession of such doctrines as are articles of Catholic Faith, at once makes them Catholics; though no notice whatever be taken of other opinions, which, in fact, they need not know at all. I shall spend no more time in these questions.

4. No jubilee, or indulgence granted by the Pope, or by a council, whether *plenary*, or otherwise, and confined to a specified number of years; or *particular*, that is granted for certain particular reasons, or depending on the performance of certain specified works, is an article of faith; or, in other words, the validity of no such jubilee, or indulgence is of that certainty which is essential to every article of Faith; whilst many of these are merely probably valid; and, others, which have a certain currency, have no other object but sordid gain, are scandalous, and as such, consequently, are by all means to be done away with. That it is not of Faith, that any particular Indulgence is valid may be proved, first, because no one particular Indulgence is specified in our creed, the Council of Trent, or any other General Council.

2. Indulgences granted by Popes, or by councils, are nothing but so many practices, which I have shewn above are not, even though adopted by the Universal Church, a sufficient ground for an article of Faith; since the only foundation of these usages may be an opinion, in itself merely probable.

3. Indulgences, granted by the Popes, are still less of faith, even doctrinal points propounded by them, as I have already observed, not being of faith, and especially not of Catholic Faith; much less consequently usages introduced, or confirmed by them.

4. No conclusion is of faith, that is deduced from two propositions, one of which has not been revealed, and much less if it be merely a probable opinion:

now I shall shortly prove this to be the case with all jubilees, and indulgences. The above position may also, in the third place, be proved from the authority of our own writers "it being the unanimous opinion of all theologians," says Bellarmin\* justly, "that an Indulgence granted, without a sufficient cause, is of no effect, in expiating before God, either in this life, or in purgatory, the debt of punishment due to sin. This is taught by St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Durand, Gabriel, and all modern scholastic writers. It is, however, disputed, for the grant to be considered as just, whether there should be a *proportion* between the work enjoined, and the Indulgence, so that the greater the Indulgence, the greater the cause;—or, whether an Indulgence the most extensive even, may not be granted for the performance of the smallest work. There are two opinions on this question:—the first of which teaches, that no such proportion is necessary, and that it is enough, that the cause be good; that is to say, that the Indulgence be not granted, for the performance of a work radically bad, or purely temporal and worldly, useless or nowise conducive to the glory of God; and that an Indulgence, consequently, is valid, if granted for any work whatever that tends to the honour of God, and the good of his church. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, Durandus, Paludanus, Valentia, &c. But, St. Bonaventure, on the other hand, Gerson, Richard, Gabriel, Cajetan, Major, Soto and others are of opinion that, for an Indulgence to be considered as granted for a just cause, it is not enough, that a work, in itself pious and useful, be enjoined, but that it is also requisite, that it be proportionate to the Indulgence; and that consequently, if a very great Indulgence be granted for a very slight cause, such Indulgence is not valid. For, they argue, if it were true that Indulgences are valid, when granted, for any pious cause, or motive whatever; there would be no such a thing as a superfluous, or indiscreet Indulgence; as there will always be some such motive at hand; and, if this were the case, nothing could hinder the Pope from liberating at any moment that he pleased, all the souls of purgatory from their sufferings; since it is to the glory of God

\* Bellarm. De Indul. Lib. 2, ap. 12.

that these souls be admitted, as soon as possible, to the joys of heaven. This opinion is not only the more generally received, but seems to me the more true ; so that, if for instance, a plenary Indulgence were granted for the recital of the Lord's prayer once, for the conversion of heretics, or for the contribution of a very small sum of money, towards the recovery of the holy land ; I should not consider either of these as a just cause, for so great a grant." Now it is in no case of faith that any one particular cause, or any one action in particular, in virtue of which an Indulgence, or jubilee is granted, *is a just cause*; or, that a due proportion is preserved, between the Indulgence, and the work enjoined ; it is, therefore, evident that we are never certain, that an Indulgence, or Jubilee is valid.

From what has been said above, it follows that the second clause of this fourth corollary is true beyond all controversy—"that many, and indeed almost all Indulgences, are only probably valid." It is, in fact, scarcely possible ever to know for certain, what this requisite proportion is ; and the more trifling the cause and the work enjoined, the less probability is there of the validity of the indulgence. This is the case with many Indulgences, such, for instance, as are granted for the recital of five "our Fathers," and the giving some small alms. However, we are not justified in blaming the Pope, for granting these Indulgencies ; we ought, rather, in fact, to commend him for so doing ; a probable opinion, such as the first above mentioned, being quite enough to justify this practice ; and though these Indulgences may not be entirely valid, if the second opinion at least be true, still there is no harm done by the grant of the Indulgence, as the faithful are moved by it, to the performance of works of piety.

Before I conclude this subject, I wish to observe with Bellarmin,\* "that though a just cause be always requisite, still, it is not the province of inferiors, to pass judgment on the sufficiency or insufficiency of such cause ; it is their duty, in simplicity of heart, to consider it as just. It is well known, however, that the Popes, in former ages, were exceedingly sparing in granting Indulgences." Nor ought the faithful to be deterred,

\* Bellarm. l. c.



by this uncertainty, from their endeavours to obtain Indulgences, since, in almost all human concerns, we undertake many things with nothing but a probability in our favour, and yet we act with prudence. The physician prescribes a medicine, without any imprudence whatever, which he has probable, but not certain grounds, for believing will be useful, or, at all events, certainly not hurtful to his patient. We go to law, we embark in trade, with merely a probable prospect of gain; and without being by any means certain even that we may not lose our cause, or our goods by shipwreck. The Popes, for a similar reason, act with prudence in granting and the faithful, in endeavouring to obtain, these Indulgences. "There is, generally speaking," observes Bellarmin,\* "no danger whatever of the faithful being deceived; for as the Indulgence may sometimes not have its effect, from a deficiency on the part of the receiver; there can be no absurdity in supposing, that, in like manner, it may be invalid from some defect on the part of the giver. Besides the faithful know full well, that it is of faith that there is a power in the church of granting Indulgences, but not that it may not sometimes happen, that some particular Indulgence may be invalid; or, in particular cases, not beneficial;—and all prudent and well-regulated Catholics, whilst they receive the Indulgences granted by the Pope, do not neglect, at the same time, to bring forth *worthy* fruits of penance, and to satisfy to God for their sins.

There is still a third clause in my fourth corollary;—and this too is confirmed by Bellarmin.† "Some writers," says he, "amongst whom are Gerson and Soto, deny altogether that certain Indulgences, which promise the remission of punishment for thousands of years, have ever been granted by any Pope; and they assert, that all such Indulgencies are mere forgeries of the mendicants. It has been the custom of the Popes to confine their grants of Indulgences, to the same number of years as the church did her penitential canons; which were sometimes for two, three, five, ten, or twenty years, or, at most, for a person's life-time, which seldom reaches beyond a hundred years. A person that really wish-

\* Bellarm. l. c.

† Bellarm. l. c. cap. 9.

es to know the true history of Papal Indulgences, must not seek it in the writings of our professed enemies, nor in obscure and miserable pamphlets, such as Chemnitz tells us he saw translated into the German language, and edited, *with additions*, at Nuremburg, which had been first published in Latin at Rome, though containing, observe, less matter. Let him not refer to such sources, but rather to the decrees of our Popes; to the authorized documents of the church; or, at all events, to writers who have a just claim to veracity, authority, learning, and probity. For no one can possibly doubt, but these obscure and anonymous publications contain many forgeries, or, at all events, many mis-statements. We never find any mention in writers, whose authority is of any weight, of Indulgences, either of several thousand days, or of thousands of years." Besides these, are many that have obtained a certain currency, which seem clearly forgeries, or, at all events, the authenticity of which is highly doubtful, and even scarcely probable,—which, however, it is not worth my while to mention here,—These also owe their origin to the mendicants to swell their gains; and this, to the no small scandal of Protestants *who have taken occasion*, says the Council of Trent, *from these abuses, to inveigh against the very name of Indulgences*. And the Synod, in consequence, decreed, that all sordid gain, obtained by these means, which had been the fruitful cause of so many abuses among the faithful, should be entirely done away with.

With this discrimination of what is faith, from what is not, our Dissenting brethren cannot possibly find much difficulty in admitting the doctrine of the Catholic Church on Indulgences; the misunderstanding of which has caused the most tragical scenes to be enacted in our days; and was the unhappy beginning of their separation from the church. Let us propose nothing to their belief, but what is contained in our Profession of Faith, and the Council of Trent: let us not pretend to be *more wise* than the Fathers of this Synod, and the author of this Creed—Pope Pius IV.; let us bury all other questions in silence, since the profession of what is propounded by these two authorities, is undoubtedly enough to make any man a true Catholic, on this point.

## § 5.

*On Purgatory, and Suffrages for the Dead.*

On these subjects we profess in our creed, that we “firmly hold, that there is a Purgatory; and that the souls therein detained, are helped by the suffrages of the Faithful.” We also “profess, that in the Mass is offered to God a true, proper, and propitiatory sacrifice for the living and the dead.” In this section, I shall confine my remarks to the second of these propositions.

The following is the decree of the Council of Trent.\* “As the Catholic Church, instructed by the Holy Spirit, has taught in her Councils, from the sacred writings, and the ancient tradition of the Fathers; and this Synod has now recently declared, that there is a Purgatory, and that the souls there detained, are helped by the suffrages of the Faithful, but principally by the acceptable sacrifice of the altar,—therefore this holy Synod gives her commands to the bishops, to be particularly careful, that the sound doctrine concerning Purgatory, which has been delivered by the holy Fathers, and Sacred Councils, be taught, and held, and believed, and every where preached: that all abstruse, and subtle questions, which tend not to edification, and from which piety seldom draws any advantage, be avoided in public discourses before the uninstructed people: that uncertain things, or such as have the appearance of falsehood, be not allowed *to be made public*, nor be discussed: and that whatever may tend to encourage idle curiosity, and superstition; or may savour of filthy lucre, be prohibited, as scandalous impediments to the Faithful. And let the bishops be attentive, that the suffrages of the living—the sacrifice, namely, of the Mass, prayer, alms-deeds, and other works of piety, which have been hitherto accustomed to be offered up for the departed faithful, be still piously, and devoutly continued, according to the established regulations of the Church.”

We know, therefore, according to our Rule, what is of faith, as being propounded by an æcumenical council;—whilst, on the other hand, the following opinions are not of Faith, because not confirmed by this authority.

\* Concil. Trid. Sess. 25. Decret. de Purgat.



1. It is no article of Faith, says Bellarmin,\* that there is a true, and real fire in Purgatory,—of the same kind as our common elementary fire;—because this has not been defined by any of our Councils; and though, in the Council of Florence, the Greeks openly declared, that they did not believe in a Purgatorial fire, still, in the Decree, passed in the last Session, it was merely defined, that there is a Purgatory, without one word being said as to there being a fire there. However, I deem it the most probable opinion for these reasons, &c.” 2. “It is also a question,” says the same writer,† “*where Purgatory is*, but the Church has defined nothing on this point. There are a variety of opinions,” he continues, and after stating several, “the eighth, he observes, is commonly adopted by the schools, and asserts, that Purgatory is in the bowels of the earth, at no great distance from hell.” 3. ‡ As to the intensity of the pains of Purgatory, says the same author, though all admit that they are greater than anything that we suffer in this life, still it is doubtful, how this is to be explained and understood. Bonaventure says, that the sufferings of Purgatory are only severer than those of this life, in as much as the greatest suffering in Purgatory is more severe, than the greatest suffering endured in this life; though there may be a degree of punishment in Purgatory less intense, than what may sometimes be undergone in this world. This opinion I am myself favourable to. 4. Nor is there anything of Faith, on the duration of the pains of Purgatory, and, “as this is a question,” says Bellarmin,§ “so completely uncertain, it is rash to pretend to determine anything about it.”

Now, with this discrimination of what is of faith from what is not, it must be easy for the Protestant, to persuade himself of the existence of a Purgatory; especially with these words of Calvin before him. || “It is neither right, nor useful, to enquire too curiously into the state of souls, between the time after death, and their resurrection. Many torture themselves exceedingly with disputes about the place into which our souls are received; and wish to know, whe-

\* Bellarm. Lib. 2. De Purgat. cap. 11.

† Bellarm. Ibid. cap. 6.

‡ Cap. 14. § Bellarm. Ibid. cap. 9. || Calv. Instit. Lib. 3. cap. 25. § 6.

ther our souls are immediately admitted to the enjoyment of the promised glory, or not. Scripture is silent on these points, and which of our Doctors shall teach us, that which God has hidden from us? As the scripture wishes us to remain in suspense till the coming of Jesus Christ, and bids us patiently await his coming, and refers us to that day, for the reception of our crown of glory; let us keep within the bounds which God himself has marked out for us; that is to say, let us believe that the souls of the faithful are received into rest; and there joyfully await the fruition of the promised glory; and that everything will remain in this state of suspense, till Christ shall appear as the Redeemer." From this passage, it is clear that Calvin admitted a *third* place, and one too in which there is a suspense, and delay; but "hope, which is deferred, afflicteth the soul."\* This third place is undoubtedly a kind of Purgatory.

2. It is evident from the decree of the Council of Trent, what is of faith on the question of *suffrages*:—all, in a word, that is propounded, in the passage cited above, by that authority; and it also follows, that none of the following opinions are of faith.

1. However much the following opinion may be the more common and true, still it is not of Faith, as I have, indeed, shewn already, *that the sacrifice of the Mass always obtains, in virtue of a fixed law and covenant, a remission of punishment in favour of the souls of Purgatory; or that it is available to them, in any other manner, than by way of suffrage.* 2. *Nor is it of Faith, that the suffrages of the faithful are beneficial to the dead, by any fixed, and unerring law.* The reason is, that the Council of Trent has decreed nothing on these points. However, I grant that it is the more probable opinion, that these suffrages really are available, by a fixed, and certain law. 3. Nor is it of Faith, that the sacrifice of the Mass produces this effect by virtue of the nature of the action, or, in scholastic phraseology *ex opere operato*. The council is silent on this subject; "and," observes Vasquez,† "our own writers neither think, nor speak, unanimously about it." "Some theologians think, says Saurez,‡ "that

\* Prov. xiii 12. † Vasquez, Disp. 229. cap. 1. ‡ Suarez. Disp. 48. sect. 5.

the sacrifice of the Mass is not an action by which, in virtue of a fixed, and infallible law, the souls in Purgatory may be delivered, *ex opere operato*, from their sufferings."

The reasons assigned for the three preceding decisions, may be applied to this also. 4. Nor is it of Faith, that the remission of punishment is caused, by the application of our satisfactions to the souls in Purgatory. For, in the first place, the Council of Trent, says nothing about this; and, secondly, our own writers disagree. "There is a first opinion," says Suarez, \* "that asserts, in general terms, that not only is it possible, that our suffrages are beneficial to the souls in Purgatory by way of impetration, but that we cannot even assist them in any other manner. This is beyond all dispute, and *a fortiori* the opinion of those divines, who do not even admit of any other kind of vicarious satisfaction between the living, since it is a principle admitted by all writers, that our suffrages cannot possibly be more efficacious for the dead, than they are for the living."

### § 6.

#### *On the Obligation of Human Laws, as binding the Conscience.*

In the creed of Pope Pius, IV. we declare, that "we most steadfastly admit, and embrace, the observances, and constitutions of the church: that we receive, and admit the received, and approved ceremonies of the Catholic Church, used in the solemn administration of the different sacraments: we promise and swear true obedience to the Bishop of Rome; and also receive all other things that have been delivered by the Sacred Canons, and General Councils." The following is the doctrine of the Council of Trent.† If any one shall say, that the just man is under no obligation to observe the commands of the church, let him be anathema." can. 8. If any one shall say, that those who are baptized are free from all the precepts of the holy church, so as to be under no obligation of complying with them, unless, from their own free choice, they please to submit to them, let him be anathema." And finally, in the 25th session, "The holy synod exhorts and entreats all pastors, like good

\* Suarez, disp. 48. sect. 5. † Concil. Tridentinum, Sess. 6. cap. 20.



soldiers, sedulously to recommend to all the faithful, the observance of all the precepts of the Holy Roman Church, as also of all the regulations determined upon in this synod, and in the other General Councils, and to use the utmost care, that the faithful be particular in observing all those duties, which tend to the mortification of the flesh, as fasting, and the abstinence from certain meats; as also, in complying with those precepts which are conducive to piety, as the devout, and religious celebration of the festival days; and to put the faithful also frequently in mind, to obey those who have been placed over them; knowing that if they hear them, God will reward their obedience, and if they despise them the Almighty will punish them.\* This is all that the council has decreed on this subject; and this, consequently, is the doctrine of the Catholic Church; being proposed to our belief, by a General Council.

It follows, on the other hand, 1. That it is not of Faith, that the church, or rather that the laws of the church, and *a fortiori* that the laws of secular princes, *can* or that they actually, and *de facto* do bind in conscience, under mortal sin; or, to use the language of the 24th article of a Protestant creed, “so as to impose a yoke upon consciences.” I repeat that this is not of Faith, and particularly not of Catholic Faith. The 24th article, consequently, of their profession of Faith, is *not heretical*, in which they *reject all human inventions, which impose a yoke upon the conscience.* Nor the 33rd which *excludes all human inventions, and all laws by which it is pretended, that an obligation is imposed upon the conscience.* Nor the following declaration of the confession of Augsburg, which asserts, that *Romanists, under the New Testament, require the observance of certain meats, days, dress, and such like, under the penalty of sin; and that, from this principle, proceed those burthens, by which the eating of certain meats is considered as defiling the conscience, and the omission of the “canonical hours,” is pronounced a mortal sin. But whence have the bishops derived their warrant, to impose these traditions upon the church, as a burthen upon the conscience?*

\* Hebr. iii. 17. St. Luke, x. 16.

The above corollary may be proved, in the first place, from this,—that it is neither declared in our Profession of Faith, nor in the Council of Trent, that either the church, or the civil magistrate, has received the power of imposing an obligation under the penalty of mortal sin, nor that the above mentioned laws, or any other ordinances whatever, whether ecclesiastical or civil, are actually, and *de facto* binding in conscience under this penalty. This is clear, from the extracts from the council given above. 2 Though many theologians of great learning were present at the council, who were fully aware of the opinions advanced in the confession of Augsburg, and also how much this question was controverted in the Schools, still the council preserved the most profound silence; which seems to amount to a tacit declaration that these points are not articles of Catholic Faith. 3. Soto and Castro assure us, says Vasquez,\* that Gerson was of opinion, that no human or ecclesiastical law could enforce anything under the penalty of sin, unless an injunction to that effect had already emanated from a divine authority, and that human laws, even those of the church, can do nothing more than declare, what has been already enjoined by the divine law. Some moderns do not stop here, but assure us that it was not merely Gerson's opinion, that no human law, not even a precept of the church can be enacted on a point that has not already been prescribed by the divine, or natural law;—but they declare, that this was also defended by Almain." Yet neither Vasquez, nor any other theologian, condemns this doctrine as heretical. 4. This position, it is true, is a deduction that follows mediately, as I shall have occasion to shew later—from a revealed truth; but I have already proved that a conclusion from premises, one or even both of which, are revealed truths, is not an Article of Catholic Faith; and, for similar reasons, a doctrine not expressly defined, but simply deduced from a decree of the church, is not an Article of Catholic Faith. Now I have shewn that the position in question is not expressly defined, it is not therefore, on both these grounds, of Faith.

2. It even seems to me, that we are nearest the truth in

\* Vasquez, Part 2. Disp. 154. cap. 1.

embracing Gerson's opinion, as reported by Almain, Medina, Driedo, Adrian, Castro, and stated by Vasquez,\* that "no human law, whether *ecclesiastical or civil*, in as much as it is a purely human ordinance, and emanates from an authority purely human, can bind the conscience under the penalty of sin; an opinion which Gerson extends, if we may believe the writers mentioned above, to the natural law. The grounds of this opinion are, *first* :—that neither the natural nor human law can take cognizance of an object which is purely supernatural,—they cannot, consequently, reach so far as to reward, or punish eternally, this being an object beyond human powers, and completely supernatural. 2. Besides no lawgiver can establish a law, and impose a penalty for its violation, which penalty is beyond the jurisdiction of the court in which he acts. 3. As no human law can take cognizance of acts purely internal, no human law can impose an obligation on us to perform such acts; and as no human legislator, ecclesiastical or civil, nor even the law of nature has power to inflict an eternal punishment, it follows that neither can he impose an obligation on us, under the penalty of incurring the guilt of a sin, which, at once, would make us liable to such punishment.

3. However, in case a human law, ecclesiastical or civil, prescribe anything, which it seriously intends should be complied with, and not merely to counsel or direct its performance,—the divine law then steps in, which commands us to obey our superiors ecclesiastical and civil: and this divine law, which, under these circumstances, lends its support, can, and actually does impose, an obligation under the penalty of sin—and even of mortal sin, and its consequent eternal punishment:—in other words, to transgress such a law would make us liable to eternal punishment. That we are bound to obey, *first*, our *ecclesiastical superiors*, is clear from the following texts of scripture :†—*He that heareth you heareth me, and he that despiseth you, despiseth me! Obey your prelates, and be subject to them, &c.* 2. We must yield obedience to the *civil* authority, because,‡ *he that resisteth*

\* Vasquez. 2. 2. disp. 158. cap. 1. † Luke x. 16. Heb. xiii. 17.

‡ Rom. xiii. 15.



*the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. And they that resist, purchase to themselves damnation. Be subject of necessity, not only for wrath, but for conscience sake.* 3. To our parents, for St. Paul says,\* *children obey your parents in the Lord, for this is just. Honour thy father and thy mother, which is the first commandment with a promise.* 4. To our masters, according to the advice of the same Apostles,† *Servants, be obedient to your masters, that are your lords according to the flesh, doing the will of God from the heart.* In fact, nature itself, says Vasquez, ‡dictates that it is highly sinful to disobey our parents and superiors, in matters of importance; disobedience to those who have authority over us, being contrary to right reason. In an assembly, in which there is a primacy of dignity, he continues, § obedience and submission from all who compose that assembly, is a natural consequence; because if it could possibly be just to act in opposition to his commands, then must the greatest confusion arise among the other members, and in the whole body. Did ever even a Gentile teach, that it is not wrong to disobey our superiors? That the divine law not only binds the conscience, but even binds it under the penalty of mortal sin, and its consequent eternal punishment, is clear from numerous passages of scripture; from which source, also, we learn that God can inflict this dreadful measure of punishment. Whatever, indeed, is grievously contrary to the law of nature, is grievously offensive to Almighty God; and destroys consequently, his love towards us, and essentially, and of its own nature, merits eternal punishment. In the manner, therefore, here explained, *indirectly and mediately*; that is, the ecclesiastical and civil law, and the commands of parents and masters may impose an obligation on the conscience, under the penalty even of mortal sin, and the punishment of eternal damnation; not, indeed, of themselves, but dependently, and in consequence of the existence and intervention of a divine law; and, in this sense, and no other, can they bind the conscience.

4. To human authority explained in this manner, and the

\* Ephes. vi. 1.      † Ephes. vi. 6.      ‡ Vasquez, Disp. 158. c. 2.

§ Vasquez, Disp. 152. cap. 3.

obligations imposed by it, Protestants neither do, nor can object. For, in the first place, they admit, that both the Church, and secular princes have authority to enact laws, and ordinances of various kinds ; and that parents and masters have a similar power to a certain extent ; and that those who are under their authority are bound to obey. 1. This is clear from the texts adduced above, and from the very dictate of reason. 2. Their code of discipline prescribes many regulations, and enforces compliance by censures—such as forbidding the delinquent to receive the Lord's supper—excommunication, &c. and these laws are so numerous as to occupy 14 chapters, embracing 251 articles, almost every one of which contains a distinct ordinance, or precept. *Thus in article 16, chap. 5, those who resist the consistory, are to be punished by suspending them, for a time, from the reception of the Lord's supper.* In article 3, chap. 10, certain regular fasting days are appointed. In the 5th Article, *it is forbidden to give public alms at funerals.* In Article 27, chap. 14, it is declared, *that all who shall either dance, or be present at such amusements, will be excommunicated:—*In article 29, *that those who play at cards, will be punished by some censure of the church.* Various kinds of marriages are forbidden *in art. 13, chap. 13, Thus, no one, is allowed to marry the woman with whom he had committed adultery, during the life-time of his own wife, or, as in art. 12, to marry the widow of his wife's brother.* In art. 31, chap. 5, it is decreed, *that whoever shall refuse to acquiesce in the resolutions passed, at the national synod, shall be separated from the church.* In article 8, it is agreed that *the government of the church shall be regulated by the articles of discipline settled at the national synod.* In article 33, chap. 14, is said, *that it shall not be in the power of either private ministers, or of provincial synods, to change, add to, or take from, the settled articles of discipline, without previously obtaining the consent of a national synod.* A national synod, however, has power to establish whatever regulations it pleases, thus by art. 32. *“ Its ordinances may extend to a particular place, or church. In art. 33, we receive, they say, all such regulations, as tend to promote concord ; and to keep each one in his proper sphere ; and in this we ought to fol-*

*low what the Lord has enjoined; and with respect to ex-communications, we approve of them, with their accompanying penalties, and acknowledge them to be sometimes necessary; with respect to the civil power they declare in art. 39, that it is the will of God that the world be governed by the laws of kings, and in art. 40, that it is necessary to obey their laws and regulations.*

Nor do they pretend to deny, that we are commanded by the law of God, to obey our ecclesiastical superiors, the king, magistrates, and parents. They also grant, that it is sinful, and often even mortally sinful, to transgress the law of God. Indeed, according to Calvin,\* “whenever an offence is committed against the law of the Lord, the curse of the Almighty falls on the delinquent; every sin is mortal, as every sin is a rebellion against the will of God, and as such necessarily provokes his wrath; all and every sin being a transgression against the law, against which, without any exception whatever, eternal death has been denounced.” Where then can the difference be between the Protestant and Catholic doctrine? Protestants must grant, that there is a divine law, which binds the conscience, under mortal sin; and Catholics teach, that it is only in virtue, and *mediately* by warrant, of this divine law, that human laws can bind the conscience, under mortal sin.

On this point also, therefore, when all misunderstandings are removed, we find that we perfectly agree. As to when human laws really command, and what are these actual, and real ordinances, as distinguished from mere counsels, and directions; as also what laws are merely *penal*,—imposing, that is, an obligation under a specified temporal penalty,—all this depends on the intention of the lawgiver, and on the wording of the law, and has nothing whatever to do with questions of doctrine and faith. In the above remarks, I do not wish to be understood, as asserting that ecclesiastical or civil superiors, parents or masters may command anything whatever, that best pleases them. “The principle,” says Vasquez,† “on which new laws may be enacted by the Church, or by the State, is the same as regulates, and is observed in

\* Instit. Lib. 2. cap. 8. sec. 58, 59.

† Vasquez, Disp. 151. cap. 3.



religious orders in this respect ;—that nothing, in a word, can be enacted but what has for its object the preservation of the constitution, in its pristine, and original condition. It is, therefore, requisite, for the prudent enactment of laws, either for the Church, or State, to consider seriously, whether a compliance with the law, if resolved upon, will be conducive to the object for which the government was established. Mere whim, or pleasure, is not a sufficient motive, or ground for passing a law. It is not, however, the province of the subjects, to pronounce a law unjust, or unsuitable, unless its injustice, or uselessness, be manifest ; in all other cases, the presumption is in favor of the legislator.” To this, Protestants do not object, as is clear from the 32d and 33d of their articles, quoted above ; and in which we also meet with these words : “ those who are chosen to govern the church, let them consider what system, and method, they ought to to follow, in directing the body of the faithful ; being careful, however, not to go aside in any way from what has been ordained by Christ, &c.” This is precisely the same restraint that we say ought to be imposed on this exercise of authority. By drawing a simple distinction, therefore, between a *mediate*, and a *direct* power to bind the conscience, our opinions perfectly coincide : so that if, after this, our adversaries choose to disagree with us on this point, they must manifestly contradict themselves. This clearly follows from the preceding observations.

5. It is not of faith that we are bound, under mortal sin, to comply with a merely human precept ; we are, for instance, under no such obligation of hearing mass on Sundays, of receiving the holy communion at Easter, &c. Observe the words, “ by a merely human precept,” because the above is not true of *apostolic precepts*—and our dissenting brethren have little or no objection to these latter observances. The proof of the above position is evident. 1st. The church does not propose any of these regulations, as revealed in the word of God. 2. The very fact of the precept being *merely* human, shews, at once, that it can have no claim to being divinely revealed ; and if not revealed, how can it possibly be an object of divine faith ? 3. So far from its being certain that such a precept is to be complied with under mortal

sin, it has not even been revealed by the Almighty, that there is any such precept. Can any one, after this, possibly deny that there is no command in the word of God to hear mass on Sundays, &c. ? However, it is undeniable, 1st, that the above, and similar precepts, have been imposed by human authority. 2nd, That there is a power in the church to command their observance, under mortal sin,—a power not direct and immediate, but secondary and mediate, as has been explained above. It is, however, necessary, that the church prescribe these observances, with an intention that they be really and strictly obligatory. 3. And from the common consent and understanding of the faithful, we know when the church does actually mean her precepts to be binding: thus, for instance, we are sure, from the unanimous agreement of the faithful, that the fasts of the church are to be observed under mortal sin. Cajetan observes,\* with regard to fasting, “I do not presume to assert, that this obligation rests on the authority of a written law; since I am not aware, that a person, who neglects to observe the fasts of the church, is declared guilty of a mortal sin, by any written decree; so that, as far as any law is concerned, there is no mortal sin incurred by the infraction of the fasts of the church, provided this neglect does not proceed from contempt.” “It is manifestly false to pretend,” says Vasquez,† “that the observance of the fast of Lent and other Papal decrees, is not obligatory under mortal sin.” This principle may be extended to all the precepts common to the church, as Annual Confession, Easter Communion, the Sanctification of the Festivals, &c. Nor will our adversaries ever be able to prove, from any text of Scripture, from the Councils, the Fathers, or from reason, that actions, which are prescribed by human laws, continue, after such injunctions, indifferent or adiaphanous. The contrary opinion has been clearly established by shewing, that there is a divine command to obey those that are placed over us. However, as to what those laws are, or how many human precepts in particular are to be considered, as truly and really binding the conscience,

\* Cajetan. In summa, verbo, “Jejunium.”

† Vasquez, Disp. 154. cap. 2.

and not mere directions and counsels, without implying any obligation ; or what laws are only *penal*, imposing, that is, an obligation under a specified temporal penalty only, or which, in fine, of these precepts, binds the conscience under mortal sin ;—all this depends on the intention of the lawgiver ; we are to be guided in our judgment by the language in which the law is couched, by the nature and quality of the precept itself, and other such considerations, which it is the office of the casuist to examine, but which are quite foreign to my purpose, which is to present to view, the doctrines which we are obliged to believe. Such questions as the above, being mere matters of fact, cannot possibly be articles of Catholic Faith. I will only subjoin two more observations on this subject, that Protestants may not complain of the burthens imposed on Catholics, in consequence of their belief on this point,—and may not, thereby, be terrified from returning to the one fold. The first is contained in the following extract from Cajetan :\* “The intention of every ecclesiastical law is to promote *the edifying of Christ’s mystical body*,† and not to lay snares for the souls of the faithful ; and we are, therefore, to beware of pronouncing, that such a multitude of precepts are, by the laws of the church, binding under mortal sin, for fear lest we may seem to lay so many snares for the conscience. 2. So that, acting on this principle, we may lay this down as a general rule, that whoever, without being guilty of any kind of contempt, infringes against a positive precept,—from pure ignorance for instance, (*not gross or supine*,) or from some reason, which appears to him a sufficient reason for its non-observance, without any intention whatever of consenting to the violation of a precept, which was obligatory on him under mortal sin,—such a one, by so doing, does not sin mortally. Indeed, it is not the intention of our holy and just mother, the church, to punish these virtuous souls as if they were really her enemies,—nor do such, before God, incur excommunication. To use the language of Vasquez,‡ “There is no difficulty in considering those persons free from mortal sin, who have transgressed

\* Cajetan in summa, verbo, “transgressio præcepti. † Ephes. iv. 12.

‡ Vasquez, l. 2. Disp. 158. cap. 6.



against a particular law, not from any contempt, but from, what appeared to them a cause sufficient to excuse from its observance, or from a real ignorance, not proceeding from gross and supine neglect. Neither the precept of fasting nor of hearing mass, is of so obligatory a nature, as to admit of no excuse if not complied with ; and a person, consequently, according to Cajetan, who should sincerely think that he has a sufficient reason to justify the omission of the precept, would certainly not incur the guilt of mortal sin." These, and similar questions, are discussed at length, by all our best casuists.

6. I shall also add the following observation, with the hope of inducing our dissenting brethren more easily to assent to the principles laid down in this section. It is often objected against us by our adversaries, for the sake of causing disunion, and of rendering the Catholic religion more odious, that the Council of Trent forbids the perusal of the scriptures in a vulgar tongue. This is a mere calumny. The following is all that is said on this subject by the council.\* "The holy synod, perceiving that the number of suspected, and dangerous books, in which erroneous doctrines are taught, and spread in every direction, has, in these days, increased to an intolerable extent,—has deemed it proper, that some of the Fathers of the council be chosen, and deputed to agree together, after a careful examination, what steps had better be taken with respect to these writings, and what censures ought to be passed on them, which resolutions they will report, in due time, to this council,—that the Holy Synod may the more easily separate this great variety of strange, and unapproved doctrine, as coele, from the wheat of Christian truth." Now is there one word in this passage, that can possibly be construed, as even alluding to a prohibition of the sacred writings, in a vulgar tongue?

As to the 4th Rule of the Roman *Index*, which Du Moulin, and others falsely ascribe to the Council of Trent, that council had nothing to do with it. This rule was never received in France, and is consequently not obligatory there ;

\* Concil. Trid. Sess. 18. Tit. de Libr. dilectu.

“for it cannot be denied,” says Vasquez,\* “that a law is not obligatory, when there is either a want of due promulgation, or when it is not received by the faithful, and this conduct is connived at, or consented to by the lawgiver. Besides, in the same *Index* there is a 6th regulation, which prescribes that controversial books, written in the vulgar tongue, on the points in dispute, between Catholics, and Protestants, be not allowed to be indiscriminately read by all persons; but that these also be put on the same footing as the scriptures in a vulgar tongue. Now, as it is beyond all doubt that this 6th regulation is of no force in France, so neither is the 4th,—which, after all, does not absolutely forbid the reading of the scriptures in a vulgar language. “Let this question, therefore, in the words of the *Index*, be, settled by the bishop, with the advice of the parish priest, or of each one’s confessor, who will allow those to read the scriptures in the language of their country, whom they are convinced will not be injured, but will rather derive an increase of faith, and piety, from the perusal.” These human regulations vary according to the different state of places, and persons. After all, we are nowise affected, by the above regulation, which neither proceeds from a General Council, nor has been promulgated, or received in France. The same may be said of many other similar regulations.

7. Nor is there any obligation, imposed on any one as a Catholic, to submit to any laws whatever of particular confraternities, or to subscribe to them in any sense whatever,—whether the confraternity be that of the Rosary, or of St. Francis’s cord, St. Monica, or of the Carmelite, Scapulary,—and the same must be said of the particular Bulls called *sabbatina* obtained in their favour. Nothing at all, in one word, is said about these particular devotions in our creed, or in the Council of Trent. Let not then any of our dissenting brethren be deterred by these practices from embracing the Catholic Faith; nor pay any attention to Du Moulin’s oft-repeated sarcasms, and invectives against these usages. His reasoning is purely that of a shallow sophist—a fallacy called by logicians an *Ignoratio Elenchi*: or a mistaking, or misstatement of the question.

\* Vasquez, Disp. 56. cap. 5.

## § 7.

*On the Invocation of the Saints.*

"I firmly hold that the saints reigning together with Christ, are to be venerated, and invoked, and that they offer prayers to God for us." These are the words of our Profession of Faith. The Council of Trent, in the 25th session, explains this doctrine more fully, and explicitly. "The Holy Synod admonishes all those, to whom the office of teaching has been entrusted, diligently to instruct the faithful, relatively to the invocation, and intercession of the Saints; teaching them that the Saints, who reign together with Christ, offer up their prayers to God for man; that it is *good*, and *profitable*, suppliantly to invoke them, and to fly to their prayers, help, and aid, in order to obtain favours from God, through his Son Jesus Christ, who is alone our Saviour, and our Redeemer; that it is an impious opinion which denies that the Saints who enjoy eternal happiness in Heaven are to be invoked; or which asserts that they do not pray for man; or that to invoke their intercession in our favour as individuals, is idolatrous, or opposed to the word of God, and the honour of the only Mediator between God, and man, Christ Jesus; or that it is foolish to pray either mentally, or vocally, to those who are reigning in Heaven.' This doctrine being proposed by a General Council, is of Catholic Faith.

On the other hand, it follows, 1. That it is not of faith, that *the saints in Heaven hear the prayers of the living*. This is proved, 1. Because neither Pius's Creed, nor the Council of Trent, declares this, nor proposes it, at least expressly, to our belief. 2. Although there were many Theologians of great learning at the Council, who were fully aware, that Protestants denied that the saints really hear us; and what is more, that they condemned the Invocation of the Saints, precisely on these grounds; still the Synod abstained, in its decree, on the Invocation of Saints, from defining any thing on this point. May not silence, on such an occasion, and under such circumstances, be considered as a positive proof that the Council was persuaded that this question was not one of Faith. 3. Even granting, that this induction follows, as a necessary consequence, from the doctrine of the Coun-



cil, on the Invocation of the Saints, that “ it is *good* and *profitable* to invoke them ;” still, as I have shewn above, corollaries from scriptural propositions, or decisions of the Church, are not articles of Faith ; and consequently, though the Church has declared that we are to believe that the Saints are to be invoked, or rather, that it is *good* and *profitable* to do so ; and though it seem to follow, as a necessary consequence that the Saints must therefore hear our prayers, the Church cannot be said, on this account, to have defined it as an express article of our Faith, that they actually do hear us. Moreover, although it be revealed in the word of God, at least in the unwritten word, that the saints are to be invoked, and it follows, therefore, that they hear us, still the close connexion of these two points does not make this consequence, however just, and necessary, a revealed doctrine, or an article of faith. 4. And what is more, St. Austin\* does not admit, that this consequence, so far from being necessary, is even just ; and what is more strange, though he be *certain*, and clearly teach,† that the saints are to be invoked ; he is still *doubtful* whether they hear us. With much less reason can an argument be drawn from the practice of the church, to establish this point, as an article of Faith ; both because from the doctrine that the saints are to be invoked, as has been observed above, it really does not necessarily follow, that the saints hear our prayers ; as also, because many practices of the church may be founded on a merely probable opinion, as has, been already shewn in the preceding pages. It is, however, true that the saints really, and *de facto* do hear our prayers, which are revealed to them, probably, by the Almighty ; or made known to them in some of the various ways explained by St. Austin, and Gregory the Great. The reason why St. Austin had any doubts at all on this subject, arose from another question on which he had not made up his mind ; but which has since been decided in the affirmative by the Council of Florence ; namely, whether the souls of the blessed are received into heaven, and enjoy the clear vision of God before the resurrection, and the last day of final judgment,—a doctrine which is generally

\* St. Augus. Lib. De cura pro mortuis, cap. 16.

† l. c. cap. 4.

admitted by our adversaries, though denied by Calvin.\* Yet St. Austin† taught, and proved, that many saints after they had been received into heaven, and admitted to the enjoyment of the beatific vision, *see all things, even those from which they are far removed,‡ as God will be to them all in all.*

2. It is not of faith, that *the saints are our mediators, and not rather that this character belongs to Christ only.* 1. Because neither our creed, nor the Council of Trent asserts this. 2. The Fathers, and the schoolmen differ on this point, though in words only, by using the word *Mediator* in different meanings. St Chrysostom § employs it for a Being *who unites in his own person two natures, the divine and human.* St. Austin, || for him, for whom no one intercedes, but who intercedes for all; so that these two writers teach, and justly, that there is only one Mediator, Christ Jesus. But other writers use the term in a much wider sense, and understand by it any kind of Mediator, or intercessor; and in this sense they call both the living on Earth, and the saints in Heaven Mediators for those for whom they pray; in the same manner as St. Paul says, ¶ that the old Law was given by the Almighty *into the hand of a Mediator*, by which is meant Moses.

3. Du Moulin \*\* most shamefully, and unreasonably calumniates us, when he asserts, that in our Litanies we indeed say, “St. Peter, pray for us;” but that when we name the Blessed Virgin, we do not say “Holy Virgin, pray for us,” but that we address her in the same form as we do Jesus Christ. It is a calumny of a similar stamp, to assert, as the same writer does, that those who invoke the Saints, not only beg of them to pray to God for them; but also believe that the saints, as St. Nicholas, for instance, can appease storms at sea, &c. This writer’s works are full of such like calumnies on all points at issue between us; with a view, of course, of causing an unfavourable impression, in the minds of the vulgar, against the Catholic religion. God forbid, that we

\* Calv. Instit. Lib. 3. cap. 25. §. 6. † Lib. 22. De Civit. Dei. cap. 29.

‡ Hebr. xii. 6. § Chrysos. Hom. 7, in Epist. ad Tim.

|| August. contra Parm. Lib. 2. cap. 8.

¶ Gal. iii. 19.

\*\* In Novit. Lib. 7. cap. 12.

should ever admit such absurdities as articles of our Faith: no, we abhor and detest them. To use St. Austin's words: "The Christian doctrine is one thing—the errors of weak minds another;—if any one fall into error, the sound doctrine is advanced to correct it; with a view, that either the error may be removed or avoided."\* It is another, and more refined calumny of Du Moulin's, that we are *ordered* to invoke the saints. This is false, as is evident from the quotation given above, from the Council of Trent, which merely says, that it is *good* and *profitable* to invoke them, without, however, ordering us to do so. A person, would, sin, who should abstain from invoking them, from a doubt of the lawfulness of the invocation; provided always his doubt extended really to the question, *whether they ought to be invoked*. There are indeed some, who, from the particular duties of their state of life, are bound by precept to invoke them; as, for instance, persons, who enjoy benefices, and who are obliged, on certain occasions, to recite the Litanies of the Saints.

4. The canonization of the saints is no article of Faith; in other words, *it is no article of our Faith, that the saints whom we invoke*, for instance, St. Laurence, St. Vincent, St. Gervase, &c., St. Blase, St. Chrysostom, Ambrose, Dominic, &c., *are really saints, and in the number of the blessed*. There is an exception, of course, to be made to what is here said, in favor of those, who have been pronounced to have been saints, by the holy scriptures,—as St. Stephen, who is said, in the sacred text, to have *slept in the Lord*.† This is proved, 1, from the silence of our creed, and of the Council of Trent. 2. It is clear, that there is no evidence to prove, either from the written or unwritten word of God, that these persons were saints; as they were all born, long after the sacred writings were penned, and the apostolic traditions delivered. 3. Besides, it is not even an article of our faith, that such men were ever in existence,—and, therefore, much less are we bound to believe, that they really lived saintly lives, or were afterwards canonized. All these are, undoubtedly, mere questions of fact, and not of doctrine. 4. Miracles performed during their life-time, or after their

\* St. August. Lib. 20. cap. 21. contra Faust. Manich. † Acts vii. 57.



death, of which we find numerous instances recorded in the lives of the saints, are the chief cause of their canonization ; but as all these miracles have been performed, since the time of the apostles ; as not one of them is recorded in the sacred writings, and consequently not one of them is of faith ; how should a canonization, grounded upon them—a judgment of the church as to their sanctity, be an article of Catholic Faith ! No Bulls, therefore, of their canonization, though they generally emanate from the Pope, as they merely contain a question of fact, declaring that such a one is a saint, are anywise matters of Catholic belief. I may again observe, that neither the Pope, nor even a General Council is guided infallibly in the canonization of a saint. The proof of this may be easily drawn from a principle, which I laid down, in our general rule of faith ; namely, that *all Catholics* are agreed that the Pope even in a General Council may err on mere matters of fact ; which, as such, depend principally, if not wholly, on the means of information, and the testimony of individuals : and I adduced the authority of Bellarmin in confirmation of this position ;—since he allows that the 6th General Council was misled by false information, and erred, in consequence, in condemning Pope Honorius as a heretic. There is much less difficulty, of course, in allowing that the Pope alone may be misled by false information, and fall into error.

But after all that has been said, the authority of these canonizations is very great ; and any one that should presume to deny, or even doubt of the canonization of any Saint, after a sentence to that effect has been passed, and passed after a most scrupulous examination into the miracles, and life of the servant of God, would be exceedingly rash, and would deserve the censures of the Church. For, as I have already observed, great authority attaches to any doctrine that is promulgated *ex cathedra* by the Roman Pontiff, and greater to any of his decisions when presiding in a Provincial Council, especially when he proposes something closely connected with a point of doctrine, to the belief of the whole Church, as he does, when in his Bulls of Canonization, he proposes a particular servant of God to the veneration of the Universal Church, as a Saint. Though the decree of Canonization is not to be received as an article of Faith,

still, it is not on that account, improper to invoke the intercession of the Saint; nor should we be justified in blaming the Church for invoking him, or in looking upon this practice as of doubtful morality,—since we know that many usages, which have obtained over the Universal Church, may be founded on nothing more than a probable opinion; and if these practices are to be respected, and may be followed without hesitation, with how much greater security may we proceed, in a case of Canonization, which puts the question of the sanctity of the individual canonized, beyond all doubt,—since we are sure for instance, on these grounds, that St. Francis is really a Saint, and happy in Heaven;—and on this evidence, and certainty, it is clearly lawful, or to use the language of the Council of Trent, it is *good* and *profitable* to invoke the Saint that is proposed to our veneration. And a person, who, from particular circumstances, as the possessors of Benefices, is at certain periods bound to recite the Litany of the Saints would be obliged to invoke this Saint; nor would it be a sufficient ground for the omission, to say that it is no article of our Faith that he is a Saint; because, we know that practices, and precepts, though grounded on merely probable arguments, may still subsist, and be obligatory.

### § 8.

#### *On Images.*

With respect to Images, our Profession of Faith, merely says:—"I most firmly assert, that the Images of Christ, of the ever Virgin Mother of God, and also of the other saints, ought to be kept, and retained; and that a due honor, and veneration is to be paid them." The Council of Trent\* decrees, that "the Images of Christ, of the Blessed Virgin, and of other saints, are to be kept, and retained particularly in churches, and that a due honor, and veneration is to be paid them;—not as if we believed, that any divinity, or virtue resides in them, on account of which they ought to be revered; or that any thing ought to be asked from them; or that any confidence ought to be placed in them, as was done by the gentiles of old, who put their trust in idols;—but be-

\* Concil. Trid. Sess. 25.

cause the honor which is shewn to the Images, is referred to the prototypes whom they represent ; so that by the Images which we kiss, and before which we uncover our heads, or prostrate ourselves, we adore Christ himself, and venerate the saints who are represented by the Images ;—a doctrine which has been sanctioned by councils, particularly by the second Council of Nice, in its decrees against those who opposed the use of Images. However, whenever the events and narrations of the sacred writings, are represented by painting, or sculpture,—a practice which is of considerable use to the unlettered faithful,—the faithful must be taught, that the Divinity is not thereby represented, from an idea that it can really be seen by our corporeal eyes, or its Image embodied in colours and figures.” Such is the doctrine of the Council of Trent ; it is, therefore, an article of our Faith, that respect is to be shewn to Images ; this being proposed to our belief by the Universal Church.

On the other hand, it follows, in the first place, that it is not an article of Faith, that the Images of the most holy Trinity, or of the persons of the most holy Trinity, the Father, and the Holy Ghost, are to be kept and retained, and to be honoured and venerated.

This is proved, 1. Because there is no declaration to this effect, either in our creed, or in the Council of Trent, where all that we find laid down is, that if it shall happen, that the events, and narratives of the sacred writings, are represented by painting, or sculpture ; that the faithful must be taught that the Divinity is not thereby represented, from an idea that it can really be seen by our corporeal eyes, or its image embodied in colour, and figures ;—which is very different indeed, from defining, that *they are to be kept, and venerated*. And, although, it be a common practice in the church, to have these images, and to venerate them, that is, through them to adore God ; this practice is not a sufficient foundation for an article of Faith, because, as I have before shewn, *all practices of the church, even of the Universal Church, are not a sufficient ground for an article of Catholic Faith*. Such practices may rest on an opinion in itself merely probable, as was proved in the same place. 2. Neither does scripture, nor apostolical tradition furnish any thing to this effect : it is, in fact, even probable that God forbade such



images to be made by the Jews, in that part of the commandment\* which says "Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing," and more expressly in the following text:—"You saw not any similitude, in the day that the Lord God spoke to you in Horeb, from the midst of the fire: lest perhaps being deceived, you might make to you a graven similitude, or image of male, or female.†

3. Although there were many Theologians of great learning present at the council, who were perfectly aware of the difficulties raised by Protestants against Images of all kinds, and that even many Catholic Theologians, as we shall see later, imagined that these particular Images in question, were forbidden; still the Council abstained from deciding anything on this point, and contented itself with saying, that the images of the Virgin Mother of God, and of other Saints are to be kept particularly in Churches, &c. May not the silence of the Council of Trent, under these circumstances be considered as a positive proof, that the point in question is no article of Catholic doctrine. "Some Catholic writers, says Vasquez† as Henricus, Abulensis, Durandus, Martinus de Ayala, declare it to be unlawful, to make any images whatever, of the Blessed Trinity, and assert, that the human nature only, which was assumed by the second person of the Trinity, may be represented. The contrary opinion, however, to this, is, to my mind, the more true; but still not so certain as to be received as a dogma of faith; although, supported as it is, by the common practice of the church, it cannot be denied without rashness: this opinion teaches, without any limitation whatever, that, considering the thing itself, it is lawful to represent the Trinity by painting, &c. and to depict the Holy Ghost under the form of a dove." This he proves at considerable length. "This opinion," he observes, "is confirmed by the common practice of the church, for we see pictures of the Trinity at Rome and other places, publicly exposed to the adoration (veneration) of the people. And though the Council of Trent did not determine or define any thing positively on this subject, still it prescribes that what-

\* Exod. xx. 4.           † Deut. iv. 15, 16.

‡ Vasquez, 3. Parte, Disp. 103. c. 3.

ever scriptural events are represented by painting, or sculpture,—(meaning such as contain representations of the Almighty, which it does not condemn, though it may not approve of them, as much as of those of the Saints and of Christ,)—that the people be taught, that they are not to suppose that this is done to shew, that the divinity may be seen, by our corporeal eyes, but to lead us by these human means, to the knowledge of that incorporeal and powerful being.” I perfectly agree in all that is here said by Vasquez.

2. That God did not entirely prohibit all use of Images amongst the Jews is so far from being an article of Faith, that we cannot be said to know anything for certain upon the point. “Many writers,” says Varquez,\* in whose opinion I also join, “think that God, in the 20th chapter of Exodus, by a positive precept, not only prohibited among the Jews, the *adoration* of Images, as practiced by the Gentiles, and which was opposed to the law of Nature; but even all use whatever of Statues and Images. This is the opinion of Alexander, Albertus, Bonaventure, Richard, &c. It is true that some of these writers as Alexander, Albertus, Bonaventure, Marcilius, and Abulensis, confine this prohibition to images of the Almighty; but the rest speak in general terms, and extend it to images of every sort. Abulensis has an opinion peculiar to himself; which is, that all images of God are forbidden, even by the natural law; but all other writers seem to agree that this was only forbidden by the old law.” “As to the two figures of cherubim,† that were placed on the two sides of the ark, it may be answered with Catharinus, that these figures, or images, were made by the command of God; who could abrogate, either entirely, or in part, a law which he himself had established:—or, it may be said, that it was not the making of images that was forbidden under the old law, but only all kind of worship and adoration of them; and, by a necessary consequence, the erecting and placing such statues or images, in a situation naturally suited to purposes of worship. So that, in this view of the question, no kind of honour was paid to the figures of the cheru-

\* Vasquez, Disp. 104. cap. 2.

† Vasquez, l. c. cap. 6.

him, or any other of the images which were in the temple. An image may be considered as set up in a situation suited for purposes of worship, when it is placed alone by itself, and not as a mere addition, and ornamental appendage to something else."

3. As to the nature of the respect which is to be paid to images, it is very far indeed from being an article of our Faith, that an image *may be adored*: no, not even the image of Christ, much less, consequently, the images of the saints. The word adoration is not even once used in our Profession of Faith, nor in the decree of the Council of Trent; nor, consequently, in that of Nice, which is followed, in this point, by the Fathers of Trent. This respect is sometimes, indeed, styled adoration by our divines, but this is merely a question about the propriety of the use of a given word. The people, it is more than probable, understood by "adoration," the highest degree of worship, the worship of *Latria*; and this, there can be no doubt, can be rendered to God alone, and it would be blasphemous to give it to *any image* whatever.—When then we say that we *adore the cross*, the meaning of these words is clear, from the extracts given above from the Council of Trent; namely, that *by the cross which we kiss, and before which we uncover our heads and prostrate ourselves, we adore Christ*.

4. Nor is it an Article of our Faith, that the respect shewn to images, is really a *religious* respect; since it is not even of Faith that the respect which we pay the saints themselves, as I shall have occasion to shew later, is really a religious respect.

5. It is still less an Article of our Faith,—though Du Moulin chooses to calumniate us, and say it is one,—*that the Images of God are to be adored with supreme worship; that is, with the same worship of Latria, with which we adore God*;—or, to use his own words, it is not of Faith, that "the images or representations of the Almighty, are to be venerated with the same worship, as the God whom they represent." This may be proved, 1st, because such a doctrine is not to be found in our creed,—in the Council of Trent, nor in any other general council. 2nd. Because there are many problematical opinions advanced by various Theologians, on



this question,—on the nature, that is, of our respect in this case. The opinions are contained in the following quotation from Vasquez.\* Some writers think, in the first place, that “Images are not only to be honoured on account of their prototypes, but that, considered even as the immediate and exclusive object of our regard, they are to be venerated, with a degree of respect, quite independently of their prototypes; and to this respect, they give the title of *honorary worship*; and admit that it is of an inferior and distinct species to that which is paid to the originals, or saints themselves. A second body of writers agree with those just mentioned, in teaching, that whatsoever honour is shewn to an image, independently of the object which it represents, that this honour, though shewn to the image on account of its prototype, is but an inferior and improper kind of veneration; but they assert, in addition, that when the image is no longer honoured, independently of its prototype, but conjointly with it, and considered as in a particular manner belonging and dedicated to, the original which it represents, the image is then to be venerated, on account of this accidental connexion, with the same kind of honour as is due to its original.—A third opinion, which I consider as the only true one, teaches that the veneration which is shewn to the image, does not stop at the image, but proceeds to the prototype, or original, and that both the image and its type, are, at the same time, honoured with the same species of respect,—a connexion so essential, that no case can be conceived, in which the image may be honoured independently of, and considered as unconnected with, the object which it represents;—and this, not merely because we are only to honour images on account of their prototypes as the *remote and ultimate* object of our respect,—but also, because whatever honour is shewn to an image, must not stop at the image, but must necessarily be directed to the object which that image represents,—and directed to it as the *immediate and proximate* object of our respect, though it is by the image, and in the image, that we shew our respect for this object.”

Such is the doctrine of Alexander, Cajetan, St. Bonaventure,

\* Vasquez, Disp. 108. cap. 1.

and others :—and these writers, besides teaching as above, that the image, and its prototype may be honoured, at the same time, by the same act of veneration ; also observe, that an image is only capable of being honoured, and venerated, in as much as it is considered as representing, and closely connected with, an original, to whom this respect is due; and that, consequently, it is only to be honoured in conjunction with its propotype, with whom it forms the proximate, and entire object of our veneration.” This opinion, Vasquez proves at considerable length,\* by arguments drawn from the Councils, the Fathers, and from reason. To the above, he then appends the following just observations ;—† “ The name of Jesus, and all other sacred things, are to be honoured precisely in the same manner as images ;” and, “ in the sacrament of the Eucharist, the Eucharistic symbols ought to receive a similar kind of respect.” “ Major,” he adds, ‡ “ thinks, that the cross, ought to receive the adoration of *latria*, not on account of its own intrinsic excellence, but because it happens that the ultimate object of our respect is, in this case, Christ ; Corduba admits that this kind of adoration may be paid to it, but only *analogically* ;—Durandus asserts that it may be shewn it on account of the *recollections*, which surround this instrument of our redemption ;—and Alexander that the *image* of Christ, and *not the cross*, may be adored in this manner. Henricus, however, fancies, that the worship styled *hyperdulia* is due to the image of Christ crucified.” So various are the opinions of different Theologians, on the manner, and kind of respect, which is to be shewn to images. But the Council of Trent, it has been seen, keeps clear of all these questions ; it preserves a prudent silence, and simply teaches, that a due honor, and veneration is to be paid them. None of the above opinions, consequently, are articles of Faith ; let them, therefore, be confined to the schools. To become a Catholic, there is no need of subscribing to any one of these opinions. Believe what the Council of Trent proposes, and nothing more is required

6. With this statement of our doctrine before us, it may be shewn that Daillé is perfectly Catholic, on the respect which is due to images.

\* Vasquez, l. c. cap. 4, 5, 6. † l. c. cap. 12. ‡ Vasquez, Disp. 109. c. 1.

## § 9.

*On the Relics of the Saints,—and of the respect to be shewn them.*

On this point, our Profession of Faith says,—“ I firmly hold that the relics of the saints are to be venerated.” The Council of Trent\* “enjoins, that the bishops, and others, instruct the faithful, on the honor to be paid to the relics of the saints ; teaching them that the bodies of the holy martyrs, and others, now living with Christ, which once were the living members of Christ, and the temples of the Holy Ghost,—and which shall be raised by him to eternal life, and shall be glorified, are to be venerated by the faithful. Through them the Almighty bestows many benefits on man ; so that they who affirm, no veneration, or honor to be due to the relics of the saints ; or, that to honor these, and other sacred monuments, is useless,—are absolutely to be condemned ; as the church has condemned, and does now condemn them.” This, and only this, is decreed by the Council ; and this, consequently, is an article of our Faith, being proposed to our belief, by a General Council.

But, on the other hand, the following propositions are not articles of our Faith, upon the same principle as was noted above when speaking of images ; namely, because they are not proposed to our belief by a General Council. Therefore, it is not an article of our Faith, 1. That relics are to be adored ; no, not even the relics of Christ,—much less, consequently, those of the Blessed Virgin, or of the saints. 2. It is not of faith, that they are to be honoured with what is strictly meant by a *religious* honour ; and not rather by a mere honour of *dulia*, or *observance* ; or some such respect, known by any other title. 3. It is also far from being of Faith, that relics are to be honoured with the same, and not rather with a different species of respect, from that which belongs to the originals whose memory they recal ;—nor is it of faith that they are entitled to this respect, as was observed with regard to images,—*of themselves*, that is *in virtue of their own excellency* ; or *by their accidental connection with an object that claims our respect* ; or, that this veneration is

\* Concil. Trid. Sess. 25.



*due to relics analogically; or that this is a secondary kind of veneration.* This may be proved, 1. Because nothing of all this determined, or specified by the Council of Trent, nor by our Profession of Faith. 2. Because our divines advance a variety of problematical opinions, on all these points. Vasquez has collected them in the following passage.\* The same observations which have been made on images, must be applied, in every respect, to relics;—namely, in the same manner as it is unlawful to honor images, when considered as totally unconnected with their originals, so neither the relics to be honoured on their own account, but merely from the connection which the mind perceives between them, and the saints, whose relics they are—the servant of God being in some manner rendered present to the eye of the mind by these remains. This he proves at very great length; arguing particularly on the following principle,—that inanimate things, such as relics, cannot possibly, of themselves, be considered as ever treated disrespectfully, and are, therefore, also as incapable of being treated with honor. There are, indeed, some writers who teach that honor may be paid to relics as such, without reference, that is, to the saint to whom they appertained; and they assert that in fact, this is the only way in which we are to honour them. But others, as was noticed when treating of the respect due to images, only permit his honor to be paid to relics on account of their connection with the sainted individuals to whom they belonged.” I have noticed above that we are to honour images, and relics, pecisely in the same manner. And I think it best to say nothing more on the opinions mentioned above, as they do not belong to our articles of Faith.

2. It is very far from being an article of Faith, that particular relics, which are honoured in this, or that Church, are really the relics of the saints they are said to be, though they may be proposed as such to our veneration. 1. Because this is neither taught by the Council of Trent, nor by our Profession of Faith. 2. Because this is a mere question of fact, depending entirely on a variety circumstances, — as the means of information, &c.; now, it has been observed, that

\* Vasquez, 3. Parte, Disp. 113.

*all Catholics agree that the Pope, or even a General Council, may err on mere matters of fact ; which, as such, depend principally, if not wholly, on the means of information, and the testimony of individuals.* The same must, of course, be said, and with much greater reason, of the judgment of private, and particular churches. 3. Because, if, as we have seen, even the practices of the Universal Church, may sometimes rest on a merely probable opinion, with how much more reason, may this be the case with particular customs of a single church, when, as in the example before us, it proposes for instance, certain relics to the veneration of the faithful, or even actually venerates them. And as, under these circumstances, a judgment prudently formed, is the rule, by which our practice must be directed, it is enough that a particular relic be reasonably judged, from a variety of proof, and evidence, to be actually what it is pretended to be ; it may then, with perfect propriety, be proposed to public veneration ;—and if it should happen not to be the relic of the saint it was said to be, or, in fact, not the relic of any saint at all, this would still not affect the general question as to its being a pious practice, to honour the relics of the saints. The case is precisely the same as the one already contemplated, when speaking of the canonization of saints. Vasquez justly observes,\* that, because some persons may happen to have relics of doubtful authenticity, it is no reason why we should not pay a reverential respect to those which we are certain, at least as far as human evidence and reasoning can render us so, are really authentic, and genuine. So that, if any one should honour a small particle of any kind, from a persuasion that it really was the relic of a saint ; he would not, even if he were deceived in his opinion, thereby lose the merit of his devotion. However, a prudent care ought to be taken in authenticating relics, before they are proposed to public veneration ; and this care ought to be more considerable than if they were merely for purposes of private devotion, or to carry about with us, which, of course, there is nothing to hinder us from doing. The following observation is also extracted from the same writer.† “ Those

\* Disp. 112. c. 1.

† Disp. 113. cap. 4.

who touch the relics of Christ, or of the martyrs, with their rosaries, or other articles of value, and carry them on their persons, are not to fancy, that these things have derived from that touch, even a material virtue, or excellency, but simply that they have thereby acquired a claim to our respect, dependent on an exercise of the imagination; in as much as they have now the power of exciting in our minds a remembrance of Christ himself, or of his saints, and, consequently, of moving the will to venerate them;—on these grounds only, this practice, so far from being superstitious, deserves to be considered, as a pious, and Christian action.

From this exposition of our doctrine, it follows: 1. That it is a pure act of folly in Du Moulin, to declaim so loudly, and idly, against certain relics, which he contends, in his usual theatrical matter, are not the relics of saints, as it is pretended. 2. That Daillé is perfectly orthodox on this point, as well as on the question of Images.

### § 10.

#### *On the respect and honour due to the Saints.*

“I constantly hold, says our Profession of Faith, that the saints, reigning together with Christ, are to be honoured.” The Council of Trent\* simply says:—“We adore Christ, and venerate the Saints.”

It follows then, that it is not an Article of our Faith, that this veneration is to be called a *religious* veneration, nor, in fact, is this true of any specific epithet, which may be used to designate it. 1st. Because neither the Council of Trent, nor our Creed has proposed anything on this point.—2nd. Because our writers differ on this question. Vasquez† gives their opinions at length, and examines them one by one. “Marsilius,”‡ says he, “thinks that the honour which is shewn to God, and to the Saints, is an exercise of one and the same virtue, which is called *latría*, when referred to God, and *dulia* when to the saints, and that the only difference lies in this diversity of relation. But the true opinion is, that the virtue of *dulia* by which we honour the saints, is distinct from

\* Concil. Trid. Sess. 25.

† Vasquez, 3 Par. Disp. 98. 99, 130.

‡ Disp. 98, cap. 1.



that of *latria*, or the virtue of religion; and that *latria*, or the virtue of religion, for they mean the same thing, is due to God alone. This is taught by Albertus, Durand, St. Bonaventure, and others. Our writers are not, however, agreed, whether the respect, which we shew to the saints, and to civil magistrates, is an exercise of the same virtue. Some, as St. Bonaventure, Albertus, and Gabriel, seem to maintain this to be the case, &c."

From the discrimination of what is of faith, from what is not, it is clear, that Protestants neither do, nor possibly can differ from us on this point: for they do not pretend, that no honour, of any kind, is due to the saints in heaven; since they grant, that we may honour, and they actually do honour individuals, who, on earth, lead pious lives. Drelincourt goes farther, and maintains, in a pamphlet, written expressly on this subject, that a *religious* honour ought to be given to the Blessed Virgin. He believes, consequently, more than he need do, to be a Catholic.

### § 11.

#### *On the Presence of Jesus Christ in the holy Eucharist.*

In our Profession of Faith, we have the following declaration: "I profess, that in the most holy sacrament of the Eucharist, there is truly, really, and substantially, the body and blood, together with the soul, and divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ." The Council of Trent\* teaches, that "if any one shall deny, that in the most holy sacrament of the Eucharist, (that is, under the appearances of the sensible elements, as we shall see the Council express it, in our next extract from chap. 1.) there is contained truly, really, and substantially, the body and blood, together with the soul, and divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ, and, consequently, Christ whole, and entire; but shall pretend that he is merely in the sacrament as in a sign, or in a figure or by his power, let him be anathema." And in the same place, after observing, in that † "In the first place, this Holy Synod teaches, that in the sacrament of the Eucharist, Christ is truly, really, and substantially contained, under the appearances of the sensible

\* Concil. Trid. Sess. 13. can. 1.

† Ibid. cap. 1.

elements ; ” (*bread and wine*) the Council teaches, that “ there is no repugnance between these two things,—that our Saviour, according to his natural manner of existence, should always be seated at the right hand of his Father in heaven, and that still he should be substantially, but sacramentally present, in many other places, amongst us, by a mode of existence, which, though it can scarcely be expressed in words, the mind, illuminated by Faith, can conceive to be possible to God, and which we are bound most firmly to believe.” So far the Council. That a *real* presence, therefore, under the appearances of bread, and wine, is to be admitted,—as expressed by the Council, by the word “ sacramentally,”—it is an article of our Faith ; since it is proposed to our belief by a General Council. But nothing but this ; nor anything different to this, on the reality of this presence, is of Faith ; because nothing but this is propounded by the Council. I will now make a few observations, on this most important, and most difficult of subjects, with a view to render the belief of this doctrine of the Catholic Church, less difficult to those who differ from us in Religion.

1st. Speaking of glorified bodies at the resurrection, St. Paul says,\* “ It is sown a natural body, it shall rise a spiritual body. If there be a natural body, there is also a spiritual body, as it is written :—The first man, Adam, was made into a living soul ; the last Adam into a quickening spirit. Yet that *was* not first, which is spiritual, but that which is natural ; afterwards, that which is spiritual.” Hence the body of Christ, which is present under the Eucharistic symbols, may, in this sense, be called a *spiritual and not a natural body* ; and our Saviour, who is actually present in the Sacrament, may be called a *quickeningspirit, and not made into a living soul*. For 1st, this is evident from the words of St. Paul. 2nd. “ Because,” as Vasquez† justly observes, “ the body of Christ is present even in a small particle, and entire in the whole element, as well as in each part of it, just as if his body were a spirit.” 3. Hence Christ is called by St. Cyril of Jerusalem,‡ “ the spiritual victim offered by the priest in the mass.”

\* 1 Cor. xv. 44.

† Vasquez, par. 3 disp. 187. cap. 2. ‡ St. Cyr. Hier. Cat. 5.

2. Not only may the body of Christ, though really present, under the Eucharistic symbols, be called a *spiritual* body, and Christ himself a *spirit*; but the body of Christ may be said to be present under the appearances of bread and wine, *in a spiritual manner, or spiritually*, and not in a *corporeal and natural* manner, or, which is the same thing, *not corporally or carnally*. This may be proved, 1st, because our Saviour is present, as a spirit, in many senses; namely, as an angel is invisible in any spot whatever that we can fix upon, is impassible; is alike entire in the whole form that circumscribes its being, and, in every part of it, being incapable of division, or of being broken into parts; just in the same manner, is the body of Christ present, under the Eucharistic symbols; is invisible, impassible, *entire under the whole element*, and *under every part of it*, being perfectly incapable of division, or of being broken. A corporeal mode of existence, or to exist corporally and carnally, is to exist visibly, and to be capable of suffering, and of local extension; that is, of an entire presence under the whole external form, and of a partial presence under each part of it; and to be, consequently, capable of division. The body of Christ, therefore, in the sense explained above, is present under the accidents, in a spiritual, and not in a corporeal or carnal manner: spiritual, that is, not corporally or carnally. 2nd. The mind feels an insuperable repugnance to saying that Christ was born of his Virgin Mother in a carnal manner, or carnally; though we know that he was truly born of her.—Why then, may we not say that Christ is not carnally, though he is really present, under the Eucharistic accidents?

3. The Council of Trent, in the extract given above, declares that “Christ is always seated at the right hand of his Father in heaven; and that still he is substantially, but sacramentally present in many other places amongst us: by a mode of existence, which, though it can scarcely be expressed in words, the mind, illuminated by Faith, can conceive to be possible to God, and which we are bound most firmly to believe.” Why then, may we not also believe, that, though Christ is always seated in heaven, at the right hand of his Father, in a corporeal and carnal manner of existence,—this being a necessary consequence of a *natural* mode of exis-



tence ;—that he is, nevertheless, spiritually, though substantially present, in many other places, in that *mode of existence*, which the mind can conceive, &c. ?

3. All that I have said of a *spiritual* body, and of a *spiritual* mode of existence, under the Eucharistic species, may be applied, for the same reasons, to the reception, and participation of the blessed sacrament;—namely, that Christ who, according to the Council, is eaten *sacramentally*, may be said to be received *spiritually* and *in a spiritual manner*, and not *carnally*, or *in a carnal manner*, though he is still received by the mouth of the body. This is evident after what has been said above;—and the arguments there adduced may be easily applied here. To eat in a corporal and carnal manner, or corporally and carnally, is to eat as we consume other viands,—that is, by masticating, and dividing the flesh in our mouths, by tasting it with the palate, &c.: but we do not eat Christ in this manner, therefore, he is not eaten coporally, or carnally, nor in a corporeal and carnal, but in a spiritual manner, and, by consequence, spiritually. Observe, also, that the nourishment of the body is the effect of carnal eating, or of eating corporally ; whilst the effect of eating the body of Christ is grace, to serve as the nourishment of the soul ;—refreshing, that is, and strengthening it in the works of a spiritual life, so that this holy sacrament is the support, and nourishment of the soul, which is a pure spirit ; and consequently, on this ground, namely, from the effect produced by the eating of Christ's body, this manducation may be said to be spiritual, and not corporal or carnal ; that is, effected neither corporally, nor carnally, as I have explained above.

But to return to the sacred body of Christ contained under the Eucharistic species.

4. It is not an article of our Faith, indeed it is erroneous to pretend that the body of Christ, contained under the Eucharistic symbols, is, or can be said to be *sitting*, or *lying*, *equal* or *unequal* to a given body, or extent, even to himself, as *sitting at the right hand of his Father in Heaven* ; or that the body, in the sacrament, is as large, thick, long, or broad, as it was on the Cross ; or that it is present under the accidents, or is contained in them locally. Nor is it even of

Faith, that the body of Christ is as far as its quantity is concerned, present under the Eucharistic appearances ; that is to say, it is not of Faith that what is called the quantity of Christ's body is contained therein. This is proved, 1. because neither the Council of Trent, nor our Profession of Faith teaches this. 2. It may be directly proved, from the extract already given from the Council ; in which it is said that the body of Christ, is indeed present under the species, substantially, but still only sacramentally, and not according to its natural mode of existence.

3. Because a spirit, for instance an angel, when present in any place,—or the soul when it animates the human body, cannot be said to be *sitting, or lying, equal or unequal to a given surface, or body*, and it is not, consequently, commensurate to any space, or body. Now the body of Christ, or Christ under the sacramental species, is, and may, with strict justice, as I have shewn, be called a spirit, and therefore nothing of the above can be predicated of his body in the Eucharist. 4. This may be proved, and at the same time explained by the following passage from Vasquez ;\* “ Amongst other properties of quantity, this is one of the principal, that every body, that possesses this quality, may be said to be equal, or unequal ; this flows directly from the nature of quantity, of which it is an essential mode, or property to be subject to measurement, since this is absolutely necessary, before any thing can be called equal, or unequal. Now, although the essence, and the mode of quantity, are found inseparably united, in the body of Christ in heaven ; in the Eucharist, this quantity is only to be found in its essence, and not in its mode. Hence, every thing which belongs to Christ, or to any other body, absolutely, and independently, and without relation, or regard to place, must necessarily coexist with Christ, or that body ; whilst, on the other hand, all such qualities as have a proximate relation with, and dependance on, place or position, such as the mode or property of quantity in question,—as also all such qualities as constitute the very nature of local existence, such as that dependant, and relative property of quantity,

\* Vasquez. 3. Parte. disp. 187. c. 2.



which causes bodies to be called equal, and unequal, and to be considered as circumscribed, and contained in a given space,—such properties as these are not inseparable from the body of Christ, nor indeed from any other body in general. Hence, it follows, that though the body of Christ retains the essence of quantity in the Holy Eucharist, this property being independent of place and position, nevertheless it has not that mode of quantity, which would render it capable of being considered as contained in a given space, or as equal to a given surface.” The above observations are thus excellently applied by the same writer: \*—“As to the quantity of Christ’s body, this body does not occupy space, and may be contained under a small accident of bread—may be entire under the whole species, and under each part of it,—not being impeded as has been said, by any modal quantity, since it is present, after the manner of a spirit, as of an angel, or the human soul, which is entire in the whole body, and in each part of it.”

From what has been said, it is at least evident, and this is all that I require, that nothing of the above is of faith. Vasquez, † in fact, observes, “That some Theologians assert, that the body of Christ in the Eucharist, is not, strictly speaking a quantity, though it has its quantity ; whilst others think, that it is present there without any quantity whatsoever ;” and though these opinions may be false, still they serve to shew, *that nothing has been defined by the church on this subject* ; they shew, in a word, that it is not of faith, that the body of Christ, under the Eucharistic accidents, is *recumbent, equal, as great, thick, long, or broad, as it was on the cross, &c.* ; since all this can only be predicated of quantity, and of that mode of quantity mentioned above. In fact, if we take the words, broad, long, thick, &c. in their common and popular meaning, as expressive of extension, and the occupying of space, every one must see at once, that the body of Christ, under the Eucharistic species, is neither great nor broad ; or, at least, that it is not of faith that it is so. It is, consequently, a mere idle waste of words in our opponents to object to us the burning of the host, &c.: ‡

\* Vasquez, l. c.    † Vasquez, *ibid.* cap. 1.    ‡ Disp. 191.



“If it should happen,” says Vasquez, “that the host be burned or trodden upon, the body of Christ, though really present, under the accidents, would not, thereby suffer, nor would it be burned or trodden upon; just in the same manner as the divinity, though every where substantially present, is not, when any thing is burned or trodden upon, thereby burned or trodden under foot.” For instance, though the divinity is in the piece of bread eaten by a dog, or a mouse, it does not follow, that either the mouse or the dog eats the divinity: in like manner, if it were to happen that a mouse or a dog were to gnaw, or eat the host, or rather the Eucharistic species; though these animals might consume the accidents, they would not eat the body of Christ. And as it is not unbecoming in the divinity, to be substantially present in a mouse, or dog, or even in filth and dirt; neither is it more unbecoming, that the body of Christ, if the accidents should happen to be gnawed, or eaten, as in the instances supposed above, should be present in those animals, even in their bowels, when the Eucharistic accidents are actually swallowed: nor is it anywise unworthy of the Divinity, when all things are properly understood, that Christ should be substantially present in inanimate things, as in the *pax*, on the altar, or in the tabernacle. And as these things do not eat, though they contain the body of Christ, so neither can the dog be strictly speaking said to eat the body of Christ, though it may eat the accidents, and though the body of Christ be substantially present, under these accidents; just as the Divinity is substantially present in the bowels of animals, and in every thing else. Man indeed eats the body of Christ, because he receives it as a sign, or rather as the cause of grace: but this is very different from the manner in which it is contained in the *pax*, or in the bowels of the dog; and, consequently, Christ’s body cannot strictly speaking be said to be eaten by a dog, as it is eaten by man. Our adversaries ought really to make no objection to this doctrine; for suppose a dog should chance to eat a piece of the bread, used by them in the Lord’s Supper, the dog would not eat the sacrament, because it does not consume the bread as a symbol, or sign. But, after all, the imagination cannot dwell without horror on these cases, and

I shall spend no more time on them ; as they do not belong to our articles of Faith, not being mentioned in our Creed, nor by the Council of Trent.

5. Vasquez tells us\* that some Theologians teach that Christ is present in the sacrament, confined to a given space ; others, on the contrary, deny this, and teach that Christ cannot be said to be confined to a given space, and that the property of position, or distance, cannot be predicated of him, that he has, as the schools term it, no *ubi*, any more than an angel, when present, or speaking in a particular body. This latter opinion he conceives is the more probable.

6. The following questions are purely scholastic, and nowise appertain to our articles of Faith. 1. *Can Christ, as he is in the sacrament, be seen, not by a natural, but by a supernatural power, and agency, by the human eye?* Vasquez, not only asserts, but proves that the body of Christ as it is present in the sacrament, is incapable alike of "material action and passion." 2. *Does the presence of the body of Christ in the Eucharist, depend on the existence of that body out of the Eucharist ;—is every affection of the body of Christ out of the Eucharist, also necessarily found in Christ's body, in the Eucharist?* The two following questions which are moved by Vasquez,† are still less articles of Faith than the preceding. 4. *Can the body of Christ be visibly present, in the form that circumscribes it, or in scholastic phraseology, circumscriptively, in several places at the same time?* 5. *Still less do we believe that the church has defined, whether any other body, beside that of Christ, can be present, in several places at the same time, and present, not in an invisibly defined, but in an extended form.* Vasquez‡ asserts, that not even the body of Christ, in this latter manner, can be present in different places at the same time.

7. Much less do we believe,—in fact, I consider it erroneous to say, that the body of Christ, which was produced in the womb of the Virgin, and will be preserved for all eternity in heaven, *is reproduced, or preserved in the Eucharist*, by the words of consecration :—it is false that the body of Christ is brought thither, and more false still that it de-

\* Disp. 190. † Vasquez, Disp. 192. cap. 3. ‡ Vasquez, Disq. 189.



scends from heaven upon the altar, leaving heaven as it were, and traversing the air. And yet almost all these foolish opinions; with a view no doubt to delude the vulgar, are ascribed to the Catholic Church by our opponents. The above opinions are indeed considered, by some of our writers, as possessing a degree of probability, but our clerical slanderers, perhaps through ignorance, but more likely from malice, declare, them to be articles of our Faith: they have an interest, we know, in fostering a disunion by which they live, but which is highly injurious to many souls, and to the peace of both church and state. *The Catholic Church merely teaches that the body of Christ is, by the power of God, present under the Eucharistic species; and this we believe because "it is impossible for God to lye;"*\* or, to use the language of the Calvinistic Confession of Faith, we believe that this is effected by *the secret, and incomprehensible power, of the spirit of God*, in a word, by his omnipotence.

8. After this explanation of our belief, our opponents can have no *real* ground, and scarcely even a specious one, for continuing to dissent from us; since the 36th article of their confession says "we believe that, by a mysterious, and incomprehensible power, He (Christ) nourishes, and vivifies us, with the substance of his body. If then they believe without doubting, that this substance is substantially present in the soul,—and this is necessary that we may be said to be nourished by it,—in whatever manner this may be explained as effected, whether by Faith, or by some other means;—what can possibly hinder them from acknowledging this substance to be present under the Eucharistic accidents, and in the human body? Especially as from the intimate union, that subsists between the soul and body, the substance of Christ's body cannot be present in the soul, without at the same time being present in the body. Moreover, the very same difficulties are to be solved in both our systems, each of which admits a substantial presence, or a presence of the substance of Christ; so that if the subject be well weighed, there will not be found even a shadow of difference between the objections that mitigate against both our doc-

\* Hebr. vi. 18.



trines. Daillé,\* at all events, grants that the Lutheran doctrine which teaches, that the body of Christ is really present in the Eucharistic bread, *carries with it*, to use his words, *no venom, and is not prejudicial to piety*: and in page 31, of the same work, he also says that *this doctrine is nowise opposed to their salvation, and much less to ours*. If so, why then cause so many disturbances? Why not assent to a doctrine which, according to their own principles, if subscribed to, to-morrow, by their whole body, would be no obstacle to their salvation. Let them follow what is clearly the safer way to Heaven. Daillé himself lays down this principle,† that a person, who believes that he might be saved in the Roman Catholic Church, and yet lives in a different communion, can neither be looked upon as a good Christian, or deserving of toleration as a citizen, or even as a man of common sense.” And yet Daillé grants, that a person may be saved, and still believe in the real presence of Christ’s body, under the Eucharistic appearances; and that this belief is nowise prejudicial to salvation. Let then our Dissenting brethren embrace this doctrine.

## § 12.

### *On Transubstantiation.*

Pope Pius’s Creed says,—“I profess that, in the most holy sacrament of the Eucharist, there is made a conversion of the whole substance of the bread into the body, and of the whole substance of the wine into the blood (of Christ), a conversion, which the Catholic Church calls Transubstantiation.” “If any one,” says the Council of Trent,‡ “shall say, that in the most holy sacrament of the Eucharist, the substance of the bread, and of the wine, remains together with the body, and blood of Christ,—and shall deny the wonderful, and singular conversion, of the whole substance of the bread, into his body, and of the whole substance of the wine, into his blood, the appearances only of bread and wine remaining,—a change, which the Catholic Church has most aptly called Transubstantiation, let him be ana-

\* Daillé, Apol. cap. 7. p. 35.

† Ep. ad. Mongl. p. 72.

‡ Concil. Trid. Sess. 13. can. 2.

thema." And again, under the article Transubstantiation, the Council says, \* "As Christ our Lord declared, that to be truly his body, which he offered under the appearance of bread, it has accordingly been always firmly believed in the Church of God,—and this Holy Synod again declares, that by the consecration of the bread and wine, a change is made of the whole substance of the bread, into the substance of the body of Christ, and of the whole substance of the wine, into the substance of his blood,—a change, which has been aptly, and properly called by the Catholic Church, Transubstantiation." The above is all that the Council decrees on this subject. This therefore is of Faith, since it is contained in our Creed, and is propounded by a General Council. But, on the other hand, nothing else is of faith on the subject of Transubstantiation, because nothing else is to be found in our Creed, in the Council of Trent, or in any other General Council. Much, however, beside the above, is ascribed to the Catholic Church, by the teachers of other creeds, with a view to foster a disunion, by which they live,—they utter calumnies, some of which are pure blasphemies, and others are naturally calculated to excite public abhorrence against our doctrines. I will subjoin a number of remarks in illustration of what has been said.

1. It is not an article of our Faith, it is even blasphemous to pretend, that in this mystery, the bread is transubstantiated into the body of Christ, in the same manner as the bread that we eat is changed into our bodily substance: nor is it of faith, that *by transubstantiation the matter of the bread begins to exist under the form of Christ's body*, just as the matter of bread that is eaten, by nourishing us, begins to subsist under the form of the human body. This is proved, 1, because the Council of Trent does not teach this; it even, in fact teaches the contrary:—for if the above were true, then the whole substance of the bread would not be changed, into the body of Christ, but the matter, or nutritive part only of the bread would be thus transubstantiated, as is the case in the ordinary course of nutrition. 2. Because it would then follow, that the body of Christ would be corruptible,

\* Cap. 3.



capable of increase, and diminution ; since these are the natural effects of the manducation of bread, and of its being converted into our bodily substance.

2. Nor is it of Faith, that *Transubstantiation is effected by the reproduction, or consecration of Christ's body*. In the last section, in fact, I had occasion to observe, that the body of Christ is not reproduced, nor preserved in the Eucharist. Nor is it of Faith, that by Transubstantiation even a substantial, or accidental mode is produced ; which production, conservation, or substantial, or accidental mode, or whatever that may be, by which the body and blood of Christ is rendered impossible with the substance of the bread and wine, and by this impossibility removes that substance, and thus, by this means, Transubstantiation is effected. Indeed, there is, in reality, no essential impossibility, between the coexistence of the body of Christ, and the substance of bread. What I have here said may be proved, 1, Because neither the Council of Trent, nor our Creed, mentions even any of these questions. 2. Because both Vasquez, and other theologians prove that all, and each of the above opinions are absolutely erroneous. Thus Vasquez \* proves, at considerable length, that it is false, that "Transubstantiation is a formal action, the effect of which, is the production of a substantial mode, or quality." 2. That it is false, † "that Transubstantiation is a change, or a reproduction of the body of Christ : " or, 3, that "it is the changing afresh, or renewing of the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist : " and this opinion he shews to be untenable, both from the very object of the sacrament, and because the words of consecration would not then be verified. As I agree with Vasquez, that none of these opinions are true, I shall not stop to enquire which of them is the least untrue : indeed this inquiry would be foreign from the plan which I have proposed to myself. It is enough that, from their variety, I have shewn, that nothing has been defined, on these points, by the Church. This is admitted by all our writers, without a single exception : not one of them, in fact, seems ever to have dreamed of asserting any of the above opinions to be of Faith. What are we then to think of those writers, ecclesiastics too, who presume to calumniate us so

\* Vasquez, Disp. 181. cap. 3.    † l. c. cap. 4.    ‡ l. c. cap. 5.



shamefully, as to impute these opinions to us, as the doctrines of our Church.

3. Nor is it of Faith, that the bread and wine are annihilated by the words of consecration. 1. Because the Council of Trent, does not declare this. 2. Because, as Vasquez\* justly observes, "this question is nothing more nor less than a pure logomachy:"—and he adds, "that some Theologians, whilst they admit a real transubstantiation, assert also that the bread and wine,—which are said by the Council, to *be changed*,—not only cease to exist, but are also actually annihilated. This was taught by Scotus, Occam, Gabriel, and Major; though the latter of these writers cautions us, not to be violent in defending this opinion, but to leave each one at liberty, to hold whatever opinion he pleases on this subject. The opinion, however, which I myself hold, and which has been long a favourite in the schools, that it is not correct to say that the bread and wine are annihilated in the sacrament;" and this opinion he confirms at some length.

4. There is still less reason for pretending, that the following questions, which are mooted, and argued by Vasquez, are articles of Faith: in fact, they nowise affect the particular manner of transubstantiation which we are now considering. They are these :† 1. "Could the body of Christ have been rendered present in the sacrament, without the substance of bread being changed into the substance of Christ's body?" "On this point," says he, "there are many opinions in the schools, &c.:" and he then proceeds to mention them. 2. ‡ "Are all substances capable of being changed into other substances? The schoolmen disagree, &c." From our rule of Faith, it is clear, that the above are not articles of our Faith.

.5 What then, it may be asked, is really meant by the word transubstantiation—in what does it consist? I answer that on this point, we must not abandon, but must content ourselves with adhering closely to the words of the Council of Trent, which I have cited above; and not wish

\* Vasquez, Disp. 183. cap. 1.

† Vasquez, Disp. 82. ‡ Vasquez, Disp. 184.

*to be more wise than it behoveth, but to be wise unto sobriety.* I will, however, subjoin Vasquez's explanation of the words of the council, without of course pretending, that his deductions from these words, are articles of our Faith. But any one that is willing to admit transubstantiation, in the sense in which this writer explains it, though he reject all other explanations whatever, believes all that can be required of him as a Catholic. No one can have any great objection to it, as the doctrine of transubstantiation, as it is explained by this writer, really does not present any real difficulty. "As I have shewn," says he,\* "all the above opinions to be untenable, it is now my duty to lay before the reader, the explanation which I myself consider true, and which I think no one at least will deny was taught by the older scholastics. And it is this: that the formal manner of transubstantiation does not consist, either in a change, or in a reproduction of anything, — but is a relation of order, between the substance, which ceases to exist, and that substance into which it passes in ceasing to exist:—a conversion, or transubstantiation, to which we have no parallel in any other conversion, or action whatever." "Let us bear in mind," he continues,† "what has been said above, that the signification of the words of consecration is such, that the verification of these words, requires not only that the body, and blood of Christ be really present, under the accidents, but also that the substance of the bread and wine entirely cease to exist. Instituted as were these words by Christ himself, and pronounced in his name, they must be absolutely true; but this cannot be, without causing the body and blood of Christ to be present under the accidents, and destroying the substance of the bread."

Our Blessed Lord might have caused his body to be present, and the bread to cease to exist, by making use of a different form of words—by a formulary, part of which might be expressive of the presence of the body and blood of Christ, and another part signify that the bread ceases to exist:—thus, if Christ, or a priest in his name, were to pronounce these words "Let this be my body, and be no longer

\* Vasquez, Disp. 18. cap. 11.    † l. c. cap. 12.



bread," or, "let this be no longer bread, and let it be my body," the effects specified above would have followed. A similar formulary might also have been used in consecrating the wine. Yet, although, in this case, the effect would be the same as it now is, as far as the real presence of the body and blood of Christ, and the destruction of the substance of the bread are concerned, still this effect would be produced in a different manner. For, in this case, neither Christ, nor the priest could be said to destroy the bread, by causing the body of Christ to be present, or by destroying the substance of the bread, to cause Christ to be present, but they ought then to be said to perform two distinct actions, namely, that they cause the body of Christ to be present, and also destroy the substance of the bread. Christ really would be present, and the bread really cease to subsist, since the signification of the words thus far is the same ; but there is this difference in the form established by Christ, and the one which we have supposed, by which two distinct effects, are produced ; that the expressions which cause one of these effects, would not also cause the other ;—the words would be really verified when one of the effects only was produced, without the second being required by them, as a necessary consequence ; these effects would, in a word, co-exist, as the very form of the words shews, but only as an accidental consequence. or, as it is styled, by concomitance. Whilst, by virtue of our present form of consecration, though it is not specified that the bread and wine cease to subsist, these two effects are produced in such a manner, that, though only one is mentioned,—the presence, namely, of the body and blood of Christ,—still this is mentioned in such a manner, that the words, which cause the body and blood of Christ to be present, necessarily require that the bread and wine cease to subsist. The bread ceases to exist as a necessary consequence of the presence of Christ's body, as is clearly signified, by the words of consecration ; and a priest, consequently, when he pronounces those words, may be, strictly speaking, said to cause the body and blood of Christ to be present, and, by virtue of the real presence, expressed by the accustomed form of consecration, to destroy the bread."



"The accidents," he also observes,\* "are, primarily at least, destined to point out the peculiar substance to which they are united, but this only as long as that substance really exists; if this cease, they are not destined to point out any other: a person, consequently, who should wish to indicate any particular substance or body, in which God is really present, would not express himself correctly, if he were to say, *this is God*; or, to give another instance, if an Angel were present in a given substance or body, it would not be a proper, or a correct form of expression, to draw attention to this fact, by saying, *this is an Angel*. To speak with propriety and truth, we ought to say, *here is God*, or, *here is an Angel*; that is to say, God, or an Angel, is in this place, or body. For the demonstrative pronoun *this*, though applied to the sensible accidents, is not intended to point out the accidents, but the substance that is under them, or to which they are united, and this is so far its primary, and even exclusive object, that as long as the natural subject of these accidents subsists, no other substance can be indicated by the pronoun. When, however, the subject of these accidents no longer subsists, but another substance exists under them; this second substance is then, with propriety, and even necessarily, indicated, by the pronoun. When, therefore, Christ took bread, and declared that what he offered up under the appearances of bread, was truly his body; and when he took the chalice, and declared, that what he offered up, under the appearances of wine, was his blood; as he clearly could not have applied these expressions, with any truth, to the substances of bread and wine, nor even, as I have shewn above, to his natural body and blood, if these were united to the substance of bread and wine, these substances being nowise destroyed,—and both the substance of his body and blood, and of the bread and wine consequently being contained under the same accidents; it necessarily follows, that the substance of the bread and wine was destroyed, by the words of our Saviour; and that the substance of his body and blood alone remained under the appearances of bread and wine. This reasoning most powerfully proves the destruction of the

\* Vasquez, Disp. 180. cap. 4.

substances of bread and wine, which is the point that alone now engages our attention, as I have already dwelt sufficiently on the real presence." To sum all up in one word; the doctrine of Transubstantiation adds nothing to that of the real presence of Christ, but this,—that by virtue of the words of consecration—in order that these words may really be pronounced with truth—the bread must cease to exist:—and, from what has been said, it is clear, that this is all that we are to understand by the word Transubstantiation. "*Formal conversion*," says Vasquez,\* is a term expressive of that relation, which subsists between the substance that ceases to exist, and that substance, which causes it to cease to exist in the sacrament; a destruction, which is absolutely necessary, that the words of consecration may be truly verified;—nor can this phrase be considered as anything more than an expression of this relation,—and an expression too which must not be taken as defining the nature of this relation, but rather as a conventional term, which, taken literally, goes beyond the nature of the relation, that subsists between the two substances mentioned above." At all events, it is quite certain, that a person, to be a Catholic, need believe nothing more than the above, on the subject of Transubstantiation, whether the opinions of the schoolmen, which I have rejected as false, in the preceding observations, be really so, or not.

Now I would ask a person, who believes that the body of Christ is really present in the Eucharistic bread, or symbols,—what difficulty he can possibly have in believing Transubstantiation, as I have explained it? Surely he can have none whatever

5 At all events, the doctrine of Transubstantiation, as it is explained above, is not a just ground for separation: and any one that admits, as Daillé does, that the belief of the presence of Christ's body, *carries with it no venom, and is not prejudicial to the piety of, or the salvation of him that believes it*,—must also necessarily allow, that neither does the doctrine of Transubstantiation carry with it any venom, and that it is not prejudicial to piety, or to the salvation of

\* Vasquez, Disp. 181. cap. 12.

him that believes it.—Since the doctrine of Transubstantiation adds nothing to that of the real presence of Christ, but the belief that the bread ceases to exist; which latter effect cannot be considered, as prejudicial to piety, and salvation, by any reasonable man, who can bring himself to admit, that the doctrine of a real presence has not these effects. It follows, therefore, from a principle laid down by Daillé, and which I have already quoted,—*that he is neither a good Christian, nor deserving of toleration as a citizen, nor even is he a man of common sense, who refuses to believe the doctrine of Transubstantiation, as explained in this section.*

### § 13.

#### *On the adoration of the Eucharist.*

There is no express declaration, in Pope Pius's creed, that the adoration of the Eucharist follows, as a necessary consequence, from the belief of the real presence of Christ under the appearances of bread and wine. But by the Council of Trent\* it is decreed, that "If any one shall say, that Christ ought not to be adored, in the holy sacrament of the Eucharist, with the outward worship of *Latria*,—and that, consequently, neither ought he to be honoured, in this sacrament, with a particular festival, nor the sacrament be solemnly carried in procession, according to the praiseworthy, and universal practice of the church; nor publicly exposed to the people to be adored; and that they who adore Christ in this sacrament, are idolators, let him be anathema." Also, after declaring in the 3rd chapter, that the true body and blood of Christ, are together with his soul and divinity, present under the appearance of bread and wine;—and establishing, in the 4th chapter, the doctrine of transubstantiation, the council draws this inference, in the 5th, and teaches that "there can be no doubt, that all the faithful, following in this, the practice which has always been observed in the Catholic Church, ought, in venerating the holy sacrament, to worship it with the same adoration of *Latria* that belongs to the true God. For this sacrament is not the less deserving of this adoration, because it was instituted by

\* Concil. Trid. Sess. 13. can. 6.



Christ our Lord that it might be received, believing, as we do, that that same God is present, in this sacrament, whom the eternal Father introduced into the world by saying *let all the angels of God adore him* :—\* the same God *before whom the magi falling down adored* ;—whom the apostles also, according to the sacred text, *adored in Gallilee*.” As this is proposed by a General Council, it is of Faith : but it also follows, on the other hand, that nothing but this is of Faith, on this point.

1. The opinion which I shall subjoin, is not of Faith, in fact, it is a mere and shameful calumny of Daillé, and one too of the most aggravated kind, and deserving of severer reprehension, because it is ascribed to us by this writer, not merely as an article of Faith, but is assigned, as one of the grounds, on which the separation from our church, and the disturbances both in Church and State, that were consequent on that event, may be justified. It is contained in the following passage of his apology, to which Mestrezat, Drelincourt, and Aubertin also attached their names. “The real question is not,” says he,† “and this I have stated again, and again, in my writings, and in every part of them, in the title-page—the beginning, the middle, and the end of them,—the real question between us is not, whether the body of Christ is to be adored in the Eucharist, but whether we are to adore the Eucharist itself. There is a wide difference, between these two ways of adoration. In adoring the Eucharist, the act of worship is directed to that particular, and definite object, which subsists in the spot, towards which the act of worship is referred,—directed, that is, to the substance which is veiled under the accidents of bread and wine; so that, supposing that this substance happen to be a mere created object, the act of adoration is, in this case, necessarily an unlawful creature-worship—one in fine that is forbidden by the Almighty. On the other hand, by directing our adoration to the body of Christ, in the Eucharist,—if his body should happen not to be present there, the worship would, in this case, be futile, and useless, but no more; it would then be directed, if I may be allowed the expression,

\* Ps. xcvi. 8. Hebr. i. 6. † Daillé in Apol. cap. 9. Ep. ad Mongl.

to nothing ; the error consisting not, in paying divine worship to an object incapable of it,—which I have shewn to be the case in the other system,—but merely in this, that an object really adorable is erroneously thought to be present, and subsistent, where it really is not.” In these words Daillé ascribes to us, as an article of our Faith, an opinion which we in reality reprobate and abhor ; asserting this second kind of adoration to be different from the first, and that we admit two objects of adoration, under the Eucharistic accidents. Now that such is not our belief is clear, 1. Because no such doctrine is propounded by the Council of Trent. 2. Because there is not one amongst all our writers, that has ever hinted at such a system, as that ascribed to us by Daillé—a system which admits of two objects of adoration in the Eucharist,—by which an act of adoration, besides that which is referred to Christ, may be directed to a particular, and definite object, which subsists in the spot, towards which the act of worship is referred,—directed, that is, to the substance, which is veiled under the accidents of bread and wine. Now I would ask again, whether one single Catholic writer can be mentioned that ever thought of this system ? Undoubtedly not:—and even if there were one such, the opinion would not be the less horrible. It is not true, that we adore *indiscriminately, and indefinitely, whatever substance happens to be contained under the appearances of bread and wine*: we adore Christ only, whom we believe to be there present ;—Daillé, consequently, is convicted as a calumniator. 3 It may be proved also, that this system is no article of our Faith, from the following answer given by the faculty of Theology of the University of Paris. “....The learned Doctors of the faculty of Paris, are requested to deliver their opinion, whether the fact, stated in the 63rd page of Monsieur Daillé’s Letter, to M. Monglat, dated 1634, be true, or false.” The following is the answer. “ We, the undersigned Doctors of Divinity of the faculty of Paris. in answer to the above question, declare, that the fact referred to is false, and wrongfully ascribed to the Catholic Church ; which, in paying adoration to the Holy Eucharist, has no design whatever to adore any other substance, veiled under the accidents of bread and wine, besides Jesus Christ ;

and the Church anathematizes all, who should pretend to adore, in the Eucharist, any other substance whatsoever. It is a groundless idea, of the same writer's, to fancy, that there is more danger of idolatry, in the adoration of the Eucharist, as practised by the Catholic Church, than in the Lutheran system; since he supposes the Catholic Church to direct her worship to an object to which adoration is not due, and that it is thereby, consequently, an unlawful, and prohibited act of worship: whilst the truth is, that the only object that the Catholic adores in the Eucharist, is Jesus Christ; to whom adoration belongs, wherever he may be present, and, therefore, in the Eucharist, in which the Catholic Church does not acknowledge, or recognize, after the consecration, any other substance to exist, besides Jesus Christ. And if, from a want of proper attention, or from any other cause, unconsecrated bread were exposed to the veneration of the faithful, instead of the Holy Eucharist, the Catholic has no intention to adore, nor does he think that he does, or is allowed to adore, the mere bread:—he has no wish to adore the bread, nor any other similar substance, his adoration is directed solely to our Lord Jesus Christ. Given this 18th April, 1643.” This declaration is signed in the original, by Ja. Hennequin, Emerez, Perreret, du Fresne, de Mincé, Chapelas, M. Cantat, Broussé, Judas, A. de Mautry. Now, is there any one, even amongst those who have separated from our Church, that can listen with patience to such a calumny as this—imputed to us by the very ministers of Religion, as an article of Faith; who foment, by these falsehoods, a division most injurious to the church, and most prejudicial to the salvation of souls, and to the good of the State.

2. It is another calumny of this writer,\* of a similar stamp too with the preceding, to assert that, besides adoring Christ under the appearances of bread and wine, *we adore the sacrament with the sovereign and absolute worship of Latria*. Now, I ask, what Catholic pretends, that two acts of supreme adoration are due,—one to Christ present in the Eucharist, and the other to the Eucharist itself, that is to say, to the other substance, which, according to Daillé, we say

\* Daillé in Apol. pag. 45, 46, 66.



exists there? When Catholics say, that they adore the sacrament with a sovereign and absolute worship, they mean, by these words, to be understood to say, that they adore Christ present in the sacrament, under the Eucharistic appearances; Catholics often use these terms, "the sacrament, the matter of the sacrament," as conventionally equivalent to that of Christ present under the sacramental appearances; on account of his being present there as the cause of grace. But God forbid that we should ever think of adoring the sacrament, in any other sense, with supreme and absolute worship;—to do so, would be idolatry. As to the respect, which is to be shewn to the Eucharistic symbols, considered as distinct from the body of Christ, of this I shall have occasion to speak later;—but I will observe that all Catholics are agreed that this is a mere relative, and not an absolute or sovereign respect. Here then is another instance, not very unlike the preceding, of palpable attempt to impose upon the public.

3. It is not of Faith, indeed it is not true, that the Council of Trent,\* as Daillé pretends, has defined that there are in the sacrament two distinct objects of our adoration,—one in the person of *Christ*,—and the other in the *Eucharist*. 1. Because the Council of Trent does not mention two. 2. Vasquez,† justly observes, that "when the council speaks of the adoration of the Eucharist, and affirms that the worship of Latria, which belongs to the one true God, is the species of adoration with which this sacrament is to be venerated; it is to be understood as speaking of Christ contained under the accidents, or as speaking of the accidents considered as containing under them the body of Christ: it being the opinion, and a just opinion, of many Theologians that Christ is essentially connected with the very nature and essence of the sacrament; indeed, as Christ is what is contained in the sacrament, he is on this account called a sacrament; or, at all events, the accidents are called a sacrament, in no other sense, than in as much as the body and blood of Christ are really present under them. 3. It may also be proved from the following words of the Council that "in venerating the holy sacrament, we ought to worship it with

\* Concil. Trid. Sess. 13. c. 5. † Vasquez: disp. 109. c. 3.

the same adoration of Latria, that belongs to the true God:”—now it is beyond dispute, that this worship of Latria is absolute and supreme; and it is equally certain, that an absolute and supreme worship belongs not to the species, but to Christ only. 4. From the observations subjoined by the Council, my explanation may also be established:—the council says, that the same worship is required from us, that was rendered by the Magi, who fell down and adored, &c. Now this worship, every one must admit, was neither more nor less, than the absolute adoration of Christ. 5. The Council argues to the nature of this worship, from the real presence of Christ, to whom adoration belongs, wherever he may be present;—there is consequently no mention whatever, in this passage of the Council, of the adoration of the accidents. When, therefore, the Council says, that the absolute worship of Latria belongs to the sacrament, by the word sacrament is meant Christ under the sacramental accidents; which is nothing uncommon, as this term sacrament is not unfrequently used to denominate Christ present under the Eucharistic accidents; he being present there, as I have already observed, as an efficacious sign of the grace that he bestows. No Catholic, at all events, will pretend that the explanation, which is here given, of the words of the Council, is opposed to the faith of our Church; it follows, therefore, at least, that it is false to say, that *it is of faith*, that two distinct objects of adoration,—Christ, and the sacrament, considered as two objects,—are specified by the Council of Trent. The same object is specified by the Council under different names.

4. As to the veneration which is to be paid to the Eucharistic accidents, as this is undoubtedly nothing more than an inferior and relative, and not, by any means, an absolute respect, there can be no need of my dwelling at any length on the explanation of it. Daillé says nothing about it, and in fact, there is no particular difficulty whatever in the case. Vasquez\* spends some time in proving, that “we are to proceed on the same principles in venerating the holy sacrament of the Eucharist, that we follow in honouring images: from which it follows that the body of Christ, being

\* Vasquez, part. 3 disp. 118. cap. 12.

present in the Eucharist, claims the adoration of Latria." "But," he subjoins, "as to the nature of the respect, and veneration which belongs to the Eucharistic appearances, the schoolmen do not agree; of course, to be consistent, each one will adopt the same principles, that he embraces on the nature of the honor that is due to the images of Christ; as the formal and ultimate object of veneration is in both cases the same, namely, Jesus Christ. The feeling of respect may not be so ardent, when directed to the image of Christ, as when referred to the sacrament, because Christ in the sacrament is really present; and for this reason we shew in our outward behaviour a greater degree of reverence towards Christ in the sacrament, than towards any image that merely represents him." "The sacramental accidents," says the same writer,\* "are mere inanimate modes, and are of themselves incapable of receiving any kind of respect, or honour, which is only due to them, on account of their close connexion with Christ, who is really present under these outward appearances. The act of adoration must not, therefore, stop at these exterior accidents, but must proceed to what is contained under them:—it is not the accidents, but Christ present under these accidents, that we adore. The reader would do well to reperuse my remark, on the respect due to images which he may apply, without any limitation whatever, to the subject before us. As I taught in that section, that it is not of Faith that images—not even the images of Christ—are to be adored, and much less adored with the worship of Latria:—that, in fact, it is not of Faith, that even a religious honour is due to them, much less an honour corresponding to that, which belongs to the prototype whom they represent; so in like manner, I say that it is not of Faith, that the sacramental accidents are to be adored, much less adored with the worship of Latria; that it is not of Faith, that a religious honor is due to them, much less, consequently, the same worship that belongs to Christ:—and, as the word sacrament is often used for nothing more than the sacramental symbols, signs, and accidents, I apply the same observations to this word when used in this manner.

\* Vasquez, l. c.



In fact, a Catholic has never any intention to adore the accidental modes, which he sees, as the whiteness or roundness of the consecrated particles;—his adoration is directed to Christ only, whom indeed his eyes see not, but whom Faith tells him to be really present under these outward appearances; and, as we respect not only the king, but even his dress, and robes; so does our veneration extend to the Eucharistic accidents, under which Christ is really present. Some moderns think, says Vasquez,\* that Gabriel taught that the sacrament, that is to say the sacramental species, may by synecdoche, be said to be adored—not of course in the strict meaning of the word adoration, but merely on account of the presence of Christ under them.” Vasquez does not think that this opinion need be censured.

5. I select the following observation also, from a variety of excellent remarks made by Vasquez.† “From the interior worship of Latria, which is called adoration, and which has the prototype, that is represented, for its immediate object flows a mark of exterior respect, which is usually spoken of in ordinary language, as an honour, respect, or adoration of the material object to which our interior worship is directed, or before which our exterior respect is exhibited,—this respect, however, does not stop at the material object, but proceeds to the prototype which it represents: whilst, on the contrary, the outward expression of praise by which we commend the excellency of the prototype,—prayer too, and sacrifice, are commonly spoken of as addressed to the prototype only, and not to the material objects that represent it; and likewise, we seldom say, that these actions are directed to, but rather performed before, these material [representations and inanimate objects; to which acts of respect, of course, they never, of themselves, have any claim. Now, I am of opinion, that what has been here said of images, may be applied with propriety, and upon the very same grounds, to the sacramental accidents. I am particular in using the words “sacramental accidents,” as distinguished from the word “sacrament,” because as the presence of Christ, according to my explanation given above, essentially enters into

\* Vasquez, l. c. cap. 12.

† Disp. 109. cap. 4.

the full meaning of the latter expression; prayer, religious praise, and sacrifice may be said to be directed to the sacrament, just as we say that the interior worship of *Latria*, in the absolute and unmodified meaning of the words, may be paid to it.

6. In a word, we honour the king, whether clothed in his royal robes or not, whether borne in state in his carriage or not, with precisely the same kind of respect; we make no distinction in our respect in either case; the honour is one and the same. In fact, a courtier, or any one of common sense, would laugh at the man, that should be foolish enough to honour the king, when divested of his royal robes, or of clothes entirely, and should yet refuse to pay him that respect when dressed, or riding in his carriage. And he would undoubtedly be considered as a madman, if he turned rebel, or made his escape from the king's palace, for fear of being compelled to honour the king on such occasions. The application of this is obvious:—our dissenting brethren are guilty of an equal act of folly, and shew an equal want of sense, in accusing us of idolatry for adoring the Eucharist; they consider it, in a word, a detestable act to adore Christ, veiled and concealed under the Eucharistic accidents. For we call Jesus Christ, when proposed to the adoration of the faithful under the Eucharistic species, the Eucharist, or the Sacrament of the Eucharist. And on this ground, they are guilty of an act, which nothing can ever justify, namely, of causing a schism,—though they admit\* that it is no idolatry *if the body of Christ be not adored in the Eucharist*; that is to say, that it is not idolatrous to adore Christ when present in the sacrament, or when considered as present independently of it.

It is folly indeed, to advance this—as I have shewn the Protestant Ministers do, both in their apology, and in their letter to Menglat,—† as one of the main reasons for separating from the Roman Catholic Church. Whether naked in the crib, or stretched upon the cross,—clothed as on earth in his ordinary vesture, or veiled from our sight by the expanse of heaven, or by the Eucharistic accidents, to Christ ever belongs the same supreme worship. I have al-

\* Ep. ad Meng. pag. 63.

† Pag. 63.

ready observed, that when hidden by the Eucharistic accidents, the term sacrament of the Eucharist is employed, to express his presence in this manner, and in this meaning, and no other, do we say that the worship of Latria belongs to the sacrament. Both parties would afford much mirth to a courtier, if they were to argue the question before him, applied as above to the dress of the king, and should enter into fierce controversy on the nature of the honour due to the king's dress, whether on his person, or in his wardrobe. In the same way, is it possible not to smile, to see our adversaries, engaged in long and warm debate, about the nature of the honor that is due to the sacramental species; which may be considered as the robe, or covering in this case; and also examining what respect is due to the sacrament, to the species, namely, that contain the body of Christ, considered as containing this body—whether Christ veiled in this manner may be adored, whether there is not in this case a twofold worship, and in addition to this a relative honor belonging to the species, the nature of which also requires to be determined:—

“Spectatum admissi risum teneatis, amici?”

I am also afraid, that the courtier would secretly laugh as heartily at us, for involving this plain question in so many subtleties:—and I have, I think, some reason for this apprehension,—for undoubtedly he would smile, if these intricate distinctions and discussions were applied to his master's dress, which there can be no difficulty in supposing, as the cases are perfectly parallel, and the very same kind of distinctions, and disputes might be started, on this appendage to royalty.

7. At all events, if *to believe that the body of Christ is really present under the Eucharistic species, and that his body, because considered as present there, may be adored in the Eucharist,—carry with it no venom, and be not prejudicial to the salvation of him that believes this doctrine, and adores Christ in consequence of such belief*;—it is impossible for any one, in his senses, to assert, that to adore the Eucharist, or the sacrament, with the sovereign, and absolute worship of *latria*, in the sense and manner already explained,—*either carries with it any venom, or is prejudicial*



to salvation:—and if not prejudicial to salvation, then it follows from a principle several times alluded to, that the man, who refuses to adore the sacrament, or the Eucharist, is neither a good christian, nor deserving of toleration as a citizen, nor even does he shew common sense.

#### § 14.

##### *On the Sacrifice of the Mass.*

In our creed we possess, that “In the mass, is offered to God, a true, proper, and propitiatory sacrifice for the living, and the dead.” And the Council of Trent\* declares, that “If any one shall say that in the mass, a true, and proper sacrifice is not offered to God; or, that by a sacrifice being offered to God, nothing more is meant, than that Christ is given to be eaten, let him be anathema.” And again, in the third canon, it decrees, that “If any one shall say, that the sacrifice of the mass is merely an act of praise, and thanksgiving; or a bare commemoration of the sacrifice that was completed on the cross, and not a propitiatory sacrifice; or that it only benefits the receiver; and that it ought not to be offered for the living, and the dead,—for their sins, their punishments, satisfactions, and other necessities, let him be anathema.” Being proposed by a General Council, the above is of Faith, but, on the other hand, none if the following propositions are articles of our Faith.

1. It is not of Faith, that *the mass, though it is a true, and propitiatory,—is also an absolute, and not a relative, and commemorative sacrifice.* Neither are the following questions of Faith, since even our own writers differ in opinion respecting them. This is also undeniably proved to be the case, 1, from the Council of Trent having passed no decree on these points; though there were many individuals of great learning present at the Council, who were fully aware that conflicting opinions were advanced, and defended in the schools, on these subjects. In the second place, as we learn from Vasquez,† the schoolmen, as I observed above, are not agreed in opinion, on these questions. To prove this, it will be sufficient for my purpose to cite the following heads of chapters from

\* Concil. Trid. Sess. 22.can. 1.

† Vasquez, Disp. 222.

that writer.\* chap. 19. "The oblation which is made by the priest, in a given form of words, nowise appertains to the nature, and essence of the sacrifice." chap. 2. "Neither does the breaking, or the distribution of the sacrament essentially belong to the sacrifice." chap. 3. "There are various opinions as to the nature of the relation that subsists between the reception of the sacrament, and the sacrifice." Chap. 4. "However, the sole reception of the sacrament does not constitute the essence of the sacrifice; nor is its nature such as to be at all adapted to have been instituted by our Saviour, for any such purpose. Chap 5. "I propose to prove, that the sole consecration of the sacrament constitutes the entire essence, and nature of the sacrifice." Chap. 6. "The true essence of the sacrifice, though it consist in the consecration, still our Theologians are not agreed in their explanations on this point." Chap. 7. "From the testimony of the Fathers, I propose to prove, that the Consecration of the Sacrament constitutes the entire essence of the sacrifice, inasmuch as the sacrifice of the cross is represented by that of the altar."—Chap. 8. "The essence of the Sacrifice of the Mass may be deduced most clearly, from merely considering it, as a representation of the death of Christ." In chapter 9, he replies to the objections of his opponents. From this it is clear, that there is a variety of opinion, on this subject, amongst our own writers; and that nothing, consequently, has been defined by the church to be received as of Catholic Faith. The following extract, from the eighth chapter referred to above, contains a succinct statement of Vasquez's own opinion. "In signifying and shewing forth the omnipotence of God, as the author of life and death, consists the real and precise nature, and character of sacrifice; and, consequently, if there can be an oblation, by which, without a true, and real change of the thing offered, the Almighty can be denoted and honoured, as the author of life and death,—such oblation ought to be styled a true and real sacrifice. Such a case presents itself in the consecration of the body and blood of Christ; and this too effected by the simple representation of Christ's death, without any real change or mutation in Christ himself; and as

\* Vasquez, l. c.

such, consequently, is a true and proper sacrifice. For it is quite clear, that, by the simple representation of the death of Christ in the consecration, God is shewn to be the author of life and death, as effectually as by our Saviour's death upon the cross :—for the commemoration of this death represents, and, as it were, brings before our eyes that tragic scene ; and shews the power of God over life and death, in the same manner, as if Christ were really, at that moment, dying in his honour. That a change consequently, takes place in the thing offered, is nowise essential to the nature of sacrifice in general, there may be a *commemorative*, though not an *absolute* sacrifice without it, since the formal nature of a sacrifice, which consists in signifying, not by words, but really and effectively, the sovereign power of God over life and death, may subsist in a commemorative sacrifice without any such mutation. Still, however, we must carefully observe, that, even for a commemorative sacrifice, I mean a real and proper sacrifice, it is not enough that it be a mere sign, or representation of the death of something,—without containing in any manner, the object itself, whose death is represented,—for, in this case, it would not be true to say, that the object whose death is represented, is really offered in sacrifice, and consequently, there would not be a really commemorative sacrifice, but rather a sign, and empty shew of a sacrifice ; but it is also necessary, that the object whose death is represented, signify and shew forth its own death. To illustrate this by an example. Suppose the opinion of our adversaries to be true, that the body and blood of Christ are not really present under the appearances of bread and wine, but only the substance of the bread and wine ; it must be granted,—and our opponents do grant,—that the death of Christ may still, even in this system, be represented ; but Christ would not, in this case, be truly and really, but only figuratively offered in sacrifice. In fact, how could that be said to be truly and really offered in sacrifice, which is not really, but only by some kind of similitude, and figuratively only, the object of the action of the offering Priest. As however Christ is really present, under the appearances of bread and wine, and the action of the priest in offering, and the presence of Christ under, these species, are so closely



connected, that, in consequence of the peculiar form of consecration, made use of by the priest, Christ represents, by means of the accidents of bread and wine, his real and bloody death upon the cross,—and points out the Almighty as the author of life and death,—in this case though Christ cannot be said to be killed, and to die truly, and really, but in figure and similitude only,—still it is true to say, that he is truly, and really immolated, and offered in sacrifice.” With this explanation, what difficulty can there be in believing in a *true, and proper*, but still a *commemorative*, though not an *absolute* sacrifice.

2. At all events, if it be granted, that the belief in the doctrine of the real presence of the body of Christ, under the appearances of bread and wine, *carries with it no venom, and is not prejudicial to the salvation of the person that believes it, there surely can be no difficulty in allowing, that a belief in a true, and proper, but still commemorative sacrifice, as explained above, carries with it no venom, and is not prejudicial to salvation.* And as a clear consequence of another principle admitted by our adversaries, it must be said, that the man that refuses to believe in such a sacrifice, is *neither a good christian, nor deserving of toleration as a citizen, nor does he even possess common sense.* And yet as I have already observed on similar questions, nothing more than the above is required to be believed, to be a perfectly orthodox Catholic.

In explanation of the nature of *propitiation*, or of a *propitiatory sacrifice*, I will subjoin another extract, in addition to the passage already cited, from the Council of Trent.\* “Because in this divine sacrifice which is offered up in the mass, the same Christ is present and offered, in an unbloody manner, who, on the altar of the cross, offered himself in a bloody manner—the holy synod teaches, that this sacrifice is truly propitiatory; and that by it, if we approach to God with fear and reverence, truly contrite, and penitent, and with an upright heart, and true faith, *we shall obtain mercy, and find grace in seasonable aid.*† For the Almighty, appeased by the oblation of this sacrifice, and bestowing on

\* Concil. Trid. Sess. 22. cap. 2.

† Hebr. iv. 16

us his grace, and the gift of repentance, remits our crimes, and sins, though grievous. For it is one and the same victim,—the same Christ now offering himself by the ministry of the priest, who offered himself on the cross; the only difference being in the manner of offering. By this offering, the fruits of that bloody offering are most plentifully received; so far is it from truth, that we hereby derogate in the least degree, from it. Wherefore, according to apostolic tradition, the mass is duly offered, not only for the benefit of the living, for their sins, and the punishment due to them, their satisfactions, and other necessities; but also for those, who, though dead in Christ, are not fully cleansed from all defilement.” The above being propounded by a General Council is of Faith; but nothing more than this is of faith; so that it is easy to do away at once with the idle invective and declamation of our adversaries, against our doctrine of *propitiation*.

1. It is far from being true, that the sacrifice of the mass is *propitiatory*, in the same manner, as the sacrifice of the cross. That of the cross merited our redemption—the pardon of sin, and all those graces which are bestowed upon us; and in it was consummated all the merit of Christ, and this is the sense, in which this sacrifice is called *propitiatory*; whilst that of the mass was instituted by Christ, as an instrument, or means of applying the merit of his passion to our souls,—in the same manner as this merit is applied by the sacraments, by faith, and by good works in general; and it is, in this sense, that the sacrifice of the mass is called *propitiatory*, just as faith, and other virtues are *propitiatory*. Now what difficulty can there be in believing our doctrine on *propitiation*, as here explained? And how can it be pretended, that this doctrine is derogatory to the *propitiatory* sacrifice, that was offered for us on the cross?

2. The fruits of the sacrifice of the mass are produced by *impetration*, and consequently, as Vasquez\* justly observes, “The mass is only *secondarily*, and *mediately* *propitiatory*, and that by way of *impetration*.” He also proves, in the same place, that this sacrifice does not, like the sacra-

\* Vasquez, Disp. 128. cap. 2.

ment of Penance, immediately, and directly remit even venial, much less mortal sin; nor increase grace in our souls, nor augment our justification. These are not its direct, but only mediate effects; it produces them by supplicating the Almighty to grant such assistance by his grace, that we may be cleansed from sin, whether mortal, or venial, and advance in justice:—and by begging of God, that he would vouchsafe to give us that spirit of penance, and contrition, which may wipe away all our sins:” or by procuring for us such other holy inclinations, as may cause us to advance in the ways of justice. In this manner, namely by impetration, — faith, prayer, and other virtuous works are also impetratory—but these virtues have this effect, in consequence of the piety and rectitude of the individual that performs them, whilst the sacrifice of the Mass is propitiatory in virtue of the thing offered, or of the justice of Christ. As prayer obtains for us many temporal blessings, as health, life, abundant crops, &c.; so, and on a similar principle, are these effects to be expected, from the sacrifice of the Mass. And what objection can any one find to a propitiation of this character; or to our hoping to obtain these blessings, by way of impetration, by the sacrifice of the Mass?

3. Experience shews, says Vasquez, \* that, on certain occasions, though without there being any fixed law, or covenant to that effect, the Sacrifice of the Mass procures for us both temporal blessings, and the help of divine grace to advance in justice:” and, he adds, in the same place, that “it does not always follow as an effect of this sacrifice, that sin is remitted, even in the manner explained above; or that we obtain, by virtue of this sacrifice, the other spiritual helps, or temporal blessings there mentioned.”

4. It cannot be reasonably denied, says Vasquez, † that the remission of the temporal punishment due to the sins of the living, is always, and infallibly obtained, as the direct, and immediate effect of the oblation of this sacrifice; and that it is, in this sense, propitiatory for the living: because, he argues, as this sacrifice has been shewn, from the Council of Trent, to be a particular means by which the general ben-

\* Vasquez, Disp. 126. cap. 4.

† Vasquez, l. c.



efit of the merit of Christ's death, is applied to us, it is clearly necessary, that some specific fruit be ascribed to its efficacy, as its certain, and infallible effects, dependent, however, as in the case of the sacraments, on the disposition of the receiver. Now there is much less difficulty in fixing on the remission of punishment, rather than on anything else, as this effect; because all its other effects are uncertain, and do not infallibly follow from the oblation of this sacrifice, as I have already shewn from another passage of [this writer's works. "It appears then to follow," he continues, "that, in virtue of a fixed and unerring rule, the remission of the punishment, to which the living may be liable, is, in proportion to each one's disposition, the infallible effect of this sacrifice; and that, on this principle also, it may be called a propitiatory sacrifice for the living, and the dead." But observe that he adds, that *this point has not been defined by the Church*, It is not, therefore, of Faith, that, by the sacrifice of the Mass, this temporal punishment is always infallibly remitted,—remitted, that is to say, in virtue of a fixed and unerring law.

5. Vasquez \* starts the following question:—"Are all the effects of this sacrifice, whether in favor of the living, or the dead, to be considered as flowing from the very nature, and constitution of the action itself, that is to say, do they proceed, in the language of the schools *ex opere operato*? However various the language and expressions of the schoolmen may be in appearance, they are, in reality, all of the same way of thinking, on this point." He then explains the opinions of those writers, and observes, that it is one thing for a blessing to be granted us in consequence of this sacrifice, *ex opere operato*, or in virtue of the very nature, and constitution of the work itself, and another to obtain this blessing in virtue of a fixed, and unerring law." It is not, therefore, of Faith, that the above effects are produced by the sacrifice of the Mass *ex opere operato*; in fact, the Council of Trent is silent on this point; and our writers do not agree in their explanations of this scholastic term

6. The following observations, on the nature of the propitiation of this sacrifice, in favor of the dead, are deserving

\* Vasquez, Disp. 229.

of notice. 1. Vasquez observes,\* that “this sacrifice can evidently only be beneficial to the dead, by remitting the temporal punishment which may be due to their sins. 2. It has been already observed, that some divines are of opinion, *that the sacrifice of the Mass, particularly when offered for the dead, is not of such efficacy as to be infallibly accepted by the Almighty; that it is not, in fact, an action by which the souls of the departed faithful can be delivered from their sufferings, by a fixed and unerring law, in virtue of the very nature, and constitution of the Mass, or, ex opere operato.* Soto, Canus, and Corduba, says Vasquez,† assert that the sacrifice of the Mass, though it produces a remission of temporal punishment, in favor of the living, and that, too, by a fixed and unerring law; that still it does not produce this effect when offered for the dead; and that it can only be available for this object, *by way of suffrage*, meaning by this expression, that the sacrifice of the Mass is only beneficial to the dead, in as far as God is pleased to accept it; and that he has entered into no covenant, to remit the pains of these suffering souls, according to a fixed, and unerring standard. These writers, consequently, conceive, that the effect of the sacrifice of the Mass is less certain, when the Mass is offered for the dead, than when for the living.”

7. It is very far, indeed, from being an article of our Faith, that the sacrifice of the Mass is of infinite value. Vasquez treats this subject at length. The following is the title to one of his chapters: ‡ “A considerable body of Theologians are of opinion, that the value, and efficacy of the sacrifice of the Mass are only finite.

8. After thus distinguishing what is of Catholic Faith, from what is not, what difficulty can there be in believing, with the Catholic Church, that the Sacrifice of the Mass is propitiatory for the living and the dead! What a variety of opinions are falsely ascribed to us by Protestant ministers, as articles of our Faith, with a view, no doubt, of fostering a schism and a disunion, on which they depend for their subsistence!

\* Vasquez, Disp. 218. cap. 4. † Vasquez, l. c.

‡ Vasquez, Disp. 130. cap. 1.



9. And granting, even, that there may be some difficulty in admitting this doctrine, even as I have here explained it, still, surely, the man that can admit that a belief in the real presence of Christ in the Eucharistic symbols, *carries with it no venom, and is not prejudicial to the salvation of the individual that believes it*, must also allow the same of this doctrine as here explained. And, it consequently follows, from another principle of our adversaries, that whoever refuses to subscribe to this doctrine, cannot be looked upon as *a good christian, nor deserving of toleration as a citizen, nor even as a man of common sense.*

### § 15.

#### *On the Pope—his Primacy, and Authority.*

In our Profession of Faith we merely declare, that we “acknowledge the Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Roman Church, for the mother, and mistress of all churches: and we promise, and swear true obedience to the Roman Pontiff—who is the successor to St. Peter, Prince of the Apostles, and the Vicar of Jesus Christ.” These words are copied from the Council of Trent,—\* and contain all that has been defined by that council, which “conjures all pastors, sedulously to recommend to all the faithful, everything that has been established by the Holy Roman Church—the mother, and mistress of all churches; and to use all their care; to cause the faithful to be particular in observing all her regulations,” and in almost every session of the council we meet with the following observation:—“in the synod of Trent, the three legates of the Apostolic See presiding.”

The above is more fully defined by the Council of Florence. The decree is as follows, “We define that the Holy Apostolic See, and the Roman Pontiff hold the primacy over all the world; and that this Roman Pontiff the successor of the blessed Peter, the Prince of the Apostles,—is the true Vicar of Christ, the head of the whole church, and the father, and teacher of all christians; and that to him, in the person of Peter, was committed, by our Lord Jesus Christ, the full power of feeding, directing, and governing the Universal Church, according to the manner specified in the acts of General Councils, and in the holy canons.”

\* Concil. Trid. Sess. 25.



As this is proposed to our belief by a General Council, it is of Faith: but nothing more than this, or anywise differing from this is of Faith, because it has not been defined by a General Council, and in particular, by that of Florence, at which so many Fathers both of the Greek and Latin churches were present; and in which the power of the Pope was discussed, with the utmost attention, particularly by the Prelates of the Greek church. It therefore, follows, 1. That it is not of Faith, that when the Roman Pontiff teaches any thing, either assisted by his own private council, or by a Provincial Synod, even though he address the Universal Church, or as it is termed, speak *ex cathedra*,—in a word, as long as he does not propose a doctrine in a General Council, so long he is not *the supreme judge of controversies*, nor is it of Faith that he is infallible: nor would a decree passed under these circumstances, be of Faith, unless the opinion of the church were, from other sources, clearly ascertained to have been pronounced in its favor. The reason of this is, 1. That this has not been proposed to our belief, by either the Council of Trent, or of Florence, or by any other General Council; indeed in the creed, and in the Council of Trent, it is said of the Church alone, *that to it belongs the right of judging of the true sense, and interpretation of the holy scriptures*. 2. Because not one of our writers, not even Bellarmine, has ever yet pretended that it is an article of our Faith. 3. Because, on this point, some of our Catholic Theologians maintain one thing, and some another, as I have shewn, in an early part of this treatise, from Bellarmine.\* "Some Theologians," says he, "think, that the Pope, even speaking as the successor of St. Peter, or as Pope, may teach heresy, when he takes upon himself to define anything, without the concurrence of a General Council; and even be an actual and formal Heretic. Gerson, Almain, and several other French Theologians have maintained this opinion, which was also defended by Alphonsus de Castro, and Pope Adrian VI. All these writers placed the infallibility of the church, in matters of Faith, not in the Pope, but in the Universal Church, or rather, in a General Council." "*As the support-*

\* Bell. Tom. I. De Rom. Pontif. Lib. 4. cap. 2.

ers of this opinion," he continues, "*are still tolerated by the church, [they cannot, strictly speaking, be called heretics.]*" Bellarmin was likely to be a severe judge of such an opinion, and he, accordingly, passes the following censure on it;—*though not strictly speaking Heretical, it still seems to be absolutely erroneous, and but little removed from Heresy.* This however, he asserts, without any sufficient reason. It is, on the contrary, to be considered as a probable opinion, both on account of the weight of authority in its favor,—since we have seen, that besides many other learned divines, even Adrian VI., before he ascended the Papal throne, maintained it; as also, because nothing has been defined, on this subject, by the Council of Trent. In fine, if Bellarmin's arguments proved anything, they would prove the Pope to be infallible, even when he defines anything alone, and unassisted, or merely declares his own opinion to others, even to individuals only, and not in answer to the Universal Church; and it would follow, that in all these cases, his doctrinal decisions are of Faith: yet Bellarmin himself grants that this cannot be asserted of the Pope, and admits that he may err on such occasions, and that this has even actually happened, as I have already observed. The testimony and evidence, adduced by Bellarmin, is general, and without limitation, even taking it on his own shewing, and statement; and consequently, if it proves anything, it is against himself.

But, perhaps, some one will ask me what, in my statement, is really the most probable opinion? To such a one I should say, that this question is foreign to my present purpose, and that, consequently, a direct reply cannot be expected from me. I speak here as a Dogmatical Theologian, and not as a scholastic. As the church proposes nothing to be believed on this subject, neither ought I,—nor need those who differ from us in religion, know anything about this question, to become members of the Catholic Church. Whether they purposely withdraw their attention from this point, or are really ignorant of it, it is no hinderance to their becoming orthodox Catholics. But not to leave anything doubtful on this subject, I will observe that every one is perfectly at liberty, without any prejudice to his Faith, to embrace which ever opinion best pleases him, since both are



probable. However, be this as it may, whatever emanates from a See of so pre-eminent a character, is most undoubtedly, to be received with the greatest respect. But I have already treated of this subject, at considerable length.

2. It is not of Faith, that *the Pope is superior to a General Council*, or the Universal Church considered as separated from its visible head; neither is it of Faith, on the other hand, that *either a General Council or the Universal Church*, considered as separated from its visible head, *is superior to the Pope*. This position is perfectly true, in whatever terms it may be proposed, provided it be but fairly and properly stated. It is proved, because it has not been defined to be an article of Catholic Faith, either by the Council of Trent or of Florence, or by any other General Council. 2. Bellarmin himself, as I have already shewn, grants this: "Those," says he, who deny that the Pope is above a General Council, and the Universal Church, so as to acknowledge no power on earth as superior to his own, are not, strictly speaking, heretics;—and he also admits, that it is at least doubtful whether the Council of Lateran defined the point denied by these divines, expressly and undefinably as an Article of Catholic Faith. This position may also be more fully proved, and better understood, by observing that our divines, as Bellarmin notices,\* are not agreed in opinion on this question; which alone, is a sufficient proof, that nothing has hitherto been proposed by the church on this subject, to be believed as an article of Catholic Faith. Those who have strayed from the true church, are only required to subscribe what has been actually defined. Bellarmin gives the following statement of the opinions of the divines on this question. "There are," says he,† "three opinions on this point, all defended by Catholic writers. The first is, that a General Council is superior to the Pope; an opinion which was maintained by the Cardinal of Cambray, Gerson, Almain, de Cusa, Abulensis, Panormitanus, and his teacher, the Cardinal of Florence.—It is, however, necessary to observe, in order perfectly to understand the opinion of these writers, that their assertion rests on these two grounds: that the Pope is not, strictly

\* Bellarm. Tom. 1. De Concil. Lib. 2cap. 14.

† Bellarm. l. c.



speaking, the head of the assembled church,—a position which is explained in two different meanings, by heretical and orthodox writers. The former mean by this to assert, that the Pope is, in no sense, the head of the Universal Church, and that he is merely the bishop of his own particular diocese, or, at most the Patriarch of the West. Whilst another body of writers who are not heretics, do not pretend to deny by this assertion, that the Pope is the head and pastor of all and every one of the faithful, and of every individual church, considered as a separate establishment; but they do deny that he is the head of the universal church, assembled in a General Council. For then, say they, the church assumes, as it were, the form of a single body, and all the power that was before scattered amongst a variety of distinct members, is united in that one body. So that, in this system, to compare the Pope to the rest of the faithful, considered as private individuals; is the same as comparing the most valuable and noble of the members of the body, to one of minor importance; whilst to compare the Pope with a General Council is to compare a part with its whole—the less, consequently, with the greater. And if it be said that a General Council, without the Pope, is not a perfect whole, but is a headless trunk, they will answer, that the supreme power of the church is radically as well in the council, as in the Pope; and that it exists in the former in a prominent degree, and in a more direct and permanent manner. Christ, they assert, gave to the church the direct and full power of binding and losing, and as the church will remain all days to the end of the world, this power ever continues to be a permanent and perpetual prerogative of the church. But, as the church cannot always, and at all times, be assembled in a General Council, and cannot, consequently, always exercise this power by its own direct agency, a chief bishop, or a Pope, was appointed by Jesus Christ, that, as a general and usual rule, the measures deemed necessary for the church be settled by his instrumentality and means; and that the Pope was, on this account, entrusted with supreme power, which, however, he is always to exercise in the name of the church. These writers, however, differ, in the details of this opinion. Some admit that this power is vested *formally and subject-*

*ively*, in the Pope, and in the church *objectively*, inasmuch as the object, or end for which this power was established, is the good of the church,—also *directively*, since it belongs to the church to direct and guide the Pope, *the church, and not the Pope, being infallible* ; *supplementarily*, since in case of the natural or civil death of the Pope, it is the church that then supplies his place, and performs the usual duties of the papal office. Others, however, are of opinion that this power is *formally and subjectively* vested in the church, and only *instrumentally*, and subordinately in the Pope. They are unanimous in asserting that this power is vested *immediately and directly* in the church ; and that, consequently, in case the Pope die, or is deposed, or refuses to be present at a council, such council does not thereby become an imperfect body, but is still perfect in all its parts, and enjoys a supreme authority, even that also which was before in the Pope : can pronounce doctrines to be Articles of Faith, enact laws, and grant Indulgences, &c. And they conclude, that consequently, the power of a council is superior to that of a Pope ; that the council can sit in judgment upon him, and punish him ; and that to ask whether the Pope is superior to a council, is to ask whether a part is greater than the whole. Finally, they consider that the position of the Pope in the church, is the same as that of the Doge in the Venetian republic ; or of a general of an order in relation to the religion of his body. The Doge, it is admitted, is superior to any individual magistrate, senator, or citizen of Venice ; but is not superior to the whole senate assembled ; and in case of the demise of the Doge, the whole power of the state, even that which was vested in the Doge, is centered in the senate.—Or, as the general of an order is superior to any individual whether a simple religious prior, or provincial of the body, but not to a general congregation, which he is bound to obey, and has no power to govern. The second opinion is defended by a body of Jurists. These writers teach that the Pope is indeed superior to a General Council, and that there is no power which can sit in judgment upon him, unless he be himself willing to submit to its jurisdiction, and they maintain that he can do this, and grant this tribunal a power over him, and that when he has once done this, he is obliged to acqui-

esce in the decision of the council, though the council even proceed to depose him. But the third, and last opinion, may almost be called the common opinion of our divines. This teaches that the Pope is superior to a General Council, and so far superior, that he cannot, even if he wish, subject himself to its sentence, at least, to a sentence which implies a force and power in the council to bind him. This opinion is maintained by Turrecremata, Cajetan, Turrianus, Ferrari, Nicholas Sanders, &c." Thus far Bellarmin. Consequently, from the very existence of this variety of opinion, it clearly follows, that nothing has, as yet been proposed to our belief on this point, as an article of Catholic Faith. In fact, we have seen, in the above extract, that, in defending their own opinion, none of these writers pretend to accuse the supporters of a contrary sentiment of heresy. "This question," says Bellarmin,\* "was first started when the councils of Pisa, Constance, and Basil, were convened. The fathers of these councils began to ask whether they were under any obligation of yielding to the Pope, or whether the [Pope ought not rather to yield to them,—that is, to a General Council. At this period, many embraced the opinion, that a council is superior to the Pope; and this question has continued to be agitated to this day. 2. That the three opinions mentioned above, are all—even the first—probable; and that, consequently, each one is even now, at perfect liberty to embrace either of the three, even the *first*, without exposing himself to any kind of censure, may be proved, 1. from the authority of the writers that support this first opinion, who are men of great weight, and learning, such as Gerson, Almain, &c. 2. When the evidence in favor of this third opinion, even as brought forward by Bellarmin, is considered, and weighed, it certainly seems, even on its own intrinsic merits, to have its probability, "Indeed," as Vasquez justly observes,† "when we reflect that the writers, that maintain a contrary opinion, have read, and weighed the evidence and arguments adduced in proof of this third opinion without being convinced by

\* Bellarm. De Concil. Lib. 2. cap. 13.

† Vasquez, l. 2. disp. 62. cap. 4.



them, and have given even a kind of answer to them; we must necessarily allow that *the first* is still a probable opinion." 3. The illustration drawn from the example of a General of an order is plain, and very much to the point; and it is of no real importance to the question, from whatever source, we believe that the Pope derives his power as its efficient cause: whatever this efficient cause may be, it cannot change the essential, and formal relation that subsists between the head, and the rest of the body. 4. Nor has Bellarmin advanced one single argument that cannot be easily answered. There is not a single passage from the General Councils,—not even that quoted from the last Council of Lateran,—not one single text of the Fathers, that can be said to be opposed in direct, and express terms to the first opinion. A person need only read these authorities, even as quoted by Bellarmin; to convince himself at once of this. All, and every one of these passages prove what we all admit is an article of Faith, and has been expressly defined by the Council of Florence, *that the Pope is the head of the church*. This they prove, and nothing more. They do not even go so far as to condemn, any one of the principles on which the first opinion is grounded; unless we choose to admit the consequences which Bellarmin draws from them,—consequences which as they are not deduced by the General Councils, or by the Fathers themselves, each one is at liberty to deny. The real fact is, that none of the councils, or Fathers have ever discussed these refined, and subtle questions. 5. The very silence of the Councils of Florence, and Trent, on this subject, though the Bishops and Theologians present at these councils were fully aware of the difficulties that surrounded it, seems of itself a positive proof that this first opinion must still be considered as probable. If not, why after the many disputes that had arisen on this very point, in the Councils of Constance, and Basil, did the Fathers of Trent and Florence, still preserve so profound a silence? There is evidently no sufficient ground for Bellarmin's declaration, that *it is impossible to excuse those who defend the first opinion, from being guilty of great rashness*; and that the contrary opinion is so certain, as almost to be an article of our Faith. This, his censure, deserves rather itself to be

censured, and condemned,—venturing as he does to condemn so severely, writers of such acknowledged authority, as he himself tells us have supported this opinion,—as the Cardinal of Cambray, Almain, &c. ; besides all the Fathers of the Councils of Constance, and Basil, even considering them in no other character than that of so many private Divines. Especially when, as we have seen, no decree has been promulgated by a General Council, since the tenets of these two councils, in opposition to their declaration. The Council of Constance declares that a synod, constituting a General Council, and representing the Universal Church militant, possesses an authority which it draws immediately from Christ, to which every one of whatever state, or dignity, though even he be the Pope, is bound to submit, in those things which appertain to Faith, the extirpation of schism, and the general reformation of the church of God, in its head, and members.” The Council of Basil made a similar declaration. Is not the authority of the assembled prelates of Constance, and Basil, sufficient to render this opinion probable? Vasquez, and indeed almost the whole body of Theologians tell us, that an opinion is called probable, and is really such, if it be but defended, and considered probable by writers of discretion, and learning.

If any should wish to know which of these opinions seems to me the most probable, I would refer him to my answer to a similar question,—namely, the Infallibility of the Pope. I shall make no further observations, on either of these subjects.

2. Much less is it an article of our Faith, that *the Pope has any indirect power over temporal matters* ; that is to say, that it is not of Faith, that *the Pope, as the successor of St. Peter, or as Pope, though he have no power purely temporal, still he has a supreme power to dispose of the temporalities of all the members of the Christian Religion, for the purpose of causing some spiritual good ; and that he can, consequently, as the supreme spiritual prince, make what alterations he pleases in States, depose monarchs, and place others on their thrones ; abrogate laws passed by the highest powers in the State, and erect others, if he deem any of these measures necessary for the salvation of souls.* This is proved, 1, because nothing of

the above has been proposed to the belief of the Church, by our creed, by the Council of Trent, or by any other General Council. 2. Not one of our writers, not even Bellarmin, asserts, that this is of Faith. 3. It is evident, that neither the Fathers, nor Councils of the first ages of the Church, were aware of any such power being attached to the Papal supremacy. Liberius never seems to have thought of deposing Constantius; nor Demarus, the Emperor Valens; nor Liberius, even the Apostate Julian. 4. Let the reader remember, that not all the practices of the Church, even of the Universal Church, are a sufficient ground for an article of Catholic Faith; and he would also do well to reperuse my observations on this principle, and to apply them to the case before us. It is clear, that the practice of certain Popes, in comparatively modern times, is not sufficient to establish an article of Catholic Faith. To justify the adoption of a particular practice, it is enough, that the opinion, on which it is founded, be supported by a considerable number of divines, and by them considered probable, and appear such to the individual, who regulates his practice by it. But it is also evident, that opinions may be advanced of quite a contrary character, and still be equally probable. But, after all, it is better to say nothing at all on this subject; especially as, in case the Pope were to attempt to exercise this power, there would be little need of discussing the abstract, and speculative question of the power of the Pope; since the case would be more easily met, by examining another element, which necessarily enters into the argument, before we can conclude that the Pope is to be submitted to; namely, the monarch that it is attempted to depose, might, without at all entering into the general question of the Papal power, simply contend that in his case, there is no cause sufficient to justify the sentence of deposition. It is, in fact, admitted by the writers of all parties, that the Pope is never to attempt to fulminate this sentence, unless the case be most urgent, and the cause most clearly, and undoubtedly just. So that, in point of fact, the least powerful party,—that which has not a superior force to back its pretended right, must necessarily yield, perhaps even without an attempt to support its claims. And, for my own part, I am of opinion, that it is highly blameable in any wri-



ter, to give a decisive opinion in favor of either side of the question, as, by so doing, he merely sows seeds of dissension, that may tend to destroy the amity, that subsists between the Pope, and the Princes of Christendom. It is also advisable for the same, or similar reasons, to pass the two preceding questions over in silence. He acts most prudently that follows in this, the example given him by the Council of Trent, which preserves the most perfect silence on these points: following the advice of St. Paul, "not to be more wise than it behoveth to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety." And if a protestant wish to know what is our opinion on these matters, we cannot do better than reply to him, in the manner suggested in the above observations.

### § 16.

#### *On the Judge of Controversies.*

In our Professsion of Faith, we have the following declaration: "I admit the Holy Scriptures, according to that sense which our Holy Mother, the Church, has held, and does hold; to which it belongs to judge of the true sense and interpretation of the Holy Scriptures; neither will I take nor interpret them otherwise, than according to the unanimous consent of the Fathers." The following is the decree of the Council of Trent\* on this subject: "The Synod defines, that, on questions of faith, and morals appertaining *to the edification of Christian doctrine*,† no one relying on his own discretion, pervert the sacred scriptures to his own meaning, in opposition to that sense which Holy Mother Church,—to which it belongs to judge of the true sense and interpretation of the Holy Scriptures,—has held, or does hold; venture to give an interpretation of the sacred text, contrary to the unanimous consent of the Fathers."

This is all that has been defined by the council, and this consequently,—that is, the doctrinal instructions, which this passage contains, are to be received as articles of our faith. Whilst, on the other hand, it follows, that no other doctrine besides this is of faith; nor are we to pretend to be *more wise* than the council, consequently, 1st. as the council, though

\* Concil. Trid. Sess. 4.

† Ephes. iv. 29.

speaking of the authority of the church, and of the Universal Church too, on questions of faith and morals, abstains from using the word 'Infallibility,' every Catholic is at liberty to do the same. The term is, of itself, exceedingly useful, and significative, and may be used with advantage in the schools, or in popular instruction, or in sermons; but it is better omitted in all controversy with Protestants. The phrase has not been adopted by any council; nor is it found in the sacred writings; what obligation then, are we under to employ it, especially as it happens to be considered as objectionable by our adversaries. Why render the path to truth more difficult, and harden them against the doctrines which we have undertaken to prove to them. The term 'Transubstantiation,' is used by the Council of Trent, and Catholics should, in consequence, employ it, and not merely content themselves with believing the doctrine which it expresses. But as no such authority can be pleaded in favour of the term Infallibility, we had better abstain from it, and not attempt to appear more wise, in matters of Catholic doctrine, than the Council of Trent. And if a Protestant should ask, what he is to think of the term, we may tell him that he may abstain entirely from it, and that he need not know more on this question than the Council of Trent has defined.

2. However the doctrine which this phrase expresses is of Faith,—provided, that nothing more be meant by it, than what the Council of Trent has defined; namely, that *it belongs to the church to judge, of the true sense of scripture, and of all controversies, and that we are to submit to her decision, and to admit her interpretation, since the church can never err, in consequence of the assistance of the Holy Spirit that has been promised to her;\** which Holy Spirit cannot deceive her, *since it is impossible for God to lie.*† If the scholastic divine include, under this term, anything more than the above,—as is very often the case by an almost imperceptible transaction,—such addition, whether absolutely certain as a Theological opinion, or merely probable, is not of Faith, it may be suited to the subtilties of the schools, but not to the simplicity of the Christian Faith;

\* St. John, xiv. 16. 26; xvi. 13.

† Hebr. vi. 18.

and, consequently, as such should be confined to the schools, and not proposed to the belief of those whom we are anxious to bring back to the fold of the Catholic Church. And if Protestants ask what they would have to believe as Catholics on these points, the obvious answer is, that they ought to follow in this the example of the church, and say nothing about such questions, which they may be utterly unacquainted with, without any prejudice to the purity of their Faith. They must be advised *not to wish to be more wise, than it behoveth to be wise; but to be wise unto sobriety.*"\* They must be told that we are not justified in teaching any doctrine in the name of the church, unless the church have actually taught that doctrine; but that whenever he pleased to embrace the Catholic religion, we will introduce him, if he choose to follow us, into all the subtilties of the schoolmen. The subject before us is very nearly, if not quite of the same stamp as the following scholastic curry: *Can the predestinate be lost, or the reprobate saved?* For as no Church, is really the Church of Christ, which is not guided by the *infallible* assistance of the Holy Spirit, and as it consequently is *infallible* by the virtue of this assistance: so, in like manner, no one can be truly called one of the predestinate, except by virtue of a real *predestination*, and therefore, as God cannot but bring his determination to have its effects, supposing this predestination in his favor, or, in the language of the schools, *in sensu composito*, such a one cannot be damned; though he may be damned, to use again the phraseology of the schools, *in sensu diviso*. So it is with the church, she may err *in sensu diviso*, but this would be to suppose her not to be the true church; as, in the parrallel case, the person if lost must be considered, as not being truly of the number of the predestinate: but it is impossible that she can err in *sensu composito*. Now every one must feel that such subtilties as these, are quite out of the pale of christian truths;—and, that, consequently, the real doctrines of the church, when mixed up, and joined to these metaphisical subtilties, are no longer to be considered as our pure and unalloyed doctrines, and ought, consequently, to be confined to the schools. Let us

\* Rom. xii. 3.



then confine ourselves to the words of the Council of Trent, and propose nothing but what she has defined on this point, as an article of Faith. Nothing can be easier than to prove our belief on this subject, as long as it merely proposed in this manner; and the Protestant can have but little difficulty in embracing it. Why then, strew the path to truth with thorns and briars, for fear lest it should become too smooth and easy?

3. It is not of Faith, that neither the Almighty, nor the scriptures, are the judge of controversies, and that this is the *exclusive* privilege of the church. On the contrary we are free to declare that God is the first and supreme judge, and that scripture also is a judge of controversies, and a judge too, of greater authority than the church, since the scripture contains the word of God, whilst the church only speaks by the mouth of man. Such a declaration is calculated to bring back, those who have strayed, to the true fold. And that this position is true may be proved, 1st, Because neither our creed nor the Council of Trent asserts, that this character does not belong to the Almighty, or to the scriptures. In fact, our Saviour says, in the gospel of St. John,\* “the word that I have spoken, the same shall judge him in the last day.” Suarez† justly observes, that “the Rule of Faith is either *inanimate or animate*; the former is scripture or tradition, and the latter, the living voice of the church—a General Council, or the Pope. So that there are fair rules or standards by which to direct our Faith.” This he repeats again and again,‡ ascribing indiscriminately to the church, and to the word of God or scripture, the right of judging of all controversies. In this he differs in no respect from many other writers, who follow the example set them by St. Austin, and many of the other Fathers. 3. It is customary enough to say to persons engaged at law, that *the law* will decide their case. Why may we not use similar language of the Scriptures? 4. It is one of the refinements of the schools to say, that, as the *law* is the *rule*, by which the judgment of the judge is guid-

\* St. John, xii. 48.

† Suarez, disp. 5. sect. 2.

‡ l. c. sect. 3, 4, 5, 6.

ed, and that the law itself cannot be strictly speaking said to judge, as it is unable to hear the litigants, and as each of the contending parties drags it forward to support his own pretensions, so it is with scripture. This is ill-suited, to the simplicity of Faith ; and our doctrines mixed up with these subtilties can no longer be proposed as our genuine and unalloyed tenets, but are rather to be classed amongst scholastic questions.

4. It is not of Faith, that the Pope out of a General Council, is *the chief judge of controversies* ; or *that he is then infallible*, on questions of Faith, and morals. This is evident both from what I have already shewn, and because nothing on the above points has been proposed to our belief by our Profession of Faith, or by the Council of Trent. Such are the observations which I have thought it proper to make on the Rule of Catholic Faith ; having *with the aid of one principle, discriminated the doctrines of the Catholic Church, on all the controversies of the day, from the opinions of the schools, and from other popular statements, and errors.*

THE END.

# PRINCIPAL ERRATA. ---

Page.	Line.
10	14, <i>for</i> other, <i>read</i> the
19	36, .. anyways..anywise
20	34, .. reasons..reason
24	16, .. John and Turrecremata..John a Turrecremata
59	23, <i>before</i> sacrifice, <i>add</i> same of
63	5, <i>for</i> conversion, <i>read</i> conversion
70	20, .. find..bind
73	50, <i>dele</i> ; <i>before</i> that is
90	16, <i>for</i> understood, <i>read</i> understand



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